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Taking the English ‘riots’ of August 2011 as a lens, this thesis explores how criminal 
justice professionals make sense of the punitive system within which they work. Though 
the four nights of unrest precipitated by the Metropolitan Police force’s killing of Mark 
Duggan in Tottenham have attracted a vast amount of sociological and criminological 
analysis, relatively little critical academic attention has been paid to the criminal justice 
reaction that followed. 
The thesis draws on qualitative interviews with prosecutors, sentencers, defence lawyers 
and policymakers who were responsible for designing and delivering the swift and 
strikingly severe response, characterised by extraordinarily harsh practices at each stage 
of the process. It applies a critical discourse analysis approach to professionals’ accounts, 
identifying the imaginations and narratives that allow them to variously rationalise, 
normalise and problematise this vindictive response to the disturbances. 
The thesis contends that agnosis, disavowal, denial and obfuscation are vital to justifying 
‘justice’. The analysis shows how four interlocking and overlapping elements enable 
professionals to frame the punishment of rioters as proportionate, necessary and fair: 
forgetting England’s long history of unrest and ignoring or dismissing Duggan’s killing, 
distorting the demographics of ‘the rioters’, summoning a highly selective notion of 
public opinion, and obscuring the racialised and classed harms that prisons perpetuate.  
The thesis offers insight into the cultural politics of punishment in the contemporary 
conjuncture, highlighting the common sense ideas that sustain the criminal justice system 
from within. It suggests that a delimited, decontextualised and depoliticised notion of 
crime, racialised and classed discourses of criminality, an imagination of a monolithically 
punitive public, and strategic ignorance of the harms of punishment are integral to 
legitimising a violent and inherently racist and class-based system, both in the wake of the 
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Introduction: ‘Riots’ and revenge 
 
This is criminality, pure and simple, and it has to be confronted and defeated… you will 
feel the full force of the law, and if you are old enough to commit these crimes you are 
old enough to face the punishment. 
Prime Minister David Cameron, 9th August 2011  
The outcome of the criminal justice system in relation to the riots was… an oppressive 
law and order policy which impacted on particular communities in disproportionate 
ways. So we basically re-enacted Mark Duggan in a different format. 
Sadie, Defence Barrister, London, 2018 
We got it right… Everyone I’ve talked to was pleased that they did what they did. 
Leonard, District Judge, London, 2018 
The criminal justice response to the ‘riots’1 of August 2011 – four nights of civil unrest 
across the country, sparked by the Metropolitan police force’s brutal killing of 29-year-
old Mark Duggan in Tottenham, North London – was startling in its severity. With the 
disturbances quickly and decisively depoliticised in much media and political discourse, 
dismissed as simply ‘looting, violence, vandalising and thieving’ (Cameron, 2011a), the 
 
1 ‘Riot’ is a problematic term that I use apprehensively. Since the eighteenth century, defining a 
set of events as riots has had important ideological implications for how they are understood, 
interpreted and reacted to. With ‘riots’ conveying connections to violence and illegitimacy 
(Clover, 2016; Keith, 1993), critical commentators have framed the events of August 2011 in 
alternative terms which foreground their political context and meaning: as civil unrest (Mckenzie, 
2013), uprising (Trott, 2014), insurrection (Darcus Howe, 2011, cited in Gough and Glenton, 
2011), counter-conduct (Sokhi-Bulley, 2016) or protest against a racist and oppressive police force 
and wider political system (Akram, 2014). However, ‘the riots’ has become the most widely used 
and recognised term for the events, and in this thesis I engage critically with it, asking how the 
meanings it carries have been variously reproduced and contested (see especially Chapter 4).  
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criminal justice system responded accordingly with an extraordinary backlash, 
characterised by exceptionally harsh practices at each stage of the criminal process, from 
arrest, prosecution and remand to sentencing; overwhelmingly targeting working-class 
and racialised young people.  
Though the disturbances themselves have been the subject of a huge amount of academic 
analysis and commentary, attracting explanations and interpretations from every 
conceivable discipline and theoretical standpoint (as I discuss in Chapter 2), this punitive 
backlash has received relatively little critical attention. This response, I contend, is vitally 
important and warrants further sociological inquiry. The punishment of the ‘rioters’, I 
argue, reveals more about the contemporary cultural, political and ideological moment 
than about the disturbances themselves.  
The thesis addresses three research questions:  
1. How did the criminal justice system respond to the ‘riots’ of August 2011? 
2. What are the moral claims, shared understandings, narratives and imaginations 
that legitimised, normalised and naturalised this response?  
3. What does this reveal about the cultural and ideological processes by which the 
criminal justice system sustains itself?  
In answering these questions, I investigate how a set of shared imaginations and narratives 
of the ‘riots’, the ‘rioters’, the criminal justice system and society worked to underpin and 
legitimise the vindictive criminal justice response to the unrest and the starkly racialised 
and class-based state violence that it exemplifies. In doing so I explore how the 
disturbances came to act as a powerful ‘ideological conductor’ (Hall et al., 2013 [1978]: 2) 
around which potent ideas about crime, justice, citizenship and society coalesced and 
convened.  
My analysis in the following chapters draws on empirical research with professionals and 
practitioners who were responsible for designing, delivering and dealing with the punitive 
reaction against the ‘rioters’. These accounts, gleaned through 14 qualitative interviews 
conducted in 2018 with prosecutors, defence lawyers, sentencers, civil servants and local 
authority workers, offer a lens through which we can glimpse some of the cultural and 
ideological constructions, shared assumptions and moral claims that underpinned the 
state’s reactionary backlash in 2011, and provide rich insight into the complex and often 
contradictory meanings that have circulated and settled around the disturbances in the 
years since then.  
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Over the course of the thesis I make three key arguments. First, I contend that the analysis 
makes a significant contribution to critical academic literature on the ‘riots’, and more 
specifically on the cultural and ideological imaginaries that legitimised the state’s 
extraordinarily severe criminal justice reaction to the disturbances. Attending to 
practitioners’ ‘riot talk’ reveals the shared imaginations of the unrest, the people involved 
in it, the public and prisons that served to justify the punitive criminal justice response to 
the disturbances, and shaped enduring memories of this response as rational and 
proportionate. 
Second, the thesis provides an original perspective on the sociological significance of 
ignorance, broadly conceived, in the contemporary politics of crime and punishment. My 
analysis of practitioners’ accounts, alongside political and media discourses, shows how 
the legitimacy and coherence of the criminal justice response to the disturbances 
depended on a highly selective memory of the events, a specific imagination of who was 
involved, a carefully configured construction of the public, and a blinkered view of the 
effects of punishment. Agnosis, I argue, is vital to the process of justifying ‘justice’. 
Third, I argue that studying the ways that criminal justice professionals made sense of 
their organisations’ response to this very specific moment offers a lens onto the 
ideological configurations that legitimise the criminal justice system more broadly. My 
analysis offers insight into what – drawing on Jensen and Tyler (2015; see also Jessop, 
2010) – I call the cultural political economy of punishment, whereby circumscribed 
imaginations of crime, criminality, citizenship, race and class work together to underpin 
and procure consent for the criminal justice system’s discriminatory practices. 
In developing these arguments, the thesis provides an original perspective on how the 
criminal justice system sustains itself from within. Taking the disturbances as a moment 
where underlying logic and language of criminal justice became shockingly visible, the 
thesis identifies a series of discursive resources that normalise a racist and class-based 
system. The stories that policy makers, prosecutors and sentencers tell offer a glimpse of 
the discursive mechanisms of self-justification and legitimation that allow those working 
within it – as well as those outside – to justify an inherently unjust system.  
In this introductory chapter I set out some important background and context for this 
thesis, briefly outlining the disturbances of August 2011 and some of the social and 
political reactions to the unrest. I then outline the structure of the thesis and set out the 
key arguments of each chapter. 
Introduction 
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Part 1. The ‘riots’ and responses 
Beginning on Saturday 6th and ending on Wednesday 10th August, the 2011 ‘riots’ were 
marked by widespread clashes with police, damage to property and looting in cities and 
towns across England. The scale and spread of the disturbances meant that these few 
days were widely perceived as ‘the worst bout of civil unrest in a generation’ (Lewis et al., 
2011: 1). The disturbances emerged at a moment of significant and widespread social and 
political turmoil, erupting fifteen months into the contentious Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat coalition government, formed after a tightly fought election resulting in no 
clear majority for any party. Coming to power in May 2010, two years after the global 
financial crash and in the depths of the subsequent ‘credit crunch’ recession, the Tory-
dominated administration had successfully secured a narrative that diagnosed the 
country’s financial crisis as a consequence of reckless and irresponsible public spending 
by the previous Labour government, and put in place a brutal austerity agenda, imposing 
a program of vicious cuts to welfare spending and public services (Lewis et al., 2010). 
London’s Olympic games, which would come to be framed as a redemptive moment for 
the city and the nation, were still a year in the future. On a global scale, the Arab Spring 
was in full flow. The day before Duggan’s death, Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak had been put 
on trial, and within three weeks, Gaddafi would be overthrown as Libyan rebels took 
Tripoli (The Telegraph, 2011a). The Occupy movement, condensing around London’s 
Stock Exchange and New York’s Wall Street, was yet to take hold, but would dominate 
the news in the autumn of 2011.  
The immediate spark for the disturbances was the killing of Mark Duggan, a 29-year-old 
of mixed Irish and black Caribbean descent and a father of four, by a Metropolitan Police 
officer who became known as V53 at the subsequent inquest (see page 94 for more detail). 
The police suspected Duggan, who was from the Broadwater Farm estate in Tottenham, 
North London, of being in possession of a firearm, having been informed that he was 
planning to collect the weapon from an associate and take it back to the estate. The police 
claimed Duggan had connections to the Tottenham Man Dem group, which had led to 
him becoming the focus of an offshoot of Scotland Yard’s Operation Dibri. At 6.15 in 
the evening on Thursday 4th August, officers from Operation Trident (the unit established 
to deal with gun crime in the black community) performed a ‘hard stop’ on the minicab 
Duggan was travelling in on Ferry Lane, Tottenham. Officer V53 shot Duggan, who was 
unarmed, in the chest and the arm. Duggan died at the scene.  
Introduction 
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In the hours following Mark Duggan’s death, his sister, brother and fiancée had attended 
the scene of the shooting but left unsure whether it was Mark who had been killed. One 
relative drove to Whitechapel hospital believing that he had been taken there alive by air 
ambulance, only to find that it was actually a firearms officer (injured by another of V53’s 
bullets) who had been transported (Barkas, 2014). It was not until the next day, Friday, 
that the family found out definitively that Duggan had died, and it took the police until 
the morning of Saturday 6th August to officially inform them of the death (Dodd and 
Taylor, 2012). At around 5.30pm on the Saturday afternoon, Duggan’s family, along with 
a group of about 300 friends and community members, marched from the Broadwater 
estate to gather outside Tottenham police station, demanding information about the 
killing. A police chief inspector came out to speak to the group and conceded that a more 
senior officer should be present, but this more senior representative never appeared 
(Lewis, 2011). How the peaceful protest escalated into rioting is not entirely clear, but 
some reported a teenage girl being beaten with batons by police officers (Eddo-Lodge, 
2011).  
That night saw widespread attacks on police cars, confrontations with police and looting 
across Tottenham, the nearby retail park and Wood Green two miles to the west, lasting 
through the night. The next day, Sunday, saw further clashes with the police and episodes 
of looting in locations across London. The most serious episodes were in Enfield, four 
miles north of Tottenham, and in Brixton, ten miles to the south, where disturbances 
broke out following the yearly Brixton Splash festival and a large branch of electrical 
outlet Currys was looted. Minor outbreaks of disorder occurred elsewhere in the city, 
including in Oxford Circus, Hackney and Waltham Forest (Lewis et al., 2011). Monday 
night, the third night of the disturbances, saw ‘the most intense 24 hours of civil unrest 
in recent English history’ (Lewis et al., 2011: 17), with disturbances across 22 of London’s 
32 boroughs and episodes on a smaller scale in dozens of locations across the country, 
including in Birmingham, Nottingham, Liverpool, Bristol, Leeds and several smaller cities 
and towns. Clashes began in the late afternoon in Hackney, where there were sustained 
battles with police, before spreading across the capital. Some of the most seriously 
affected areas included Clapham Junction, Lewisham, Catford, Peckham, Woolwich, 
Wembley and Ealing, where Richard Bowes, 68, was critically injured after confronting 
‘looters.’ The worst of the disorder was in Croydon – the scene of widespread arson, and 
the place where Trevor Ellis, 26, was shot dead (his killers were thought to have been 
involved in looting but never identified) (BBC News, 2014). By Tuesday night, police had 
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regained control in London, after deploying unprecedented numbers of officers, and the 
city was relatively calm, while unrest continued in other parts of the country including 
Gloucester, Liverpool, Nottingham and Birmingham, and reached its peak in Manchester 
and Salford (Lewis et al., 2011). By midnight on Wednesday 10th August, the last riot-
related incident (a failed attempt to break into a corner shop in Ladywood, Birmingham) 
was over (Taylor et al., 2011).  
It was estimated that 13,000 to 15,000 people were ‘actively involved’ in the unrest, while 
the financial cost to the country, including policing, clean-up operations, damage to 
property, losses to business and lost tourism revenue, was thought to run to around half 
a billion pounds (Riots Communities and Victims Panel, 2012). Across the country, police 
recorded a total of 5,175 individual riot-related offences (Home Office, 2011).2 Three 
hundred police officers were injured, 2,584 commercial premises were damaged, at least 
231 crimes against domestic properties were recorded (HMIC, 2011) and five people were 
killed in events linked to the unrest (Riots Communities and Victims Panel, 2012).  
As I will show in Chapter 2, a great deal of academic effort has been expended in pursuit 
of neat explanations for the unrest, reading the riots as a symptom of various social, 
cultural and economic malaises. This thesis takes a different approach, focusing instead 
on the state’s extraordinary reaction to the disturbances, and exploring what this might 
tell us about the political, cultural and ideological conjuncture from which it emerged. 
Though commentators have raised considerable concerns about the strikingly harsh penal 
sanctions handed down for riot-related offences – marked by custodial sentences on 
average four times longer than those passed for comparable crimes outside of the ‘riot’ 
context (Ministry of Justice, 2012a) – this critique has often overlooked the ways that the 
justice system in fact reacted with increased severity at every stage of the criminal process 
(see Lightowlers and Quirk, 2015 for more  detail and discussion). The criminal justice 
response to the unrest was in many ways as shocking and striking as the disturbances 
themselves, and warrants sustained sociological attention.  
 
2 The vast majority of these offences (5,112) were reported by just ten police forces ⁠. The 
Metropolitan Police recorded 3,461 riot-related crimes (68 per cent of the total), followed by 
Greater Manchester Police (581 offences), West Midlands (495 offences) and Merseyside (195 
offences), the other forces (Avon and Somerset, Thames Valley, Hertfordshire, West Yorkshire, 
Leicestershire and Nottinghamshire) all recording fewer than a hundred riot-related offences 
(Home Office, 2011). 
Introduction 
 15 
After an initial loss of control in the first days of the unrest, the police reaction to the 
disturbances was swift and remarkably punitive. Having adopted a policy of not arresting 
suspects at the scene on the first night of the disturbances due to insufficient staffing 
levels, this approach changed dramatically as more officers were drafted in (Home Affairs 
Committee, 2011). A month after the disturbances, the ten police forces that saw the vast 
majority of  disturbances had arrested 3,960 people (Home Office, 2011). Around 2,455 
(62 per cent) of  these arrests were made by the Metropolitan Police, with West Midlands 
(16 per cent) and Greater Manchester Police (eight per cent) the next two largest (Home 
Office, 2011).3 The majority of arrests were for acquisitive crimes, with burglary especially 
prevalent (41 per cent of all arrests); while almost a quarter (23 per cent) of total arrests 
related to disorder offences (violent disorder, public order and breach of the peace); with 
smaller numbers of arrests for criminal damage (five per cent), and violence and weapons 
offences (seven per cent) (Home Office, 2011).  
Perhaps the most spectacular and memorable aspect of the courts’ response was the 
highly unusual introduction of all-night sittings at a number of magistrates’ courts to 
process the large numbers of people arrested, prompting serious concerns about due 
process, access to legal advice, and the quality of decision-making. Lawyers interviewed 
by The Guardian described ‘kangaroo courts, dispensing “conveyor-belt justice”’ with 
‘tired and frightened children being brought into court in the middle of the night, having 
been held in police cells for up to 48 hours’ (Bawdon and Bowcott, 2012). 
While ordinarily around a tenth of people arrested for the most serious offences will be 
remanded to custody, fewer than forty percent of those arrested for involvement in the 
disturbances were granted bail (Curtis, 2011).4 Many of those remanded for riot-related 
offences were children or young people, and many were ‘of previous good character’: 
 
3 Although police forces continued to make arrests in the months following this, there is no 
national data available on the total number of  people arrested for riot-related offences after 
September 2011. Some additional information is available on the situation in London: by early 
November 2011, three months after the disturbances, the number of arrests made by the 
Metropolitan Police had risen to 3,003 (Channel 4 News, 2011), and by Christmas the figure had 
reached 3,423 (BBC News, 2011a).  
4 Most defendants awaiting trial or sentence are presumptively entitled to release on bail unless 
there are substantial reasons to believe that they pose a risk to the public by committing further 
offences, interfering with witnesses or absconding (Bail Act, 1976).  
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21.9 per cent of all suspects and 36.3 per cent of juveniles had no previous convictions 
and were charged with only minor offences (Ministry of Justice, 2012a). Though it is not 
formally meant to punish, legal scholars suggest that remand is widely used, in practice, 
as a form of informal punishment (Wells and Quick, 2010) or ‘a first bite at punishing an 
offender’ (The Guardian, 2011). This approach to remand meant that many people who 
were ultimately acquitted or given community sentences spent a significant period of time 
in custody;5 in this way, the exceptional approach to remand had the greatest impact on 
those who committed the least serious offences (Lightowlers and Quirk, 2015).   
Many offences that would ordinarily be dealt with at magistrates’ court were instead sent 
up to the Crown Court, representing ‘a remarkable ratcheting up of the stakes’ 
(Lightowlers and Quirk, 2015: 73) given the far greater sentencing powers available to 
Crown Court judges. Nearly two thirds (65 per cent) of riot-related cases were sent to the 
Crown Court (Ministry of Justice, 2012a), paving the way for more punitive sentencing: 
Crown Court sentences are on average six times longer than those in magistrates’ courts 
for ‘either-way’ offences like burglary, theft and handling stole goods (Gilson, 2011). In 
the wake of the riots, Crown Courts were especially likely to impose custodial sentences, 
and the usual ‘almost perfect’ consistency in sentencing between different Crown Courts 
was replaced by substantial variability, posing a serious challenge to legal principles such 
as proportionality, legal certainty and transparency (Pina-Sánchez et al., 2017). This 
tendency to send cases to the higher courts was in part due to guidance from the CPS on 
particular offences such as burglary.6 Even where cases remained in the magistrates’ court, 
the stakes were again raised by assigning most cases to professional district judges rather 
 
5 If a defendant is subsequently given a custodial sentence, time served on remand is deducted 
but no such allowances can be made where community punishments or fines are handed down. 
6 Despite the existing guidance that states that burglary of non-dwellings should usually be tried 
by magistrates’ courts unless there are particular aggravating features, which did not apply in most 
of these cases (Lightowlers and Quirk, 2015: 73), the CPS’s riots guidance altered this, stating that  
‘offences of burglary involving the stealing of property from shops or stores, even of a seemingly 
opportunistic nature, are unlikely to be regarded as suitable for summary trial’ (Crown 
Prosecution Service, 2011). Similar guidance was also issued by the courts service: a senior justices’ 
clerk issued guidance to court clerks instructing them to advise magistrates to consider 
disregarding sentencing guidelines and committing cases to the Crown Court if they felt their 




than lay benches (district judges process cases more quickly, but are more likely than lay 
benches to remand defendants on bail, and to impose custodial sentences (Ipsos MORI, 
2011)).  
Though it has received little critical attention, the Crown Prosecution Service played a 
crucial role in responding to the disturbances, taking an exceptionally severe approach to 
prosecution (I discuss this in greater depth in Chapter 4). This remarkable ‘prosecutorial 
zeal’ (Lightowlers and Quirk, 2015) was reflected both in decisions regarding whether or 
not to prosecute, and the kind of offences with which suspects were charged. Effectively 
disregarding the usual standards and procedures signalled a significant shift in policy and 
paved the way for the courts’ remarkably harsh approach to remand and sentencing.  
By August 2012, 3,100 individuals had been charged for riot-related offences, over 2,000 
were tried, convicted, and sentenced (Ministry of Justice, 2012a). Of those convicted two 
thirds were sentenced to immediate custody; an increase of 24 per cent compared to 
similar offences in 2010 (Ministry of Justice, 2012a). Most shockingly, the average 
custodial sentence handed down for riot-related offences was 17.1 months; four times 
longer than the average sentence for comparable crimes the previous year (Ministry of 
Justice, 2012a) (see Figure 1 below).  
 
Figure 1: Custodial sentences for riot-related offences (graph reproduced from Lightowlers and Quirk, 2015)  
Some illustrative examples give a sense of what this meant in practice. On the 11th August 
2011, the day after the disturbances ended, Nicholas Robinson, a 23-year-old electrical 
engineering student with no previous convictions, was sentenced to the maximum 
permitted jail term of six months at Camberwell Green magistrates’ court after pleading 
guilty to stealing bottles of water worth £3.50 from Lidl in Brixton. He had been walking 
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home in the early hours of the morning when he saw the shop being looted and took the 
opportunity to help himself to a case of water because he was thirsty. His lawyer said he 
was caught up in the moment, and was ashamed of his actions (Addley et al., 2011). Ursula 
Nevin, a 24-year-old mother of two who had slept through the disturbances but had 
accepted a pair of shorts looted from Manchester city centre by her lodger, was sentenced 
to five months in prison for handling stolen goods (Carter and Bowcott, 2011). Ricky 
Gemmel, 18, received a 16-week custodial sentence for threatening a police officer, 
though he claimed he only called him a ‘dickhead’ after the officer assaulted him (Lakhani, 
2012b). David King, 53, was the oldest person charged in Birmingham, and was 
sentenced to 16 months in prison after pleading guilty to trying to steal scratch cards but 
leaving the newsagent empty-handed (Lakhani, 2012b). Among the youngest children 
convicted was an 11-year-old boy, given an 18-month youth rehabilitation order for 
stealing a bin from Debenhams in Romford (BBC News, 2011b).   
Particularly shocking was the treatment of children and young people. Around three-
quarters of the defendants brought before the courts for riot-related offences in the six 
weeks following the disturbances were under 24 years of age (Ministry of Justice, 2012a). 
Those convicted of riot-related offences in the youth courts, where most cases involving 
children are heard (though some, concerningly, were heard in adult courts), were six times 
more likely to be sentenced to custody than those convicted by the same court for similar 
offences in 2010. By the summer of 2012 more than 700 under 18s – many extremely 
vulnerable young people with no prior convictions – had faced court; 218 were given 
custodial sentences averaging eight months; and 34 children were still being held on 
remand awaiting trial (Bawdon and Bowcott, 2012).  
As I discuss in more detail in Chapter 5 this punitive reaction predominantly targeted 
people who are working-class and racialised, with those from economically deprived 
neighbourhoods and ‘minority’ ethnic groups far more likely to be affected. Forty-two 
per cent of young people appearing before the courts were, or had been, in receipt of free 
school meals, compared to the 16 per cent average. While people racialised as black made 
up 3.3 per cent of the overall population in England and Wales in 2011 (www.gov.uk, 2018), 
39 per cent of those charged with riot-related offences identified as black, and were less 
likely to be granted bail, and more likely to be sentenced to prison (Ministry of Justice, 
2012a). These patterns are largely reflective of wider racial disparities in the ordinary 
functioning of the criminal justice system whereby racialised people are more likely to be 
stopped and searched by the police, arrested, charged, tried, found guilty in the Crown 
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Court and are at greater risk of receiving custodial sentences (Lammy, 2017; Williams and 
Clarke, 2018). 
Alongside the racialised and classed immediate response to the unrest from the criminal 
justice system, in the months and years that followed the coalition government and 
subsequent Conservative administration mobilised the ‘riots’ to justify a range of 
‘extrajudicial,’ ‘civil law’ and ‘collective’ punishments targeting not just those directly 
criminalised by involvement in the disturbances, but a broader population of marginalised 
and poor communities. London councils served eviction notices to households whose 
family members had been charged with (but not convicted) of riot-related offences, and 
government ministers pushed for benefits to be withdrawn from individuals involved in 
rioting (Gilson, 2011; Kelsey, 2015). The coalition government swiftly set in motion a 
series of punitive and vengeful social policy programmes to ‘fight back’ against the 
supposed causes of the unrest: gang culture, ‘troubled families’ and a putative ‘moral 
collapse’ in which traditional values and virtues had been replaced by irresponsibility, 
laziness, lack of discipline and social permissiveness (Cameron, 2011b). There was to be 
no Scarman-like independent inquiry into the root causes of the disturbances; instead 
Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg launched the Riots Victims and Communities Panel, 
whose 2012 report centred on addressing the ‘problems’ of culturally deficient, 
insufficiently ‘resilient’ communities, and failing public services, and proposed policies to 
match, including greater resources and powers for police and encouraging schools to 
build character (Cooper, 2012). Most of its recommendations were ignored. 
In a speech a year on from the disturbances, Communities Secretary Eric Pickles set out 
the government’s longer-term response to the unrest, outlining their action in areas 
including policing and security, criminal justice reform, policy on families and parenting, 
tackling gangs and youth violence (see Chapter 5), and substantial changes in welfare, 
housing and education policy (Pickles, 2012). The disturbances have been used to 
demonstrate the urgent need for ‘regeneration’ and sweeping change to local areas that 
were affected by the unrest: gentrifying projects in Tottenham, for example, have 
explicitly drawn on the ‘riots’ to legitimise their aims to dramatically transform the area 
and its residents along the lines of class and race (Peacock, 2014). Other community 
responses, in contrast, have been instrumental in challenging these discourses, not least 
by highlighting, organising against and resisting violent and racist policing and criminal 
justice practices (Elliott-Cooper et al., 2014). 
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Both the criminal justice reaction to the disturbances and the broader policy agenda it 
catalysed, then, were focused on punishing the most marginalised populations in the 
country, overwhelmingly targeting poor and racialised communities and further 
entrenching long-established patterns of punishment and exclusion. In this thesis I 
contend that these responses to the disturbances, as much as the ‘riots’ themselves, 
require sustained critical attention. In the following chapters I explore how we might 
make sociological sense of these reactions. I investigate the claims, shared understandings, 
narratives and imaginations that legitimised, normalised and naturalised this response, 
and consider what this reveals about the cultural and ideological processes by which the 
criminal justice system continues to sustain itself in the contemporary moment. 
Part 2. The structure of the thesis 
The subsequent chapters situate the thesis in relation to broader academic debates, 
discuss its methodology and present the findings of my empirical research and analysis. 
In Chapter 2 I discuss how the thesis builds on, extends and contributes to academic 
conversations about the disturbances and the criminal justice response to them, and to 
broader sociological debates about the cultural constructions of crime and punishment. 
While much academic energy has gone towards diagnosing and debating the factors that 
led to the disturbances, I argue that we should shift our critical sociological attention 
towards the harsh criminal justice response to the unrest; attending in particular to the 
cultural imaginaries, narratives, assumptions and shared meanings that worked to 
normalise and justify the state’s punitive and discriminatory response to the disturbances. 
Drawing on the concept of agnotology (Barton and Davis, 2018; McGoey, 2016a; Proctor 
and Schiebinger, 2008; Slater, 2016a) I make a case for tracing how various kinds of 
ignorance, amnesia and denial were vital to legitimising the punitive criminal justice 
response. Approaching the disturbances in these terms – not as an event to be explained, 
but as a moment through which we can examine the ideological processes that procure 
consent for a violent and discriminatory criminal justice system more broadly – provides 
important new insight into the cultural political economy of punishment in the current 
conjuncture. 
In Chapter 3 I describe my research methods, arguing that conversations with 
professionals who were at the heart of designing and delivering the punitive criminal 
justice response to the disturbances offer a unique lens onto the shared imaginaries that 
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served to legitimise and justify the response to the unrest – and those that problematised 
and challenged it. My research, based on in-depth qualitative interviews with criminal 
justice practitioners, affords an opportunity to explore how the broader political and 
ideological context played out through a set of tangible policies and practices, and is 
enacted, interpreted, negotiated and resisted in complex ways by different organisations 
and individuals. I set out an analytical approach, based on critical discourse analysis and 
drawing on concepts of ‘dirty work’, that has helped me to make sociological sense of 
practitioners’ ‘riot talk’ and to connect it to broader political and cultural processes. The 
chapter discusses the process of designing and conducting the project; and reflects on the 
methodological, political and ethical considerations that shaped the research and analysis. 
I argue that ‘studying up’ (turning the analytical gaze away from ‘offenders’ and towards 
those in positions of power who shaped and enacted the state’s response to the 
disturbances) offers important opportunities for researchers but also poses significant 
methodological and ethical challenges.  
Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 foreground my empirical analysis and my key arguments; examining 
in turn how practitioners drew on shared cultural imaginations of the ‘riots’, the ‘rioters’, the 
public and the criminal justice system to legitimise the punitive response to the unrest. In each 
case I show how professionals’ accounts mobilise distinct forms of forgetting, ignoring 
or dismissal that allow them – in most cases – to justify their actions in 2011 and maintain 
a narrative of the criminal justice system as essentially necessary and fair.  
In Chapter 4 I focus on my conversations with senior lawyers from the Crown 
Prosecution Service, arguing that specific patterns of amnesia and ignorance about the 
disturbances were vital in allowing prosecutors to normalise the state’s exceptionally 
punitive reaction to the unrest. Prosecutors’ accounts elided both the immediate context 
in which the disturbances occurred (in particular, the police killing of Mark Duggan) and 
the longer historical continuities of which they are a part, allowing them to frame the 
disturbances as an extraordinary, unprecedented and senseless outbreak of offending 
requiring an exceptional reaction. Drawing on interviews with more critical criminal 
justice practitioners, I show how acknowledging and recognising this context enables very 
different understandings of the criminal justice response; not as a reasonable response to 
an eruption of crime, but as a means of perpetuating and deepening the social divisions 
that sparked the unrest.  
Chapter 5 explores how practitioners talked about who was involved in the disturbances, 
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tracing the particular imaginations of the rioters that served to naturalise and legitimise 
the racialised and classed criminal justice response. In contrast to the starkly racist and 
stigmatising representations of the rioters that dominated right-wing media and political 
discourses, those I interviewed emphasised the diversity of the rioters – and in particular, 
the surprising presence of a group of ‘unusual rioters’ figured as middle-class, educated, 
and white. Yet far from challenging or subverting the racialised and classed patterns of 
blame that circulated elsewhere, I show how practitioners’ understandings of these 
surprising rioters in fact reflected and reinforced, in sometimes subtle and tacit ways, 
long-established cultural imaginations that connect criminality to ‘race’ and class. I argue 
that doing so enabled those within the criminal justice system to rationalise the 
disproportionate criminalisation and punishment of working-class and racialised young 
people following the disturbances. 
In Chapter 6 I demonstrate how criminal justice professionals drew on assumptions about 
the public to justify the courts’ draconian reaction to the riots. I argue that a shared idea of 
a monolithically fearful and vengeful public allowed practitioners to assert that the courts 
were simply responding to society’s demands for swift and severe punishment. This claim 
allowed prosecutors and sentencers to disavow personal and organisational accountability 
for their harshly punitive policies and practices, instead shifting moral responsibility onto 
a putative punitive public. I argue that rather than simply echoing what the public at large 
expected, practitioners were in fact summoning an imagined public that is imbricated with 
and orchestrated through contemporary politics of citizenship and nation, and in 
particular a regressive and exclusionary notion of Britishness that was reinvigorated and 
reinforced in the wake of the unrest.  
Chapter 7 turns to look at the discursive techniques that interviewees used to normalise 
and naturalise the extraordinarily widespread use of prison as a punishment after the 
disturbances.  I show how denying, dismissing or minimising the harms of imprisonment 
allowed professionals to frame the custodial sentences handed down as proportionate 
and just, whether by transforming prison from a political or ethical question into a technical 
problem; or understating the serious harms and violence that are inherent in 
imprisonment. These strategies, I contend, are crucial in enabling professionals whose 
roles bring them into close proximity with sites of profound state violence to justify their 
work. In particular, I argue that eliding the starkly racialised and classed dimensions of 
imprisonment allows practitioners to defend and legitimise the discriminatory violence of 
punishment, both in 2011 and more broadly. 
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Through these chapters, then, I map out the claims and narratives about the ‘riots’, the 
‘rioters’, the public and prisons that practitioners drew on to make sense of the 
extraordinarily punitive state response to the disturbances, showing how processes of 
denial and ignorance are crucially important in allowing practitioners to position the 
criminal justice reaction as reasonable, rational, necessary and adequate. In Chapter 8 I 
draw together the arguments of the thesis, assess how the analysis contributes to academic 
literature on the 2011 ‘riots’, and explore what the research reveals about the ideological 
underpinnings of the criminal justice system more broadly; examining what I call the 
cultural political economy of punishment. I argue that four interlocking and overlapping 
elements – delimited, decontextualised and depoliticised conceptions of crime, racialised and classed 
imaginations of criminality, an imagined punitive public, and strategic ignorance of the harms of 
punishment – work together to sustain and legitimise the criminal justice system. I discuss 
how the disturbances provided a focal point for the rearticulation of ideas about race, 
class, citizenship and justice in the contemporary moment, providing further ideological 








Making sociological sense of the unrest and the criminal 
justice response 
Introduction 
The years since 2011 have seen the emergence of a wealth of riots research, with scholars 
from every conceivable discipline offering interpretations and readings of the unrest. 
Relatively few, in contrast, have focused on the startlingly harsh criminal justice response 
to the disturbances. This response, I argue, presents a rich opportunity for critical analysis. 
In this chapter I describe my approach to making sociological sense of the disturbances 
(and, more specifically, the criminal justice response to them) as a lens to examine the 
cultural politics of punishment in the twenty-first century and situate the research within 
contemporary academic conversations. I show how the thesis offers new insight into the 
processes by which the criminal justice system procures consent for its profoundly 
discriminatory and ineffective policies and practices in the current moment.  
Focusing on the narratives and claims that coalesced around the disturbances in popular, 
political and professional discourses – what I call ‘riot talk’7 – provides a significant 
contribution to three distinct bodies of academic work. First, it intervenes in critical 
conversations about the unrest, and more specifically on the cultural and ideological 
claims that legitimised the punitive reaction to the disturbances; second, to analysis of the 
sociological significance of ignorance in the contemporary politics of crime and 
punishment; and third, to literature on the cultural and ideological modes of  consent that 
continue to legitimise and sustain the criminal justice system in the years beyond 2011. 
In the first part of the chapter I review the explanations that researchers have offered to 
make sense of the disturbances. While many academic accounts have focused on the 
apparently novel features of the 2011 ‘riots’ and paid insufficient attention to England’s 
long history of urban unrest, I show how foregrounding this historical context is crucial 
 
7 I borrow this term from Marisa Silvestri (2013) – see also Sasson (1995) on the significance of 
‘crime talk’. 
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if we are to make sense of the disturbances and the state’s racialised and classed response 
to them. Moreover, despite providing crucial counterpoints to the dominant media and 
political discourses that had framed the riots as uniformly apolitical, many efforts to 
ascertain and confirm the causes of the disturbances are limited in that, I argue, they have 
not paid sufficient attention to the way that the state responded to them. While the 
disturbances themselves provoked a great deal of analysis, much of this has focused on 
explaining the causes of the unrest, with far less on the punitive response. We may indeed 
need to know what the various political, economic and social causes of crime are, but 
those causes tell ‘less than half the story’ (Hall et al., 2013 [1978]: 1). More important is 
understanding why society reacts to crime ‘in the extreme way it does, at that precise 
historical conjuncture’ (Hall et al., 2013 [1978]: 1). Despite the limitations of some of the 
explanations for the disturbances, it is useful to think about how interpretations of the 
unrest have ideological power in legitimising certain responses in their wake. ‘Riots,’ I 
argue, are key sites of meaning-making; providing moments in which shared assumptions 
about crime and society are made and remade. Rather than focusing only on the 
disturbances themselves, then, I argue that it is crucial to look critically at the responses 
to them, and to trace how these responses both reflect and actively structure broader 
political, cultural and ideological formations.  
In Part 2 I set out my methodological approach. I make a case for expanding our 
sociological gaze beyond the disturbances themselves and their putative causes, looking 
instead at the responses they stimulated. While scholars have provided important critiques 
of the policies and practices employed in the state’s punitive reaction to the disturbances, 
this thesis develops a different approach, situating it in relation to a broader cultural, 
political and ideological context. Drawing on critical sociological scholarship, and 
particularly from emerging debates on the political power of ignorance and denial, I argue 
we must attend to the cultural and political formations that licensed and legitimised the 
punitive criminal justice reaction against them. Examining the imaginations and 
assumptions that were invoked to procure public consent for the harsh punishment of 
rioters offers important insight into the ideological constructions of crime, justice and 
citizenship through which the criminal justice system as a whole justifies and sustains 
itself – and in particular, its racist and class-based practices.  
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Part 1. Explaining the ‘riots’ 
The disturbances prompted a great deal of analysis; but far less has been written about 
the response. Even before the unrest had ended, journalists, commentators, politicians 
and researchers had offered a profusion of opinions on how we might interpret what was 
happening, and how the state should respond. Despite pleas from Boris Johnson, then 
Mayor of London, who criticised the media for offering ‘too much sociological 
explanation and not enough condemnation’ for the unrest (cited in Cooper and Nicholls, 
2011), academics rushed to make sense of the events by situating them in a broader set 
of political, social and economic circumstances. In the years since 2011, scholars from a 
disparate range of disciplines have continued to produce journal articles and special 
issues, book chapters and books on the disturbances at an impressive rate. As well as 
sociologists and criminologists, urban scholars (Millington, 2013), psychologists (Reicher, 
2011; Stott and Reicher, 2011), geographers (Baudains et al., 2013; Slater, 2011), 
economists (Bell et al., 2014), and legal scholars (Banakar and Lort Phillips, 2014; 
Lightowlers, 2015; Roberts and Hough, 2013; Sokhi-Bulley, 2016) have offered valuable 
analyses, alongside a number of cross-disciplinary and collaborative projects such as the 
Guardian and LSE’s Reading the Riots (Lewis et al., 2011), edited volumes (Briggs, 2012) 
and special thematic editions of journals such as Criminal Justice Matters (2011), Sociological 
Research Online (2011, 2013) and Contention (2014). Scholars from less likely disciplines such 
as psychiatry (Aiello and Pariante, 2013), psychoanalytic theory (Finchett-Maddock, 2012; 
Lowe, 2013), computing (Tonkin et al., 2012) and public health (McKee and Raine, 2011) 
have also offered interpretations of the unrest. The disturbances arguably ‘became 
something of a criminological Rorschach test’ (Reiner, 2012), where ‘almost every 
commentator tended to see in them a vindication of their own particular perspectives and 
concerns’ (Cavalcanti et al., 2012), with scholars interpreting the events using the 
concepts and theories from their own disciplinary toolboxes.  
Some of these diagnoses have been overly simplistic and reductive, treating a 
heterogeneous and multi-faceted series of processes, moments and representations as a 
singular event that might be neatly explained by a set of determining factors, or even a 
single cause; the label ‘riots’ perhaps suggesting an artificial uniformity which belies the 
diverse actions and motivations encompassed by the term (Moxon, 2011). The events of 
August 2011, like other ‘riots’, were heterogeneous on at least three levels (Reicher, 2011). 
First, while the events varied greatly across time and space with qualitatively different 
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occurrences taking place in various locations over several nights, most analyses have 
sought to explain the disturbances as a whole (but see e.g. Clarke, 2012a; Clement, 2014; 
Valluvan et al., 2013 for geographically grounded analyses). Second, even within the same 
time and place, it is difficult to generalise about the actions and motivations of the 
different individuals and groups involved. The term rioters, then, also suggests a 
homogeneity that obscures the complexity of the experiences and understandings that 
might help us to make sense of what the riots signalled, how they were experienced and 
what the aftermath has been. Lastly, even if we were able to disaggregate individuals’ 
motivations, doing so is far from straightforward since individuals’ motivations are always 
complex and mixed (Reicher, 2011).  
ln the absence of a public inquiry or any serious political effort to comprehend the 
disturbances beyond offering a set of simplistic and stigmatising cultural diagnoses, this 
academic work has undoubtedly been vital in bringing critical perspectives to bear on the 
events, challenging and unsettling ‘the easy answers and smokescreens offered by the 
government’ (Allen and Taylor, 2012: 4). But I argue that much of this literature has paid 
too little attention to the historical continuities that allow us to situate the 2011 unrest in 
relation to long patterns of resistance to economic and social inequalities and racist 
policing practices; and has insufficiently analysed the state’s response to the disturbances 
and its significance.   
In light of the diversity of theoretical perspectives that have been used to explain the 
disturbances, it can be difficult to identify key organising themes in the literature. Drawing 
on Murji’s (2017) analysis, I set out three (interconnected and overlapping) ways in which 
the 2011 disturbances have been framed: as a distinctive and novel kind of ‘riot’; as a 
reaction against inequality and austerity; and as resistance to racialised policing practices. 
Journalists, politicians and academics have drawn on these framings in different 
arrangements and configurations, rarely sticking doggedly to one simple explanation, but 
rather combining elements of each. Nevertheless, we can clearly see tendencies in how 
these framings have been used by different groups to establish different narratives of the 
disturbances and to license different responses to them.  
Focusing on the novelty and distinctiveness of 2011 
First, many scholars have highlighted the elements that seemed to set the events of 2011 
apart from earlier disturbances, focusing particularly on the role of social media in 
facilitating the spread and scale of the unrest and on the rampant consumerism and 
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materialism that appeared to characterise the disturbances (Bauman, 2011; Newburn et 
al., 2015; Treadwell et al., 2013). Though these accounts may have limited explanatory 
power, paying insufficient consideration to the broader historical and political context 
within which the disturbances occurred, they are vitally important in helping us to 
understand the criminal justice response to them. 
A key feature to catch the attention of commentators was the pace at which the events 
escalated, the wide geographical sweep of the unrest, and the overall number of episodes 
of protest, looting and violence. Many have emphasised the important role of new media 
and technologies in facilitating the spread and scale of the riots, and in particular 
communications networks such as Blackberry Messenger and social networking sites like 
Twitter and Facebook (Baker, 2011; Newburn, 2015; Tonkin et al., 2012).8 However, 
while new technologies and new modes of communication may well have affected the 
shape and speed of the events in 2011, analysis of the role of technology has often paid 
insufficient attention to the broader political, social and historical terrain on which the 
disturbances occurred. Similarly, work that has explained the spread of the disturbances 
using psychological and scientific modes of analysis has been criticised for neglecting the 
vital importance of the specific historical and political moment of 2011, drawing for 
example on discredited and outdated behaviourist theories of ‘contagion’ or ‘mob 
mentality’ to explain the seemingly unique space-time dynamic of the 2011 disturbances 
(see Burns, 2011; Gorringe and Rosie, 2011; Stott and Reicher, 2011 for critique).  
In addition to analysis of the speed, scale and spread of the rioting, much work has 
focused on the perceived prevalence of acquisitive crime, in the form of ‘looting’, that 
seemed to distinguish 2011 from previous episodes of unrest. While the dominant 
political and mainstream media rhetoric pointed to the widespread looting as proof that 
the disturbances were entirely apolitical, instead motivated solely by individualistic greed 
and criminality (Cameron, 2011a; Williams, 2011), academics, too, sought to characterise 
the disturbances as a reflection of a social order defined by rampant consumerism 
(Bauman, 2011; Žižek, 2011; Treadwell et al., 2013; see Platts-Fowler, 2013 for a critique). 
Even before the looting was over, Zygmunt Bauman had diagnosed the unrest as ‘riots 
 
8 As well as allowing for an instant, continuous response from news outlets and commentators, 
new media also facilitated a number of interesting practical responses to the disturbances: Twitter 
and Facebook were integral to the highly contentious ‘riot clean-up’ operation (see Chapter 6 for 
discussion). 
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of defective and disqualified consumers’ (Bauman, 2011): the attacks on shops, Bauman 
argued, reflected a situation whereby shopping had become the primary measure and 
expression of social standing and success, and where stark economic inequality meant 
that many lacked the means to acquire goods at the desired pace, leading not just to 
material deprivation but profound social humiliation. Similarly, Winlow and Hall argue 
that the disturbances ‘lacked the clear, unifying political symbolism necessary to turn 
objectless dissatisfaction into articulate political demands’; instead, as principally 
‘consumer-oriented subjects’, frustrated rioters ‘ultimately found themselves with 
nowhere to take their dissatisfaction but to the shops’ (Winlow and Hall, 2012: 465). 
The disturbances, in this analysis, reflected the logic and values of an increasingly 
materialistic society, and ‘looting’ might be seen as an entirely coherent form of protest 
within the context of neoliberalism and its discourses of individualism and competition 
(Moxon, 2011; Treadwell et al., 2013). As Sumner (2011) asks, ‘[i]n an aggressively 
entrepreneurial free-market economy… how can any rational person be surprised when 
young people behave like aggressive entrepreneurs with scant respect for law or justice?’ 
In some cases, this focus on consumerism as a defining and supposedly novel feature of 
the 2011 disturbances has been at the cost of paying greater attention to the historical 
and political context in which they occurred. As Valluvan et al. (2013) argue, the analytical 
emphasis on looting, ‘alongside explanatory motifs of nihilism, vulgar materialism and 
gratuitous criminality’ often elided and obscured other vital context for the disturbances; 
in particular, institutional and structural circumstances such as police-community 
relations and deepening economic inequalities (see sections below).  
Regardless of how successfully these accounts explain the unrest, understanding how 
commentators interpreted the disturbances in terms of their supposedly unique features, 
and simultaneously downplayed their similarities with other episodes of unrest, is vital in 
helping us to make sense of the criminal justice response. Discourses of unprecedented 
consumerism and looting have become central to discussions, interpretations and 
recollections of the disturbances: claims that the rioters were driven by an ‘excess of 
consumer desire’ have been used to obscure the importance of the social and political 
effect of acts of austerity governance (Jensen, 2013) and have underscored an imagination 
of the rioters as ‘a feral underclass of people seen to be morally and culturally separate 
from mainstream society’ (Casey, 2013). These claims, I argue, have been important in 
justifying the harsh punishment of rioters. In the subsequent chapters I explore the 
implications of the idea that the disturbances were entirely distinct from earlier unrest, 
Making sociological sense of the unrest and the criminal justice response 
 30 
and argue that framing the disturbances as unprecedented was a powerful means of 
justifying the harsh response from the CPS and the courts. In Chapter 4, for example I 
show how prosecutors drew on the idea that the disturbances were exceptional and 
anomalous to defend the CPS’s severe approach. In Chapter 5 I show how the idea that 
the demographic make-up of the rioters in 2011 was novel and distinctive, too, worked 
to normalise their harsh punishment.  
Inequality, austerity and neoliberalism  
In contrast to those accounts of the disturbances that took their apparently unusual 
features as evidence of their apolitical or ‘post-political’ nature, other scholars have 
instead highlighted the economic and political background of austerity and deepening 
inequality in which the disturbances occurred (Harvie and Milburn, 2013). Attending to 
the structural context in which the disturbances emerged, I argue, is vital not only for 
understanding why they erupted, but for theorising the criminal justice response to them. 
Scholars have emphasised the evidence of clear links between social and economic 
deprivation and disturbances (Akram, 2014; Lightowlers, 2015), pointing out that, 
throughout history, social unrest has tended to emerge at times of economic hardship 
and largely among the poorest groups in society (Grover, 2011). 2011 came in a period 
of economic downturn and rising social inequality overseen by a right-wing government, 
with disturbances taking place largely in deprived areas (Atkinson et al., 2012; McSmith, 
2011; Newburn, 2015). Against this backdrop, commentators have seen the disturbances 
as a meaningful (though not necessarily legitimate or effective) response to widespread 
grievances, rather than a senseless and random outburst of meaningless criminality. 
Researchers have noted that looting largely targeted those shops that were seen as 
symbols of stark inequality, where expensive goods were out of the reach of many local 
residents, and shops that were seen to discriminate against or exploit local residents 
(Elliott-Cooper, 2011). In light of this we might read looting, and the unrest more broadly, 
as ‘the consequence of the operation of socially and culturally embedded economic 
processes’ and not just the action of ‘feckless and irresponsible people’ (Grover, 2011). 
This focus on economic inequalities as a cause of the unrest looks beyond the immediate 
context of the disturbances, taking into view the everyday social struggles that preceded 
them, and continued beyond them. Rather than approaching the disturbances as an 
anomalous, isolated event – a ‘social puzzle’ (Thomas and Iossifidis, 2012) to be explained 
in terms of its most proximate causes – sociologists have located the dramatic events of 
the few days in August within  a process of ‘slow rioting’ (Mckenzie, 2013) characterised 
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by on-going anger, desperation and localised criminalisation across generations. This 
view, while agreeing that looting was a prominent feature of the 2011 disturbances, 
situates this within a context of deepening inequality that suggests a different set of 
meanings. This framing seems to offer a more thoughtful and convincing reading of the 
conspicuousness of acquisitive crimes in the disturbances, though it is important to note 
that this novelty has arguably been overstated, ignoring the fact that looting and stealing 
has been a prominent feature in earlier episodes of unrest (Bateman, 2012; Casey, 2013; 
Newburn et al., 2015).  
Again, I argue that this focus on economic and political inequalities as a backdrop for the 
unrest offers an important perspective on the ways that the state responded to the 
disturbances. While discourses of untrammeled greed have legitimised the harsh 
punishment of rioters, emphasising the context of extreme inequalities from which the 
disturbances emerged offers a more critical perspective on the criminal justice reaction. 
In Chapter 4 I show how practitioners pointed to the worsening effects of austerity in 
order to reframe the riots as social protest rather than as meaningless violence, and thus 
to critique and problematise the criminal justice response. In Chapter 5 I argue that 
foregrounding the political motivations of rioters allowed interviewees to question the 
appropriateness of the response. 
Emphasising continuity across history: ‘riots’, ‘race’ and racism 
In contrast to analyses that focused on the features that seemed to set the 2011 
disturbances apart from anything that had happened before, some scholars have sought 
to understand the unrest by situating it in relation to uprisings and movements such as 
Occupy and the Arab Spring that were happening across the globe at the same time 
(Newburn, 2015; Winlow et al., 2015) or, more often, in relation to England’s history of 
unrest, drawing attention to the factors and features that have connected different 
disturbances at different points in time (Gilroy, 2013; Murji, 2017; Newburn, 2015; 
Solomos, 2011). In particular this analysis has stressed how post-war disturbances have 
reflected social dynamics of ‘race’ and racism, demonstrating for example how racialised 
police brutality has very often triggered disturbances. In order to better understand the 
disturbances – and, crucially, the responses to them – it is essential to locate them not 
only within an immediate economic and political context but in a longer history of urban 
unrest. Situating the 2011 disturbances within their historical context brings to the fore 
the close connections between disturbances and racism in England’s recent history and I 
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argue, helps us to make better sociological sense of the punitive response to the 2011 
unrest and the modes of legitimation that underpinned it.   
Despite the widespread shock and surprise expressed by journalists, commentators, 
politicians, and some academics in 2011, the disturbances were in many ways far from 
unprecedented or anomalous. While accounts of England’s riotous past might start with 
export riots in Bristol or Kings Lynn in 1347, or the 1381 Peasants’ Revolt (Clover, 2016: 
49), historians have looked to the sixteenth century, or more commonly to the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as the ‘golden age’ of food riots and peasant 
uprisings (Rudé, 1964; Thompson, 1971) often responding to increasing economic 
inequality, rising food prices, the enclosure of land, and religious backlashes. The 
Victorian era saw new kinds of collective action, no longer primarily concerned with 
struggles over food prices, but as struggles over wages, or labour power, manifested in 
new forms of industrial action such as the strike and the machine-breaking of the Luddites 
(Clover, 2016). This era also saw an important development in the history of unrest: the 
emergence of policing, with the founding of the Metropolitan police in 1830, and the 
establishment of police forces nationwide in 1856 (Mullan, 2001), and saw police become 
the target of unrest, as in the 1887 Bloody Sunday demonstration against unemployment, 
which ‘became the kind of running battle with the police with which we are now entirely 
familiar’ (Mullan, 2001). Situating the 2011 disturbances within this long history highlights 
the intimate connections between social unrest and shifting patterns of economic and 
political relations, troubling the narrative of ‘criminality pure and simple’, in David 
Cameron’s (2011a) terms, that dominated political and media discourses in 2011.  
However, it is the twentieth century, and especially the post-war era, that offers the most 
important background for understanding the 2011 disturbances and, I argue, the criminal 
justice response to them. This riotous post-war era began with the so-called ‘race riots’ in 
Nottingham and Notting Hill in 1958 – in reality ‘a vicious week-long racist attack’ (Malik, 
2020) by groups of armed white youths against West Indians – with racist disturbances 
occurring in Dudley in 1962 and, on a smaller scale, in various locations throughout the 
1960s (Newburn, 2015). During the 1970s there was a shift toward large-scale 
confrontation between black communities and the police (Bowling and Phillips, 2002; 
Newburn, 2015) as relationships between the police and black communities became 
progressively more strained and fractious, resulting in unrest at Notting Hill Carnival in 
1976 and again in 1977 (Gilroy, 2013).  
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The 1980s saw a dramatic upsurge in the frequency and intensity of episodes of unrest 
(Benyon and Solomos, 1987a) and important parallels with 2011. Though the 
disturbances in St Paul’s, Bristol in April 1980 appeared to politicians and journalists at 
the time as an aberrant, one-off event (Benyon and Solomos, 1987a), in fact they marked 
the start of  an eruption of  unrest in British cities over the next five year. These various 
episodes were precipitated by a context of high unemployment, especially for young 
people, and deepening tensions with the police, with the immediate catalyst for the 
disturbances all too often being police violence against racialised citizens. 1981 saw 
widespread unrest across the country, with the most serious disturbances taking place in 
Brixton, sparked in part by the police and the media’s indifference and inaction in the 
wake of the house fire that killed 13 young black people in New Cross in January 1981. 
The years ‘82 to ‘84 were comparatively peaceful, though there were several episodes of  
unrest in London and Liverpool. September 1985 again saw serious disorder, first in 
Handsworth, Birmingham, and again in Brixton; this time the spark was the shooting of  
Cherry Groce by police during a raid on her house. Officers, looking for Mrs Groce’s 
son, shot her in the spine, permanently paralysing her. Disturbances soon followed in 
Liverpool and Peckham.  
A few weeks later Tottenham’s Broadwater Farm estate (where a four-year-old Mark 
Duggan was growing up) saw the most dramatic unrest of  that decade. The summer had 
brought heightened tensions between police and black young people on the estate, 
exacerbated by a stop and search operation and incidences of reported harassment by the 
police. The immediate trigger was the death of Cynthia Jarrett, following the arrest of her 
son Floyd, a youth worker, for an out-of-date car tax disc. The details of the subsequent 
events are disputed, but what is clear is that the police burst into their home and raided 
it, during which Cynthia Jarrett collapsed and died of  heart failure. Sunday 6th October 
was ‘a night of extraordinary violence’ (Benyon and Solomos, 1987a: 7) during which cars 
and buildings were burned, 20 members of the public and 223 police officers were injured, 
some by gunfire, and PC Keith Blakelock was stabbed to death. Fairly regular episodes 
of unrest occurred around London and the country through the late 1980s, and indeed 
the 1990s and into the twenty-first century (see e.g. Newburn, 2015 for details).  
Situating the 2011 disturbances against this historical backdrop draws attention to the 
continuities between 2011 and these earlier disturbances, not least in terms of the context 
of clearly racialised issues of poverty and police violence (Akram, 2014; Jefferson, 2012), 
highlighting the politics of race, racism and policing that have been central to the history 
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of urban unrest since the middle of the twentieth century (Bowling and Phillips, 2002). 
Race – or rather racism – is the ‘overriding theme running like a thread through most of 
the riots in post-war Britain’ (Newburn, 2015: 50), yet critical attention to race and racism 
were often conspicuously absent in efforts to explain the 2011 disturbances (Solomos, 
2011). As well as having limited power to explain the disturbances themselves, 
dehistoricised, depoliticised and ‘deracinated’ (Murji, 2017) narratives have important 
ideological implications, as I argue in the thesis: in Chapter 4 I show how ignoring or 
denying the historical continuities between 2011 and the 1980s, in particular, worked as 
a powerful means for practitioners to deny the political element of the unrest and 
justifying the harsh criminal justice response. In light of the immediate trigger for the 
unrest, the police killing of a person of colour, ‘to willfully fail to recognise race as a 
starting point seems to be a determined attempt to read the events in a non-political or 
post-political light’ (Murji, 2017). 
Drawing attention to the longer history of the disturbances, then, has been crucial in 
helping to make sense of the unrest. However, I argue that widening our view to 
encompass the state’s punitive response to the unrest helps us to see much more clearly 
the connections between race and ‘riots’. Not only were the disturbances a reaction 
against long-standing patterns of police racism; but the response to them from media, 
politicians, criminal justice system and a broader policy agenda – has served to further 
entrench and normalise racialised patterns of punishment.  
In the second half of the chapter I set out my approach to situating the 2011 disturbances  
within a cultural and ideological moment that imbued them with a specific set of 
meanings and licensed a particular set of punitive responses. I draw on research that has 
critically assessed the criminal justice response to the disturbances, putting it into dialogue 
with classic work on crime and culture, alongside more recent work that has begun to 
locate the unrest in a political and ideological conjuncture.  
Part 2. Beyond explaining the ‘riots’: Tracing a cultural political 
economy of punishment  
This thesis contributes to the existing academic work on the disturbances, which has 
largely sought to explain their causes, by taking a different approach to analysing the unrest. 
I shift the focus away from the disturbances themselves and towards the punitive state 
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backlash, and the political, media and professional discourses – what I call ‘riot talk’ – 
that licensed and legitimised it. In doing so, I take the disturbances and the criminal justice 
response to them as a lens through which we can explore how ‘justice’ is justified; or, the 
ideological and discursive processes by which the criminal justice system seeks and 
secures popular consent for its punitive practices, and the disproportionate harm they 
cause to marginalised and vulnerable communities.  
Though legal scholars and journalists have provided useful analysis and critique of the 
surprisingly harsh criminal justice response to the unrest, highlighting the ways in which 
the police and courts deviated from their usual policies and practices and tracking the 
administrative decisions that enabled this (Lightowlers and Quirk, 2015; Pina-Sánchez et 
al., 2017; Roberts and Hough, 2013), I situate my research and analysis within a body of 
critical sociological work that has taken a broader view, exploring how particular political 
and cultural formations make possible such punitive state responses. I show how this 
thesis draws on and contributes both to a longer-standing project that examines law and 
order politics not simply as a response to crime, but as a reflection of a specific set of 
social and ideological circumstances, and second, to work that has situated the state’s 
response to the 2011 disturbances, specifically, in relation to the context of neoliberal 
austerity. I take this work forward by examining how these broader cultural and ideological 
processes came to shape and to procure consent for, the state’s punitive reaction to the 
unrest. By looking at the narratives, imaginations and regimes of common sense that 
practitioners draw on to make sense of the disorder – and, in particular, the diverse forms 
of agnosis or strategic ignorance they employ – we can identify the discursive resources 
that work to legitimise and normalise the punitive practices of criminal justice system 
more widely.  
As I described in Chapter 1, analysis from researchers and journalists has been vital in 
drawing attention to, explaining and problematising the criminal justice system’s response 
to the disturbances, from the perceived failures of the police, to the CPS’s approach to 
prosecution, the chaos in the courts and the controversies and ambiguities surrounding 
the sentences handed down for riot-related convictions. This work has shed much-
needed light on processes that were murky and unclear. Much of this critique, 
understandably, has focused on demonstrating the unusual severity of this response and 
highlighting the various controversial and legally problematic aspects of the reaction (e.g. 
Lightowlers and Quirk, 2015; Pina-Sánchez et al., 2017). Reading the Riots (Lewis et al., 
2011) was especially thorough in publishing data and analysis on the criminal justice 
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system’s reaction to the unrest. The project’s reporting included a series of people who 
were arrested or convicted9 and those whose homes and businesses were damaged (Taylor 
et al., 2012), alongside surprisingly candid interviews with police who had been on duty 
during the disturbances (Lewis and Prasad, 2012; Prasad and Owen, 2012), prosecutors, 
judges, magistrates, defence lawyers and court staff (Bawdon and Wolfe-Robinson, 2012). 
This thesis similarly centres professionals’ accounts, as I explain in Chapter 3, but seeks 
to analyse them in not only journalistic but sociological terms, by examining how they 
relate to a set of broader political, cultural and ideological concerns. As well as situating 
the responses of the police, the CPS and the courts within a legal framework, and 
highlighting individuals’ experiences of it, then, I argue we must pay attention to the 
cultural, ideological and symbolic context in which this response emerged.  
This thesis pays careful and critical attention to the narratives, moral claims and forms of 
power that made such a punitive backlash possible, and that have shaped and re-shaped 
shared understandings of the disturbances in the years since 2011. This analysis offers a 
way to think about the state’s response to the disturbances not as an anomalous or atypical 
deviation from its usual approach; but as a moment where the assumptions, shared 
understandings and narratives that shore up the system more broadly were made clearly 
visible and legible. Much of the legal analysis from 2011 has been concerned with the 
potentially discriminatory or harmful effects of these deviations from normal practice but 
has often left intact the assumption that the criminal justice system, when functioning 
properly under normal circumstances, is more or less effective, fair, or at least functional. 
Instead, I argue that we might use this response as a lens for thinking more broadly about 
how the state procures consent for an inherently harmful, class- and race-based system. 
In this sense I draw on scholars who, in the wake of earlier disturbances, have shown 
how political and popular responses to social unrest can reveal a great deal about the 
nature of the moment in which they occur (Benyon and Solomos, 1987b; Gilroy, 1982a; 
Benyon, 1984; Keith, 1993; Solomos, 1988; Gilroy, 2002). This work has traced how 
reactions to disturbances in the 1970s and ‘80s were shaped in large part by cultural 
constructions of what the ‘riots’ were and what they meant, showing how ‘common sense 
 
9 Others who documented and theorised the experiences of individuals who were criminalised in 
the wake of the disturbances and the impacts of punishment on their lives included Becky Clarke 
(2012a, 2012b) and independent films like Riots Reframed (Alam, 2012), Riot from Wrong (Nygh, 
2012) and The Hard Stop (Amponsah, 2016). 
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understandings about the nature of violent conflict’ have been ‘just as important in 
determining the way people reacted as the events and processes that generated the riots 
themselves’ (Keith, 1993: 3).   
I argue that as well as reflecting and revealing underlying structures of meaning around 
crime and criminality, the media, political, and criminal justice responses played an active 
role in reproducing and reshaping shared understandings of crime, justice and citizenship. 
‘Riot talk’ served to legitimise the state’s harsh response to the disturbances by reaffirming 
long-standing assumptions about the nature of crime, ‘criminals’, the public and 
punishment. In particular, I show how a series of shared cultural imaginaries – 
dehistoricised and decontextualised definitions of crime, racialised ideas about criminality 
and culpability, regressive and exclusionary imaginations of the public and circumscribed 
understandings of prison and its effects – worked to license and justify the punitive 
criminal justice reaction to the disturbances. The thesis, then, updates and advances work 
that has shown how ideas about race, class and citizenship are reflected and refracted 
through crime and the state’s responses to it, drawing on work including Policing the Crisis 
(Hall et al., 2013 [1978]; first published 1978), critical analyses of 1980s riots, and more 
recent work that focused on the 2011 disturbances. 
Policing the Crisis and critical interventions from the 1980s 
I borrow from Policing the Crisis (Hall et al., 2013 [1978]) its central contention that in 
order to understand ‘crime’ we must look beyond the crime itself, expanding our view to 
include the various ways that society and the state responds to it. Policing the Crisis took as 
its starting point the extraordinarily harsh sentences handed down to three young men 
accused of a ‘mugging’ in Birmingham in March 1973 – one sentenced to twenty years’ 
detention, the others to ten – and the ‘moral panic’ (Cohen, 1973) that surrounded the 
case. This panic manifested in the huge amount of political attention, press coverage, 
‘expert’ commentary, public concern and penal backlash that the crimes attracted. Like 
the crime itself, this response had an important ‘pre-history’; conditions of existence that 
were strikingly absent from efforts to explain the crime without attending to the reaction 
to it (Hall et al., 2013 [1978]: 2). I draw in particular on the insistence that crime be 
approached not as a simple ‘fact’ but as a complex social and cultural formation, as ‘the 
relation between crime and the reaction to crime’ (Hall et al., 2013 [1978]: 2). To start to 
make sense of this punitive reaction, the authors examine the emergence of mugging as 
a multifaceted social phenomenon, rather than simply as a novel form of criminal offence. 
They ask why the idea of mugging was so widely deployed; how the definition was 
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constructed and amplified; why society (including the media, politicians, police, judiciary 
and ‘moral guardians’) reacted to it in such a way, and what this might reveal about the 
economic, political and ideological conjuncture in which this sequence unfolded.  
Such ‘moments of “more than usual alarm” followed by the exercise of “more than 
normal control”’ the authors contend, have repeatedly signalled ‘periods of profound 
social upheaval, of economic crisis and historical rupture’ (Hall et al., 2013 [1978]: 184). 
I argue that we might think about the ‘riots’ as a similarly vital moment in the 
rearticulation of popular imaginations of crime, justice and citizenship in the twenty-first 
century. The kinds of responses that the 2011 disturbances engendered echo, in many 
ways, those that emerged in relation to ‘mugging’; from the dramatic media outcry, the 
political narratives and, not least, the extraordinary sentences handed down by the courts 
for riot-related offences. In this thesis I trace the determining conditions that made the 
social reaction to the 2011 disturbances ‘imaginable, possible and contingently necessary’ 
(Clarke, 2010: 340), and explore how the disturbances came to act as an ‘ideological 
conductor’ (Hall et al., 2013 [1978]: 2) through which a series of fears and tensions about 
crime, race, class and nation were articulated. The cultural construction of the unrest, I 
argue, has worked to reproduce and reshape consent for punitive politics and policy. The 
2011 disturbances offer an opportunity to study what such a phenomenon, and the social 
reaction to it, tells us about the historical moment in which it occurred, and the times in 
which we are still living.  
Policing the Crisis situated the moral panic around mugging within a crisis of the post-war, 
social democratic consensus – a series of intertwined economic, social, political, and 
cultural settlements, characterised by the welfare state, public ownership, and wealth 
redistribution through progressive taxation (Clarke, 2014) – and the forms of social and 
political consent that had sustained this settlement. From the mid 1960s to the mid 1970s, 
this consent had eroded, setting the scene for the emergence, in its place, of a new kind 
of authoritarian, populist politics that would come to be conceptualised as Thatcherism 
and, in the longer term, as neoliberalism (Massey and Hall, 2010). I argue that 
conversations about the 2011 disturbances similarly expose the modes of consent that 
underpin the criminal justice system in the twenty-first century. In particular, I ask how 
riot talk in 2011 has rearticulated and reaffirmed widely held imaginations of ‘race’ and 
class that naturalise the criminal justice system’s disproportionate targeting of 
marginalised communities. Policing the Crisis showed how the figure of the mugger in the 
1970s ‘solidified a new “common sense” consensus around authoritarian policing and 
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race relations’ (Jensen, 2014a), with young black men invoked as folk devils to legitimise 
increasingly aggressive policing in black urban neighbourhoods. This thesis shows how 
the 2011 disturbances similarly reinvigorated ‘common sense’ discourses that connect 
crime and criminality to race and class – but in ways that reflect the specific politics of 
race and class in the twenty-first century. 
In doing so, the thesis also builds on, develops and updates work that has shown how 
disturbances, in particular, have paved the way for shifting politics of law and order. 
Scholars in the 1980s showed how urban unrest was an important arena in which popular 
understandings of race, class, citizenship and justice were made and remade, providing a 
set of cultural imaginaries that legitimised discriminatory patterns of policing and 
criminalisation. As Paul Gilroy (2002; first published 1987) notes, 
The country’s exceptionally punitive system of criminal justice still accommodates the 
principal institutional sites in which ‘race relations’ are made and rendered widely 
intelligible as intractable problems of crime, disorder, violence and social pathology. 
(Gilroy, 2002: xxviii) 
Responses to the widespread urban unrest of the ‘80s were especially powerful in 
constructing a link in the popular imagination between race and criminality (Benyon, 
1987a), establishing a ‘new definition of blacks as a law and order problem’ (Gilroy, 2002: 
90). Journalistic and political accounts ‘explained’ social unrest in terms of an inherently 
criminal ‘black culture’, while political motivations or explanations were effectively 
obscured. This process was crucially important in justifying increasingly authoritarian 
policing and criminal justice practices (Burgess, 1985), and naturalising the ‘systematic 
racist criminalisation of black communities in Britain’ (Keith, 1993: 3). Disturbances, 
then, have provided the setting in which common anxieties that connect racialised 
communities with crime and criminality have emerged and gained traction.  
Though the racist policing practices and disproportionate criminalisation that had 
provoked the disturbances of the 1980s ‘continued unabated, indeed, if anything 
accelerated’ (Bowling and Phillips, 2002: 12), by the end of the decade the cultural 
imagination of crime and urban unrest as inextricably connected with race had arguably 
been unsettled (Bowling and Phillips, 2002). With relatively few major incidents of urban 
unrest occurring, some have argued, public anxiety about race and crime died down, 
‘displaced to a large extent by a concern with youth in general’ (Bowling and Phillips, 
2002: 11). The Poll Tax riot in 1991 ‘symbolised both the end of the Thatcher era, and 
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the myth that riot was a “black thing”’ (Bowling and Phillips, 2002: 11). But as I argue in 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, the events of 2011 showed not only that racism and racist 
policing remain key to explaining ‘riots’ but also that racialised understandings of 
criminality and culpability have not disappeared. Rather, I argue, they have changed shape 
and been reconfigured, but remain potent. While in the 1980s disturbances were explicitly 
blamed on ‘black culture’ across political and media responses, in 2011 such statements 
were confined to the most conservative and regressive commentaries, while in the 
mainstream such explicitly racialised statements were disavowed. Nevertheless, I show, 
imaginations of disturbances as essentially black phenomena remain important in 
allowing practitioners to make sense of the disturbances and the criminal justice response 
to them.  
Neoliberalism as conjuncture  
As well as building on critical academic interventions that theorised moral panics and 
disturbances in the late twentieth century, the thesis also makes a significant contribution 
to more recent efforts to situate the 2011 ‘riots’ in the contemporary political and 
ideological conjuncture. As I will discuss in the next chapter, looking at riot talk within the 
criminal justice system, and its ideological and political implications, offers a new 
perspective on these debates. While Policing the Crisis sought to examine the cultural 
politics of crime in 1970s Britain, this thesis situates the 2011 disturbances within a 
moment where the failures and consequences of four decades of neoliberal politics came 
to the fore. 
This context not only helps to explain the disturbances themselves – as argued above, 
scholars have theorised the unrest as, in part, at least, as a reaction against the sustained 
symbolic and structural violence that working-class communities had been subjected to 
for decades – but is also essential in making sense of the state’s response to them. 
Situating 2011 within a moment where the decades-long neoliberal consensus was under 
significant strain provides analytical concepts that allow us to think sociologically about 
the punitive state reaction to the unrest. Neoliberalism – conceived as a cultural, political 
and economic project based on an ‘ugly triad of economic deregulation, welfare state 
retraction, and penal expansion’ (Slater, 2016b: 5) – has been read as an inherently 
punitive political project that is centrally concerned with reproducing and legitimating 
harsh criminal justice practices. Wacquant’s (2008, 2009, 2010) conceptualisation of  
neoliberalism is especially useful in holding together an analysis of  the impact of  laissez-
faire economic policy, on the one hand, and on the other, interventionist and vindictive 
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social and penal policy. Neoliberalism as an intrinsically ideological project mandates 
‘submission to the “free market” and the celebration of  “individual responsibility” in all 
realms’ (Wacquant, 2009: 1, emphasis added) but in practice requires and is inherently 
imbricated with ‘more intensive and punitive interventions in the lives of  marginalised 
groups’ (Crossley, 2016: 266). Punitive social and penal policy is ‘not a deviation from, 
but a constituent component of, the neo-liberal leviathan’ (Wacquant, 2010: 201 cited in 
Crossley, 2016). For Wacquant the two are intimately interlinked; the penal system and 
other forms of punitive ‘statecraft’ working together to contain and manage the social 
and economic havoc wrought by neoliberal economic policy. This conceptualisation 
offers a useful starting point for thinking critically about why the criminal justice system 
responded to the disturbances with such vigour and zeal.  
This thesis builds on work that has emphasised the central role of the symbolic, the 
discursive and the ideological in the politics of neoliberalism; ‘the mechanisms through 
which public consent is procured’ for state policies and practices that effect deepening 
inequalities (Tyler, 2013b). These ideas of  neoliberal statecraft as an ideological project have 
been especially useful in allowing scholars to make sense of  the state’s response to the 
disturbances; tracing the discursive regimes and patterns of  representation that have 
made society predisposed to such an extreme reaction. In this thesis I ask how the political 
and cultural context in which the 2011 disturbances emerged helps us to make sense of  
the response to them, paying particular attention to how the ideological underpinnings 
of  neoliberal politics – ideas of  personal responsibility, stigmatising imaginations of  poor 
and racialised communities and exclusionary conceptions of  the public – worked to 
legitimise and procure consent for the harsh punishment of  rioters.  
Drawing on the approach taken in Policing the Crisis, the concept of cultural political 
economy prompts us to consider not only how cultural imaginaries, narratives and stories 
provide ‘a semiotic frame for construing the world’ but also how such imaginaries actively 
contribute ‘to its construction’ (Jessop, 2010: 342; cited in Jensen and Tyler, 2015). I 
explore how media texts, political rhetoric and practitioners’ accounts worked together 
to legitimise and license the criminal justice response to the disturbances. Attending to 
the political and cultural conjuncture from which the disturbances emerged, I argue, helps 
us to understand why the criminal justice system reacted with such speed and severity, 
and to understand why there was relatively little public outcry about the violence and 
injustice engendered by this backlash.  
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Critical contributions to a cultural political economy of punishment  
Building on critical work from recent years I maintain that in order to understand the 
response to the disturbances, we must first pay attention to how marginalised 
communities have come to be understood within the contemporary cultural politics of 
neoliberal austerity. The ideology and logic of neoliberalism were especially potent in 
setting the scene for the state’s punitive reaction to the unrest (Sim, 2012; Slater, 2016b; 
Tyler, 2013b). How ‘the riots were mediated, imagined and “made” in public’ – and in 
particular, the emergence of a specific set of narratives about what the disturbances were, 
and why they happened – ‘was used to generate and deepen public consent for the shift 
from protective liberal forms of welfare to penal workfare regimes’ (Tyler, 2013b) and, 
indeed, a punitive criminal justice response against the rioters. It was, arguably, because 
‘popular and political hostility towards the poor had become so deeply embedded in the 
wider society’ that ‘the state, could, and did, respond coercively in order to restore order, 
with little consideration for the legitimacy of the judiciary’s actions’ (Sim, 2012: 27). This 
analysis has highlighted how political and media rhetoric around the disturbances, in 
particular, provided a set of meanings that legitimised the harsh punishment of rioters. 
The ruling Conservative party swiftly blamed the riots on individual responsibility, failing 
character and morals, exemplified in Cameron’s insistence that ‘these riots were not about 
poverty’ but rather ‘about behaviour’ (Cameron, 2011b). This framing effectively allowed 
politicians and commentators to deny the political nature of the unrest. Framed as 
decisively non-political, ‘the events were easily reduced to a consequence of poor choices 
and failed morals, which thus warranted punishment’ (Lamble, 2013: 582). ‘Set against 
the political backdrop of steep state retrenchment and relentless invocation of personal 
responsibility’, the disturbances were ‘bound to trigger rash statements and kneejerk 
government reaction’ (Slater, 2016b: 2), providing an ideological underpinning for the 
draconian measures and sanctions handed down to rioters. 
Critical analysis has shown how the insistence on personal responsibility lent legitimacy 
to a range of punitive responses, mobilising the disturbances as evidence for a host of 
social and moral ills and legitimising punitive state interventions that predominantly 
targeted poor and marginalised people. This work has been vital in showing how, rather 
than seeking to recognise or address profound structural inequalities, state responses have 
framed their solutions to the ‘problems’ in terms of rectifying individual and cultural 
‘problems’ that are inherently connected to imaginations of social class, race and gender. 
These ‘problems’ have included gangs and gang culture (HM Government, 2011; The 
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Centre for Social Justice, 2012; see e.g. Angel, 2012; Brotherton and Hallsworth, 2011; 
Williams, 2015 for critique), welfare dependency and inadequate parenting (Allen and 
Taylor, 2012; Bristow, 2013; Crossley, 2016). Structural issues like child poverty and youth 
unemployment were reframed ‘as consequences of a cocktail of “bad individual choices”’ 
including ‘an absence of moral judgement, poor parenting, hereditary or genetic 
deficiencies, and/or welfare dependency’ (Tyler, 2013b). Media and political responses to 
the disturbances coalesced around a ‘powerful political myth’ of the ‘underclass’ (Easton, 
2011), articulated in some cases through dehumanising and shockingly stigmatising 
language of ‘scum’, ‘ferality’ and ‘vermin’ (Tyler, 2013a, 2013b, 2015). This ‘underclass 
consensus’ (Tyler, 2013b) positioned the poor as deserving of their disadvantage. These 
critical analyses show how the systemic ‘symbolic defamation’ of marginalised people is 
a crucial part of the conditions of possibility for the state’s punitive reaction to the 
disturbances (Slater, 2016b). This body of work that has emerged since 2011, then, 
provides valuable concepts and ideas that are crucial for understanding how particular 
media and political discourses came to license and normalise a set of punitive responses.  
This thesis makes two distinct contributions to this work. First, while most of the incisive 
critical analysis has focused on the punitive social policy measures that targeted already 
marginalised communities, I pay sustained attention to the narratives and assumptions 
that played into the criminal justice response – a relatively under-explored reaction, but 
one that, as I have shown, was strikingly severe and warrants further study. I build on and 
extend the existing work, showing how a set of meanings around the ‘riots’ has similarly 
underpinned and shored up penal policy in the years since 2011.  
Second, I add a vital dimension to this sociological work by asking how these broader 
cultural and ideological processes came to shape, to legitimise, and to procure consent 
for, the criminal justice backlash against the rioters. The research in this thesis examines 
not only the discourses at work in political and media spheres but reveals how people at 
the heart of the criminal justice system itself justified the system’s reaction. By turning my 
focus to some of those people working within the CPS, the courts and local authorities, 
I examine the decisions they made, the considerations and compromises these entailed, 
and how they have come to be understood in the years since 2011 (in the next chapter I 
discuss the challenges of undertaking this kind of research).  
I show how the narratives and moral claims that dominated political and media discourse 
in 2011 come to inform and make sense of the response of the criminal justice response 
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to the disturbances. As my analysis in the following chapters shows, practitioners in 
different parts of the criminal justice system, and even within the same organisations, 
drew on very different understandings of the riots, the rioters, the public and the penal 
system, revealing a degree of diversity, multiplicity, complexity and nuance that cannot 
be captured by focusing on political and media rhetoric alone. Moreover, by bringing in 
practitioners’ perspectives, the thesis offers a glimpse into the processes whereby the 
broader, somewhat nebulous, political and ideological context played out through a set 
of tangible policies and practices. In this sense the thesis explores how neoliberal 
statecraft is not simply imposed by a monolithic state; but rather is enacted, interpreted, 
negotiated and resisted in complex ways by the multiple organisations and individuals 
tasked with its delivery (Fitzgibbon et al., 2013; Jones, 2013). As I will show, practitioners 
engaged in regimes of sense-making that were markedly distinct from – but often 
connected to – media and political discourses. Attending to their accounts offers original 
and important insight into the ideological processes that legitimised the criminal justice 
response to the disturbances, and that continue to underpin the criminal justice system 
in the current context.   
An agnotological analysis 
Finally, the thesis makes a timely contribution to emerging literature on the role of 
agnosis, broadly conceived, in contemporary politics. This literature cautions against 
thinking of ignorance as ‘a mere gap in knowledge, the accidental result of an 
epistemological oversight’ or unintentional ‘by-product of the limited time and resources 
that human beings have to investigate and understand their world’ (Sullivan and Tuana, 
2007: 1). Rather, an agnotological perspective prompts us to examine how popular 
understandings are shaped by structures of power and domination; how ignorance is 
deliberately cultivated, ‘carefully managed’ and ‘curated’ (Gilroy, 2019).  
Writers such as Steven Box (1983), Stan Cohen (2001) and Paul Gilroy (2006, 2019) have 
long since alerted us to the crucial importance of deception, misinformation, 
mystification, obfuscation, uncertainty, denial, doubt, dismissal, omission, amnesia and 
silence as powerful social, cultural, economic and political forces. Sociological work on 
this theme has seemed to accelerate in recent years, coalescing around the notion of 
agnotology (Slater, 2014, 2016a; Barton and Davis, 2018). Coined by Robert Proctor 
(1995) in his research on the tobacco industry’s deliberate management of public 
ignorance of the health effects of smoking, the concept of agnotology – the study of 
ignorance and its crucial social and political functions – has been taken up widely, 
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developed and expanded by scholars across disciplines (see especially collections edited 
by Proctor and Schiebinger, 2008; and McGoey, 2016a). Following this lead, researchers 
have exposed how ignorance, doubt and denial work as important economic commodities 
for many organisations and industries, from anti-environmentalist businesses disputing 
the certainty of climate change, to insurance industries, to financial securities traders who 
profit from uncertainty in markets (McGoey, 2016b; Rayner, 2016). Others have 
emphasised how the cultivation of ‘strategic unknowns’ (McGoey, 2016b, 2019) or 
‘orchestrated ignorance’ (Canning, 2018) is an exceptionally powerful political resource. 
Attending to patterns of ignorance, elision and amnesia is a crucial task for critical 
scholars because ‘it has the potential to reveal the role of power in the construction of what 
is known’ (Sullivan and Tuana, 2007: 2, emphasis added).  
Agnotology, then, offers scholars a valuable framework for thinking about the diverse 
ways that states and powerful organisations mobilise ignorance as a powerful resource to 
naturalise and legitimise their power (Proctor and Schiebinger, 2008; McGoey, 2016a, 
2019), and more specifically, the role of ignorance in legitimising the criminal justice 
system and its harmful and discriminatory practices (Barton and Davis, 2018; Mathiesen, 
2004). Taking a lead from these researchers, my analysis focuses on tracing how the 
narratives – about the riots, rioters, society and justice – that served to justify and 
legitimise the state’s response to the riots and its day-to-day practices, rely for their 
coherence and legibility on processes of amnesia, omission and denial. It adds a further 
dimension to work that traces the vital role of agnosis in shoring up the class-based 
violence inherent in contemporary British politics, and the punitive austerity agenda in 
particular (Graeber, 2016; Slater, 2014, 2016a), and more specifically to an emerging body 
of work that applies this agnotological focus to the criminal justice system and how it 
normalises and secures acquiescence for the harms it perpetuates (Barton and Davis, 
2018; Mathiesen, 2004).  
Work on ‘penal agnosis’ (Scott, 2018), for example, examines how popular consent for 
prisons as a central tenet of criminal justice is built upon the wilful maintenance of 
ignorance of the reality of the realities of the people in prison, the conditions they live in 
and the effects of imprisonment (see also Peacock, 2019; Stanley and Mihaere, 2018). By 
examining the cultural imaginaries that served to rationalise and authorise the criminal 
justice system’s disproportionate targeting of racialised communities I draw on and 
develop ideas from scholars who study the peculiar role that ignorance plays in reifying 
and sustaining widely held ideas about ‘race’ (Mills, 1997; Sullivan and Tuana, 2007) and, 
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in particular, imaginations of racialised communities as  disproportionately predisposed 
to crime and criminality (Gilroy, 1982b; Williams and Clarke, 2018). By investigating how 
knowledge and ignorance are mobilised in practitioners’ accounts of the riots, rioters, the 
public and the prison system, my interviews and analysis allow me to make an original 
contribution to this academic endeavour.  
Conclusions  
In this chapter I have set out my approach to making sociological sense of the 2011 
disturbances. I have made a case for approaching the unrest as a lens through which we 
might examine the cultural political economy of punishment in the twenty-first century. 
This approach offers a significant contribution to three areas of work: critical analysis on 
the 2011 ‘riots’, the broader project of theorising the politics of crime and punishment in 
the contemporary conjuncture, and emerging work on the ideological significance of 
ignorance in its diverse forms. 
Reviewing the abundant academic response to the disturbances, I noted that researchers 
expended a great deal of effort explaining the various factors that might have caused the 
unrest. I argued that in order to better understand the riots in sociological terms, we need 
to pay closer attention to historical, political and ideological context, and to the state’s 
punitive response to the disturbances. Situating the 2011 riots within their historical 
context draws attention to the vital connections between the causes of unrest, the cultural 
constructions of disturbances, and the state’s response to them, highlighting in particular 
long-standing relationships between disorder, ‘race’ and racism and the politics of law 
and order. 
Drawing on critical work from the twentieth century and more recently, I have described 
how I approach the disturbances not simply as an event or set of events to be explained, 
but as a complex social and cultural formation that is constituted in large part by the 
various media, political and judicial responses to the disturbances. By paying close 
attention to this response, I argue, we can make better sociological sense of the unrest. I 
approach 2011 as an ideological conductor through which we can trace widely shared 
narratives about crime, justice, responsibility and morality, and ask how these reflect the 
ideology and politics of neoliberal austerity from which it emerged. ‘Riot talk’, I argue, 
offers a valuable resource for studying the claims and narratives that legitimise and 
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underpin the criminal justice system. By studying the stories and understandings that 
worked to rationalise and legitimise the harshly punitive response to the disturbances, I 
argued, we can better understand the processes by which the criminal justice system 
justifies and sustains itself. Public and professional debates about the disturbances and 
the appropriate state response to them offer insight into a wider cultural political 
economy of punishment that underpins the legitimation, perpetuation and reproduction 
of an ineffective and discriminatory criminal justice system; and the particular role of 
ignorance, amnesia, denial and dismissal in this process.  
In the following chapter I explain how my research builds on these foundations by 
looking closely at how criminal justice professionals justified and defended – or, in some 
cases, criticised and challenged – the punitive criminal justice response to disturbances. I 
explain how this research enables us to see how the rhetorical, discursive and ideological 
construction of the disturbances shaped the criminal justice response to the unrest, and 
in turn how the criminal justice response to the riots and its ideological construction 








Designing and conducting the research: Studying ‘riot 
talk’ 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter I set out my approach to studying the 2011 disturbances and 
described how this emphasis on the state’s punitive response to the unrest extends and 
further develops the existing literature. While other scholars have treated the unrest as an 
outburst of crime to be explained, I made a case for focusing on the narratives and 
meanings that coalesced around the ‘riots’ and the criminal justice response to them, and 
the ideological implications of these. Instead of seeking to explain why the disturbances 
happened, then, this thesis focuses on ‘riot talk’ and uses this to trace the discursive 
regimes and patterns of meaning-making that made the harsh punishment of rioters seem 
reasonable and necessary.
In this chapter I discuss how I have implemented this methodological perspective. 
Conducting qualitative interviews with people who were at the forefront of the criminal 
justice system’s reaction to the disturbances, I argue, offers valuable insight into the 
modes by which the criminal justice response to the unrest was framed as legitimate, 
proportionate and necessary; and, conversely, the alternative narratives that provide a 
counterpoint to this. Examining practitioners’ accounts of the disturbances enables not 
only a deeper understanding of their individual processes of sense-making in relation to 
the state’s response to 2011, but the various mechanisms by which the criminal justice 
system seeks to procure consent and legitimacy for its punitive practices more broadly.  
This approach offers a new dimension to existing critical work on the cultural and 
ideological processes underlying the punitive response to the disturbances. While 
researchers have done vital work in identifying the representations and discursive 
framings that dominated media and political debate in 2011 and set the scene for the 
state’s punitive response (as described in Chapter 2) I build significantly on this work by 
foregrounding the accounts of practitioners who were central to designing and delivering 
the criminal justice backlash to the riots, asking how they justify and make sense of the 
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punishment of rioters. Centring criminal justice practitioners provides a fresh empirical 
perspective and makes an important original contribution to existing work on the cultural 
and ideological processes that legitimised and normalised the punitive criminal justice 
response to the disturbances. 
Between February and October 2018, I conducted 14 qualitative, semi-structured 
interviews with criminal justice practitioners and policymakers. The research participants 
included two people who had at the time of the disturbances been defence barristers, 
three defence solicitors, three prosecutors, a senior civil servant at the Ministry of Justice, 
a district judge, a magistrate, two staff in local authority youth offending services and a 
probation service manager (see page 232 for an overview of my interviewees, their roles, 
and where the interviews were carried out). Most interviews took around an hour, though 
some were slightly shorter (the shortest was around 45 minutes) and some were longer 
(about 90 minutes). Most of the interviews were conducted at the participant’s current 
workplace, while three were carried out in cafés, and one in the participant’s parents’ flat, 
which she was using as an office the day that we met. One interview was conducted over 
Skype due to the participant living in another part of the country. In this chapter I argue 
that these interviews offer a valuable way to capture the ‘riot talk’ that I have argued is so 
sociologically important. Interviews provide a rich opportunity to examine how 
professionals seek to present themselves, their work and their organisation to a potentially 
critical outsider; and as such, to trace the modes of legitimation that underpin criminal 
justice work.  
The chapter is in three parts. In the first part I set out my research methods, making a 
case for turning my analytical gaze ‘upwards’ towards the criminal justice system, and 
explaining why interviews with criminal justice practitioners offer a valuable tool for 
tracing the cultural and ideological underpinnings of the criminal justice response to the 
disturbances, and the ‘afterlife’ of this response in the years since 2011. In Part 2 I reflect 
on my experiences of arranging and conducting the research interviews and consider what 
this reveals about the power and politics of ‘studying up’. While the criminal justice system 
remains guarded against critical research, I show that the complex, nuanced and shifting 
power dynamics that emerged within the research relationship challenge and complicate 
some of the simplistic assumptions about researching powerful individuals and 
organisations. Part 3 of the chapter sets out my approach to analysing the interviews, 
introducing key analytical concepts that I develop throughout the thesis.  
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Part 1. Designing the research  
Why study criminal justice professionals? ‘Studying up’  
By subjecting those who define and respond to crime to the same kinds of attentiveness 
and interrogation that have traditionally been applied to ‘offenders’, the thesis seeks to 
subvert some of the ethical and political challenges inherent in studying ‘crime’. Rather 
than focusing on those who were punished, I look ‘upwards’ at some of the processes 
that shaped these practices of criminalisation and punishment. I argue that attending to 
criminal justice professionals’ accounts offers a valuable resource for investigating the 
cultural and discursive means by which the criminal justice response to the disturbances 
was made possible, and by which popular consent for such a punitive backlash was 
secured, or at least sought (or, as I argue in Chapter 6, assumed to already exist). By paying 
critical sociological attention to those who were directly designing, delivering and dealing 
with the state’s criminal justice response to the unrest, and how they talk about their work, 
we can glimpse some of the modes of consent and legitimation that were at play – and, 
crucially, the cracks where this consensus broke down.  
In Chapter 2 I made a methodological argument for taking a more expansive view of ‘the 
riots’, paying sustained attention to the punitive response to the disturbances, rather than 
focusing solely on the disturbances themselves. This decision is also rooted in political 
and ethical considerations. While sociological analysis has tended to focus on the effects of 
social inequalities on those in society who are relatively powerless, there are well-
rehearsed arguments for attending to the processes, structures and institutions ‘whereby 
power and responsibility are exercised’ (Nader, 1972: 284). By ‘studying up’ (Nader, 1972) 
– subjecting these sites of power to the same academic scrutiny that has been largely 
directed toward those at the bottom of social hierarchies – scholars have sought to use 
research as a tool to hold to account the individuals and organisations that wield power 
and influence. The study of crime in particular has often involved research for the 
powerful – those responsible for creating and maintaining the definitions and markers of 
crime, and the appropriate responses to it – on the powerless (Winter and Lumsden, 2014). 
In this way, criminology has perhaps ‘the most dangerous relationship to power’ of all 
the social sciences (Hudson, 2000, cited in Winter and Lumsden, 2014: 1).  
Of course, researchers have sought to redress this ‘dangerous relationship’ by maintaining 
a focus on those who are the targets of practices of policing and punishment, but 
employing research methods and practices that aim to serve the needs of marginalised 
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groups rather than those of the state (see e.g. Williams and Clarke’s (2018) convincing 
call for a ‘criminology from below’). The approach I take here, however, is to turn the 
critical gaze of research on the culture and practices of power, rather than of the 
powerless: a shift from looking ‘downstream’ to looking ‘upstream’ (Crossley, 2017). As 
I argued in the previous chapter, while much has been written about the riots and the 
motivations of the rioters, far less attention has been paid to those who have played vital 
roles in the punitive criminal justice reaction to the disturbances. This thesis takes the 
standpoint that the people, places, processes and institutions involved in defining and 
responding to crime are as much a part of the phenomena, and warrant as much analytical 
attention, as the crime or ‘criminals’ in question (Hall et al., 2013 [1978]). Focusing my 
analytical gaze upwards offers a distinctive insight because it renders visible a complex 
process of narration, negotiation and self-legitimation that ordinarily remains out of sight 
to sociologists and the public. Prosecutors, senior civil servants and judges had a 
peculiarly powerful role in defining the disturbances and the appropriate response to 
them, but unlike media and political discourse, this professional and institutional riot talk 
has received scant attention.  
Moreover, attending to professionals’ riot talk offers a view onto a regime of sense-
making that is connected to, but distinct from, those that have been explored in existing 
work. While important critical academic examinations of the discursive construction of 
the disturbances have focused on media and political discourses (e.g. Lamble, 2013; Tyler, 
2013b; Slater, 2016b; Kelsey, 2015) I identify a set of imaginations that were markedly 
different from those at work in much political and media discourse. It is important to 
study this process because it has potent and tangible implications. The practitioners I 
interviewed were often in senior positions within high-status professions and had been 
instrumental in designing and enacting the startlingly punitive response to the 
disturbances that predominantly affected already marginalised and over-criminalised 
communities. Understanding their perspectives, I argue, is crucial if we are to better 
understand this response, its conditions of possibility and its aftermath in the criminal 
justice system. 
Why conduct interviews? Tracing the afterlife of the ‘riots’ 
Interviews offered an effective tool for bringing to light the imaginations and narratives 
that criminal justice professionals drew on to make sense of and justify their work in 
relation to the disturbances. Social scientists are often cautious about using interviews as 
a means of discovering what people do, or why, since ‘what people say is the legitimation 
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of what they do, not the explanation or the description’ (Miller, 2012: 31 emphasis added), 
but it is precisely this aspect of interviews that I make use of (I discuss the concept of 
legitimation in more detail in Part 3 of this chapter). I approach practitioners’ accounts 
not as an accurate record of what they did in 2011 or why; but as a glimpse into the 
discursive resources they draw on to explain and justify the criminal justice response to 
the disturbances, in a highly specific social setting and at a particular moment in time.   
The timing of my project allowed me to examine how collective imaginations of  the riots 
had both settled and shifted in the intervening years; to trace the meanings that endured 
and those that had fallen away. In Chapter 2 I set out the importance of attending to the 
‘pre-history’ (Hall et al., 2013 [1978]: 2) of the riots to make sociological sense of them; 
but looking at the ‘afterlife’ (Tamm, 2015) of the riots, too, provides valuable insight into 
their significance. Conducting research seven years after the riots offered a perspective 
that was not available to scholars studying the disturbances as they happened and in their 
immediate aftermath, allowing me to trace not just the meanings and definitions that had 
shaped the response to the disturbances in 2011, but the narratives that had ideological 
influence in the years that followed.  
The imaginations that my interviews revealed were reflective not only of the cultural and 
political moment in which the riots happened, but are also intertwined with the context 
in which the interviews took place. Far from simply capturing practitioners’ views as they 
were in 2011, the interviews provided an opportunity for practitioners to reflect on the 
riots in a way they had not done before, or with new understanding that comes only with 
hindsight. As retired district judge Leonard pointed out at the end of our interview, in a 
high-pressured and fast-moving professional life he had little time to mull over his work.  
Doing the job that I did, you do something and move on. You don’t give it any other 
thought… And actually it’s been quite a nice part of retirement, [to] sort of go back and 
think ‘Did I really do that?’  
In this way the interviews constitute a kind of oral history of the riots, and following this 
tradition I take the view that memory is not ‘a passive depository of facts, but an active 
process of creation of meanings’ (Portelli, 1991: 52). Practitioners’ narratives of the riots, 
whether reliable or not, provide a valuable resource for analysis. Paying attention to the 
‘afterlife’ (Tamm, 2015) of the riots allows us to see how meanings of riots and the rioters 
not only emerged at a specific moment but how these meanings have been reconfigured 
and ‘translated’ (Tamm, 2015: 4) over time, leaving a cultural memory of 2011 that, I 
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argue, says as much about the political and cultural tensions at play in 2018 (when the 
research was conducted) as it does about the events themselves. 
My interviews, like all oral history, tell us ‘less about events than about their meaning’ 
(Portelli, 1991: 50), revealing ‘not just what people did, but what they wanted to do, what 
they believed they were doing, and what they now think they did’ (Portelli, 1991: 2). 
Remembered – or misremembered – accounts may be partial and unreliable in terms of 
factual accuracy; but rather than representing a weakness in the method ‘this is, however, 
their strength: errors, inventions, and myths lead us through and beyond facts to their 
meanings’ (Portelli, 1991: 2). Stories, regardless of their veracity, ‘are a powerful means 
of making sense of our social reality,’ Kvale and Brinkmann (2009: 55) remind us, and 
interviews are ‘a key site for eliciting narratives that inform us of the human world of 
meanings’ (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009: 55). In this thesis I focus less on the revelations 
about policy and practice contained in participants’ recollections – though these are 
important and often illuminating – than the tensions, desires and priorities of the teller 
that the accounts reveal. The particular value of these accounts ‘lies, not so much in their 
ability to preserve the past, as in the very changes wrought by memory’ (Portelli, 1991: 
52). Interviews, in this way, are a valuable method for an agnotological approach (see 
Chapter 2): by attending to the ‘half-truths, silences, and concealed information’ (Portelli, 
1991: 258) they contain, my interviews offer a view onto the processes by which collective 
memories of 2011 have been shaped by processes of ignorance and amnesia. 
The research in this thesis is based on a relatively small number of qualitative interviews. 
While I had anticipated interviewing around 30 participants, my final sample was 14. In 
part this reflects the methodological challenges of gaining access to institutions like the 
judiciary and the CPS (as I have discussed), which limited the number of professionals I 
was able to meet. Nevertheless, the interviews I conducted provided rich material, and 
working with a manageable number of interviews meant I was able to pay close attention 
to the complexity, continuities and contradictions within and between participants’ 
accounts. Though the individuals I interviewed are not necessarily typical of their 
professions or representative of other kinds of criminal justice workers who were not 
included in the study, the recurrence of narratives and claims about the disturbances and 
the criminal justice response across my conversations with participants from different 
parts of the criminal justice system (as I discuss in the following chapters) points to a 
cultural political economy of meanings that, I contend, circulated beyond the necessarily 
limited material on which my analysis is based (I discuss this in more detail in chapter 8).  
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Part 2. Conducting the research  
Having discussed why I have centred criminal justice practitioners’ accounts in the 
research, and why interviews provide a valuable tool for tracing how professionals 
justified the criminal justice response to 2011, here I describe my experience of arranging 
the research and conducting the interviews. While the process of organising the 
interviews in many ways affirmed established ideas about the power of the criminal justice 
system to guard itself from view by tightly controlling its exposure to researchers, my 
experiences of actually conducting the interviews revealed a much more ambiguous and 
nuanced power dynamic between myself and the participants, problematising some of 
the simplistic assumptions about researching upwards which assume that broader power 
dynamics will simply be reproduced in the research encounter. I found that interviews, 
far from solely providing a forum for professionals to rehearse hegemonic narratives, 
created a space in which professionals were in some ways accountable to me as an 
interviewer, providing justificatory and sometimes defensive accounts of their work and 
their organisations. Practitioners’ accounts were often characterised by doubt, 
defensiveness, and dilemma that reflected complex, nuanced and shifting power dynamics 
within the research relationship.  
Arranging the interviews 
I began arranging my interviews in earnest in January 2018, when I started to contact 
prospective research participants, and continued the ongoing process of negotiation 
throughout the period of fieldwork, ending in October 2018. Some groups of 
professionals were far easier to access than others: while defence solicitors, for example, 
were relatively forthcoming in their responses to my approaches, the judiciary, in 
particular, proved an extremely closed organisation.  
This process demonstrated the challenges of studying the criminal justice system, and 
highlights the importance of this research for subjecting to critical analysis these guarded 
and somewhat secretive institutions (Baldwin, 2008). As I explore throughout the thesis, 
participants’ accounts revealed how ignorance, denial and amnesia were vitally important 
in naturalising and legitimising the harshly punitive penal response to the unrest. The 
barriers that criminal justice organisations use to shield themselves from critical scrutiny 
by researchers allow them to retain close control over the knowledge about them that is 
in the public sphere, and to control the narratives about them. While some organisations 
were surprisingly open to participating in this research, I argue that the challenges I faced 
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in gaining access to judges, in particular, are symptomatic of how ignorance and 
invisibility plays a crucial role in upholding state practices.  
Having personal contacts or ‘friends in high places’ (Puwar, 1997) is a significant 
advantage for researchers seeking to study people in prestigious professions, but having 
such connections to call on is dependent on researchers’ social class, ethnicity, gender, 
professional seniority and age, and I was in many ways at a disadvantage having no 
obvious ‘way in’ to the criminal justice system. Without direct connections or a 
professional network to call on, I made contact with most of my interviewees via email, 
using publicly available information to find appropriate individuals and contact details.10 
This strategy had patchy success: though I recruited four research participants in this way, 
the majority of messages I sent out went unanswered, or prompted some correspondence 
that died down before we were able to arrange a meeting (see page 233 for an overview 
of the recruitment process for my final participants). However, my own privileges, and 
particularly my middle-class positioning and the informal connections it afforded, 
undoubtedly helped me to facilitate the research. Many of my interviews were made 
possible by making use of indirect connections through friends and colleagues who put 
me in touch with their contacts, who then put me in touch with their colleagues, and so 
on. My ability to develop trust and rapport with often high-status professionals was also 
undoubtedly aided by my middle-class habitus and my whiteness, and my ability to 
present myself in interviews relatively politically ‘neutral’ and unthreatening.11 
 
10 While putting together the funding proposal for this project I had established relationship with 
a penal reform organisation who I had hoped would help me to make contact with criminal justice 
professionals through their membership and networks. However, it proved very difficult to 
maintain regular contact and get things moving, and as the focus of my research changed and its 
findings looked less likely to be relevant to the organisation’s policy and campaigning work, and 
my own perspective on the political issues at stake developed, the partnership also began to feel 
less appropriate.  
11 One particular moment from the research illustrates this point. Prior to my meeting with district 
judge Leonard he had recommended I dress smartly for the interview, in order to move swiftly 
through the court’s security checks. Having dressed accordingly in office wear, at the end of our 
discussion Leonard thanked me for following his suggestion, joking that ‘I thought you might 
turn up in a T-shirt saying “All coppers are bastards!”’. My ability to present myself as 
professional, and perhaps as less politically invested than he expected, seemed to facilitate our 
discussion and his willingness to help me contact other judges.  
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Personal relationships and informal contacts were invaluable in arranging the research, 
but in the case of the judiciary the organisation remained very difficult to access. My 
contact with Leonard, the only judge among my participants, came about somewhat 
serendipitously: we were put in touch by Roger – a criminal defence solicitor and head of 
a long-established East End firm – who I had interviewed. Roger had known Leonard 
for many years, the two having practiced at neighbouring law firms earlier in their careers, 
and still saw each other regularly at Law Society events, providing the opportunity for 
Roger to put us in contact. When I met Leonard in a colleague’s plush office at 
Westminster Magistrates’ Court (see Chapter 7) he suggested a number of other judges 
who had been central in the judiciary’s response to the disturbances, suggesting I go 
through the office of the Chief Magistrate to contact them. Even with Leonard facilitating 
this contact, the formal process for requesting judicial participation in research was 
lengthy and bureaucratic and ultimately unsuccessful. The application required an 
explanation of how the project would benefit the judiciary or the courts, how it would 
improve or promote the administration of justice, and a comprehensive list of interview 
questions. The guidance for applicants stated that approval would only be granted if it 
was judged that ‘members of the judiciary would not be drawn into areas of political 
controversy or commenting on the merits of government policy,’ that the research was 
‘in the public interest’ and that ‘judicial discretion and independence would not be 
impaired by participation’ (Courts and Tribunals Judiciary, 2018). I was required to 
provide assurance that members of the judiciary would not be identified, and had to agree 
to ‘provide a final draft copy of any report to members of the senior judiciary and the 
judiciary involved in the research, to give them an opportunity to comment upon it before 
a report is published’ (Courts and Tribunals Judiciary, 2018). Having submitted a detailed 
letter covering all these points, and only receiving an acknowledgement several weeks 
later after two follow-up emails, the three emails and two phone calls I made over the 
course of the following four months elicited no further response.  
Like other researchers, then, I found gaining access to judges ‘a very tricky undertaking’ 
(Baldwin, 2008: 376): along with other powerful institutions, the judiciary ‘tend to be 
publicly visible and seemingly easy to contact’ but in reality ‘have remained secretive, 
placing high value on privacy and exclusion’ (Alvesalo-Kuusi and Whyte, 2017: 3). 
Members of the senior judiciary in particular tend to be ‘distinctly unenthusiastic about 
research; frequently viewing such endeavours as an unwarranted intrusion into matters 
that should be their business and no one else’s’ (Baldwin, 2008: 375). Though researchers 
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have succeeded in establishing research relationships with judges beyond studying written 
documents or observing their work in court (e.g. Griffith, 1977; Darbyshire, 2011; 
Annison, 2014) the judiciary, compared to other criminal justice organisations, seem 
reluctant and resistant to participate in critical research (Baldwin, 2008).  
Despite playing a crucial role in the punitive backlash against the rioters in 2011, the 
judiciary remained remarkably hidden from public view, aside from one district judge, 
Tan Ikram, taking the highly unusual step of speaking out publicly to vigorously defend 
the judiciary’s approach to the disturbances (Lakhani, 2012a), and one anonymous district 
judge giving a brief comment to Reading the Riots journalists (Bawdon and Wolfe-
Robinson, 2012). Judges’ invisibility in 2011 suggested that the judiciary in the twenty-
first century to a great extent remains ‘a closed institutional sphere within the state, 
relatively anonymous, represented in its institutional rather than its individual person’ 
(Hall et al., 2013 [1978]: 36) so that  
individual differences of attitude and viewpoint between different judges, and the 
informal processes by which common judicial perspectives come to be formed… are 
normally shielded from public scrutiny, and have rarely been studied or written about in 
any systematic way.  
(Hall et al., 2013 [1978]: 36) 
Tim Newburn noted a year after the disturbances that in contrast to the involvement of 
rioters, victims, police officers, defence lawyers and the Crown Prosecution Service, the 
judiciary had rebuffed all requests to take part in the Reading the Riots study. ‘Paradoxically’, 
he wrote, ‘it is easier at the moment to contact an unconvicted looter than a judge’ 
(Newburn, 2012). Given the critical nature of this research project and the seemingly 
impenetrable wall that protects the judiciary from critical researchers seeking to situate 
their practices in relation to broader patterns of politics and power, I felt fortunate to 
have been able to interview one judge. Having access to often revealing and surprisingly 
frank discussions with practitioners who are seldom involved in research highlights the 
original contribution of this thesis, but also points to the ways in which the judiciary 
maintains a firm grip on its representations, its reputation and what is known about it.  
Negotiating access to prosecutors similarly laid bare the power of state organisations to 
closely control the research process. My contact with the CPS was facilitated by a 
colleague who put me in contact with a relative working at the CPS, whose responsibilities 
fortuitously included managing the organisation’s participation in research. To obtain 
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agreement to interview three prosecutors, I was required to sign two documents: first, a 
declaration to state that I understood my research was subject to the Official Secrets Act, 
and that any ‘unauthorised disclosure’ may be tried in court and subject to a maximum 
penalty of two years’ imprisonment or an unlimited fine (see appendices from page 235) 
and second, a research undertaking form (see page 239) that included the following clause:  
(v) any book, article, broadcast or lecture based upon the research findings and 
incorporating information derived from the interviews for which permission has been 
granted will be submitted to the CPS prior to any publication for comment. The CPS 
retains the right to edit or otherwise restrict publication of any such information. A thesis 
made available for public inspection shall be deemed a publication. 
The prospect of agreeing that the CPS could ‘edit or otherwise restrict publication’ of not 
only my thesis but future publications, presentations and teaching materials was extremely 
concerning and placed me in a vulnerable position.12 I was risking not only potential 
criminal proceedings but a great deal of my own time and effort in undertaking research 
and analysis that the CPS could effectively prevent me from using.  
This raises important questions about research ethics in ‘studying up’ and the need for 
more nuanced understandings of the risks of harm in research with powerful 
organisations. In part because ‘the empirical methods used in social science have almost 
exclusively been developed to face downwards rather than upwards’ (Alvesalo-Kuusi and 
Whyte, 2017: 4), standard research ethics frameworks do not adequately reflect the 
complex power dynamics at play in research with the criminal justice system. Established 
ethical codes seek to ‘protect all research subjects, regardless of their social position or 
status’ (Alvesalo-Kuusi and Whyte, 2017: 5), in practice protecting powerful individuals 
from scrutiny by researchers. While turning the analytical gaze ‘upwards’, then, is an 
attempt to subvert the traditional power dynamics of research that has focused largely on 
 
12 I attempted to negotiate these terms; suggesting instead that I share the interview transcripts 
with participants, or with the organisation, for checking before I use it in my analysis and writing. 
My contact at the CPS provided some partial reassurance, assuring me that the organisation was 
accustomed to academics publishing research that was critical of them, and explaining that they 
would only remove or correct factual inaccuracies. It was also somewhat unclear what the 
implications would be if I were to proceed with publication without making the changes they had 
requested. After discussing the issue with my supervisor, I somewhat apprehensively decided that 
it was worth the risk. 
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marginalised groups, the practicalities of negotiating access to the criminal justice system 
suggest that powerful organisations are able to exert their authority to carefully control 
their exposure to academic scrutiny and critique. I reflect on this further in Chapter 8, 
taking into account the process of securing ‘sign off’ for the analysis in the thesis.  
Below I turn to consider how these power dynamics played out in the interviews 
themselves, showing that while the criminal justice system erects effective barriers to 
protect itself from critical analysis, the interview as a research method creates space for a 
far more nuanced negotiation between researcher and participant. 
Conducting the interviews: interviewing ‘elites’  
Despite the challenges I faced in accessing some organisations, my interviews with 
criminal justice professionals engendered a set of complex power relations between 
myself and my interviewees that complicates some established understandings of 
interviewing ‘elites’. Some have argued that, in contrast to ‘traditional’ or ‘downstream’ 
studies, researchers interviewing powerful or high-status individuals are relatively 
powerless in the research dynamic (Neal and Mclaughlin, 2009). Interviewing 
experienced, often high-status professionals about their work often means that 
participants are accustomed to leading discussions and speaking authoritatively on the 
subject at hand (Lancaster, 2017). ‘Elites’ are ‘used to being in charge,’ ‘used to having 
others defer to them’ and ‘used to being asked what they think and having what they 
think matter in other people’s lives’ (Ostrander, 1995: 143). In these accounts, interviews 
are structured by participants’ ability to micromanage and direct the encounter, making it 
difficult for researchers to steer the conversation to the topics in question and to glean 
valuable ‘data’. In my research I found that although some professionals presented 
polished and well-rehearsed statements (which are nevertheless valuable in themselves, 
as I discuss in Part 3) for others the interview provided a space to grapple with complex 
political and moral dilemmas. Practitioners’ accounts were often marked by more 
complex efforts to justify, rationalise and legitimise the decisions and actions that they 
and their organisations had taken in 2011, suggesting a much more ambiguous and 
flexible power dynamic in the encounter between researcher and participant, and showing 
that ideas about ‘elites’ need to considered with nuance and care.  
It is important to note that my encounters with criminal justice professionals were varied 
and each engendered its own dynamic. Though I had prepared a list of questions and 
each of the interviews covered these same broad areas, the content of the discussions and 
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their tone were in practice shaped by respondents’ own interests and priorities, but also 
their own position within the system, their ability to prepare for the interview, the nature 
of their participation and their perception of me and my interests. First, my interviewees, 
though all established professionals, were by no means of equal standing in terms of their 
seniority, status or influence. Leonard and David were leading figures in the magistrates’ 
courts, Martin was a senior civil servant, and Amar, Kofi and Jason all senior CPS lawyers. 
While solicitor Roger was head of a long-established law firm, the other defence lawyers 
I interviewed had in 2011 been newly qualified. There are also considerable discrepancies 
in financial security and prestige between professions within the criminal justice system: 
while Leonard’s judicial role earned a three-figure salary (Ministry of Justice, 2019), with 
defence lawyers Sadie and Tanya I had extended conversations about the disastrous 
decimation of legal aid and lack of funding for criminal defence work and the inequality 
of arms between defence and prosecution lawyers, and Adam, Claire and Ashley were 
working for poorly funded and overstretched community and youth offending services 
within local authorities.  
These differences were in some ways reflected in my subjective experiences of interviews. 
In some interviews, particularly those with prosecutors and sentencers, I sometimes felt 
starkly aware of the objective discrepancies between myself and my interviewees in terms 
of professional status, seniority and knowledge, most clearly, but also of gender, age and 
social class. As a PhD researcher in my early thirties, I was younger than most of my 
research participants, and with no legal background or training, had relatively little 
expertise in some of the issues we were discussing. With prosecutors and sentencers it 
was not unusual for participants to draw attention to their own professional achievements 
and credentials, citing their long years of experience, their close working relationships 
with the most senior politicians and figures in the criminal justice system, their 
responsibilities and their large teams, and accolades and praise they had received for their 
work in 2011 and more broadly. I never experienced this as a direct means of interviewees 
asserting their authority or superiority, but certainly felt, at times, what Ostrander (1995: 
19) describes as ‘a simultaneous sense of being put in one’s place by elites at the same 
time that they are being warm, friendly, open and communicative.’ Going back to the 
interview transcripts to locate these moments where I recalled feeling patronised or 
spoken down to, the text did not always match my memory of the interaction – the words 
spoken were perfectly reasonable, but as Neal and Mclaughlin (2009) note, the emotional 
tone or feel of an interview encounter is not always captured by the transcript. With other 
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interviewees like defence lawyers and those in local authorities, there seemed to be more 
of a sense of a shared critical perspective, and our interviews tended to feel much more 
like conversations between two individuals with different, but in some ways 
complementary, perspectives on the issues at hand. Claire, Ashley and Adam each 
mentioned their own experiences as social science students, showed a seemingly genuine 
interest in my research and often expressed analytical and political perspectives similar to 
my own. 
My relatively junior status and rather ambiguous outsider position undoubtedly worked 
to my advantage in some ways. In introducing myself at the outset of the interview, I 
often pointed out that although I was interested in the criminal justice response to the 
riots, I was a sociologist and might need some explanation of the legal or organisational 
detail. This allowed me to ask somewhat obvious questions and elicit articulations of basic 
principles and logics. To draw an example from my interview with district judge Leonard, 
my outsider status allowed me to ask about the logic of sentencing:  
Chloe: One of the things that you mentioned that I as a sociologist am really interested 
in is the kind of, the different kind of purposes of sentencing, as you mentioned. I don’t 
know, that must be a challenge. There’s a tension there I suppose. 
Leonard: There is. Yeah. It’s a well-recognised tension. The law… sets out the purposes 
of sentencing. But it doesn’t give precedence to any one [purpose]. So on any given day, 
a judge or a bench of magistrates is having to say, ‘well, you know, do we go for 
punishment here, or do we go for rehabilitation?’ 
The balance of punishment and rehabilitation is a basic feature of sentencing that, had I 
been a law student, I would have presumably looked rather foolish for raising in such an 
ill-informed way. Like Ostrander (1995: 19) I found that by directly positioning myself as 
a curious outsider, rather than a critical peer, senior male professionals, in particular, were 
happy to assume the role of educator, providing valuable insight into the assumptions 
and structuring narratives of criminal justice work that might otherwise be difficult to 
capture.  
In some ways, the power dynamics in my research interactions seemed to be shaped less 
by participants’ professional seniority than by the circumstances in which the research 
had been arranged, and participants’ perception of my own role. Those I had contacted 
directly and those who were retired often seemed more open and more reflective in our 
discussions than those who I had been put in touch with via gatekeepers, who regardless 
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of my assurance of anonymity13 may have felt more cautious as representatives of their 
organisation or profession. Participants also engaged differently in the interviews 
depending on the extent to which they had prepared for it. Before each interview I had 
provided participants with an information sheet (see page 234) introducing myself and 
the project and setting out the overall aims of the project. While some had gathered 
documentation and reviewed their own notes from 2011 (retired judge Leonard, for 
example, who I introduce in Chapter 7, brought to our meeting a large folder of archived 
material labelled RIOTS and seemed to have prepared comprehensive and well-
considered responses to the issues I was interested in), others clearly had far less 
opportunity to prepare (Claire, for example, who I introduce in Chapter 5, began our 
conversation asking ‘is this something about the riots?’).  
Power dynamics were also renegotiated and shifted over the course of an interview. My 
meeting with defence solicitor Tanya was one of the more difficult interviews of the 
research but illustrates the fluidity of the research dynamic. It had taken us several months 
to arrange the interview, earlier attempts having been scuppered by her crowded work 
schedule. Tanya began the discussion by saying she did not think she would be able to 
help me much, having been a newly qualified solicitor in 2011. My pre-planned questions 
seemed to fall rather flat – Tanya was reserved and seemed to give only brief, factual 
answers, in stark contrast to my interviews with more senior figures who had freely 
monologued at length without interruption. She was clearly distracted by her phone; and 
I felt uncomfortable taking an hour of her time that she seemed reluctant or unable to 
spare. As I asked my final question, about whether the criminal justice system would 
respond in the same way to future disturbances, Tanya reiterated some of her concerns 
about the courts’ reaction in 2011, and seemed pessimistic that anything significant had 
improved since then, but then turned the question back to me, which took me by surprise:  
 
13 All the names I use for research participants are pseudonyms, and individual identifying 
information has been removed or changed. This decision is partly to protect participants’ 
confidentiality and perhaps enable them to speak more freely. Some participants – particularly 
those in high-profile public positions – were happy to be named, but given the critical nature of 
the analysis I felt that anonymising all interviewees would in some ways protect both myself and 
them (I discuss this in Chapter 8).  
Designing and conducting the research  
 63 
Tanya: So I don’t know what the answer is. I’m sure the reaction [next time] will be 
identical, or worse. (Laughing) I’m sure there must be a better way. What do you think? 
Chloe: (Long sigh) I think, realistically, I think yes, it would be more or less the same… 
You know, I think quite a big part of it is that the government set the agenda very quickly, 
saying you know, ‘this is just a law and order issue, and we’re not going to take it 
seriously’. You know, not thinking of it as a political act at all. 
I was suddenly confronted with the choice between trying to remain the impartial 
interviewer, or revealing my own opinions. Exposing my own view took my conversation 
with Tanya in a different direction, creating a new sense of openness and mutual 
understanding and a more fluid discussion.  
Though I had largely tried to avoid explicitly stating my own views on the subject at hand 
– partly to avoid jeopardising access to individuals and organisations – all of the interviews 
are inevitably shaped by participants’ perceptions of me, my interests and my politics. An 
‘inter/view’, Portelli reminds us, ‘is an exchange between two subjects: literally a mutual 
sighting. One party cannot really see the other unless the other can see him or her in turn’ 
(1991: 31). It is in fact impossible to present oneself to participants as a neutral or 
objective researcher: if you withhold or conceal your own perspective, the interviewee 
will nevertheless build their own assumptions, shaping their responses in ways you cannot 
control or account for. Other interviewees, though they had not usually directly asked me 
what I thought, will have made their own judgments about my stance and agenda. In this 
way researchers ‘cannot ever really know what is going on in any given research encounter 
and therefore how the knowledge we take from it is being produced’ (Valentine, 2002: 
125–126). 
Even with the most experienced professionals, whose roles undoubtedly gave them very 
tangible authority and status and who had thoroughly prepared for the encounter, the 
interviews revealed a complex dynamic that is not captured by ideas about ‘elite 
interviewing’. Regardless of seniority or status, it is too simplistic to assume that ‘the 
power and authority available to “elites” in their professional life will translate directly 
onto the interviewer–interviewee relationship’ (Smith, 2006: 647). Rather, the interview 
interaction seemed to provide a space where practitioners, whatever their professional 
standing, were called to account for themselves; to justify and legitimise their actions and 
their institutions in ways that require a different set of analytical concepts. Indeed, I was 
often surprised by the level of openness, self-reflection, and uncertainty that practitioners 
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showed in our interviews. Interviews seemed to provide space for the kinds of 
questioning and reflection that practitioners often did not have opportunity to engage in 
day-to-day. Discussing the power of the courts handing out prison sentences to rioters, 
defence solicitor Roger – who, as I discuss in Chapter 5, was highly experienced, 
confident and self-assured – seemed to grapple with his own contradictory ideas about 
deterrence, working through them as we spoke: 
I’m not a great believer – in fact I’m not a believer at all – in deterrence. I think it’s 
nonsense. But actually that may be – I test myself – one of the occasions when deterrence 
does [work]. But I think perhaps in a riot situation, in the immediate process where you 
don’t want it to start up again, I think probably, talking against myself, I think probably 
deterrence does have a purpose, when you just need to get a message across: ‘We’ve got 
to stop this’. 
Roger’s self-questioning reminds us that regardless of a participant’s professional status, 
authority or public standing, the research interview can prove a situation where 
professional legitimacy, and ‘elite’ status itself, can be contested, destabilised and 
unsettled (Neal and Mclaughlin, 2009). Interviewees may feel exposed or vulnerable 
discussing public criticism of their organisations, intimidated by researchers who they 
perceive to be better informed regarding the particular topic in question, or ‘because your 
questioning may reveal their inadequacies’ (Empson, 2018: 17–18). Interviews with PhD 
candidates are unlikely to pose significant risk to professionals’ reputations, especially 
given the firm grip organisations retain over the research process; yet however low the 
stakes, the power relation in a research interview is peculiar in that the participant, 
whoever they are, has agreed to be accountable to the researcher (Dick, 2005). It is 
precisely this dynamic that provides a rich opportunity to examine how professionals seek 
to present themselves, their work and their organisation to a potentially critical outsider; 
and as such, to trace the modes of legitimation that underpin criminal justice work. This 
makes interviews an ideal tool for exploring the mechanisms and narratives that 
practitioners draw on make sense of and justify their work in relation to the riots – but it 
also necessitates a set of concepts that capture this complexity. In the following section I 
introduce some key analytical concepts that I develop to make sense of the interviews in 
sociological terms.  
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Part 3. Analysing interviews: Legitimation, dirty work and denial 
in riot talk  
In this section I describe my approach to analysing my interview data, based on a 
framework of critical discourse analysis, and the key concepts I used in this process. I 
approach the interviews as spaces in which practitioners account for themselves and their 
work, paying particular attention to the processes of legitimation, neutralisation and 
denial that practitioners engage in to construct narratives of the criminal justice response 
to the riots as necessary, appropriate and just. Attending to riot talk in these terms, I 
argue, allows us to trace the vital role of ignorance in legitimating the criminal justice 
system and its punitive practices.  
Critical discourse analysis (CDA) offers a framework for analysing and explaining the 
relationships between ‘discourse’ (in this case, primarily practitioners’ interviews but also 
media and political texts) and its social, cultural and political context (Fairclough, 2013; 
Richardson, 2006; Wodak and Meyer, 2016). It aims to investigate, understand and 
explain the larger cultural and symbolic context within which discourse emerges; the 
structural frames that shape its flow of meaning; and, crucially, how discourse figures in 
the establishment, reproduction and change of unequal power relations. Though the 
interviews provided a great deal of important insight about how the various organisations 
had decided on and coordinated their response to the riots, and the historical and 
organisational context against which these decisions were made; my process of analysis 
has been primarily concerned with identifying and exploring the key discursive and 
narrative resources that help practitioners to account for, legitimise or problematise the 
criminal justice system’s response to the riots, and the ideological and political 
implications of these claims, reflecting the methodological stance I set out in Chapter 2.   
Rather than an isolated and bounded stage of the project, analysing the data was an 
iterative process that developed through the course of the research, and involved each 
phase of the project from planning the interview questions, conducting and transcribing 
the interviews and coding the transcripts, to planning, drafting and editing the empirical 
chapters of the thesis. Prior to the interviews, I prepared interview guides that anticipated 
key themes and topics of interest. Immediately after each interview, I made notes of the 
key themes of the discussion, breaking this down into two key categories: information 
about the processes, policy and practices involved in the criminal justice response, and 
the kinds of assumptions, claims and narratives that practitioners drew on to make sense 
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of this response. This process continued while transcribing the interviews. As well as 
transcribing what was said (noting significant pauses, sighs, laughter, emphasis and tone 
of voice where this seemed important in shaping the meaning or mood of what was said), 
I made brief notes to mark interesting or surprising points to investigate further, 
seemingly recurrent themes, as well as notes to myself on interviewing strategies, 
questions that had worked well or fallen flat to amend for subsequent interviews. I coded 
the transcripts using NVivo, creating themes or ‘nodes’ reflecting the broad areas of 
interest I had identified in the planning stages of the project, and those that emerged from 
the interviews.14  
Very early in the research, it became clear that my interest in practitioners’ ways of 
justifying the criminal justice response was a rich seam of inquiry that needed further 
attention and more detailed conceptualisation. Before carrying out the interviews, I knew 
I was interested in the process of legitimation (as discussed in Chapter 2) but had 
underestimated the nuance my analysis would require. I assumed that certain practitioners 
– prosecutors and sentencers, perhaps – would vociferously and unreflexively defend and 
rationalise the courts’ response, while defence lawyers would provide a far more critical 
appraisal of this reaction. I was somewhat surprised at the more complex positions 
practitioners expressed: the first defence lawyers I interviewed did not convey especially 
negative views on the how the criminal justice system had treated their defendants, 
beyond questioning the validity of blatantly disproportionate approaches to sentencing, 
and even the more analytical accounts from other defence lawyers, probation and youth 
offending practitioners positioned the criminal justice response to the riots as somewhat 
necessary, inevitable and unproblematic. As I point out above, my interviews with 
 
14 I initially set up five nodes: ‘Causes of riots’, ‘Who were the rioters’, ‘Logic of punishment’, 
‘Justification of CJ (criminal justice) reaction’ and ‘Critique of CJ (criminal justice) reaction’. The 
first two nodes capture my interest in exploring how practitioners talked about the nature of the 
disturbances themselves, and those who took part in them. The third node reflected my interest 
in the underlying assumptions and claims about the aims of criminal justice that might rationalise 
or help to make sense of the peculiarly punitive criminal justice response to the riots. Lastly, the 
fourth and fifth nodes reflected my curiosity about the extent to which practitioners would 
express praise or criticism for this response, either justifying or criticising their own and their 
organisations’ responses to the riots. This process of coding evolved as I conducted and analysed 
more interviews, adding more refined and detailed nodes to reflect new themes as they emerged.  
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professionals across the board were marked by reflection and questioning about the 
appropriateness and effectiveness of the criminal justice response to the riots. 
Practitioners often anticipated or acknowledged the concerns that had been raised about 
the courts’ treatment of rioters but, crucially, found ways of – partially, at least – resolving 
these dilemmas, diffusing the tension that such acknowledgement implied, and effectively 
deflecting the criticism that they came under. To make sociological sense of this, my 
analysis has centred on a series of concepts which I briefly introduce here. 
Riot talk as legitimation  
I have discussed how I approach my conversations with criminal justice practitioners as 
glimpses into how they justified their work in 2011 within a setting where, to differing 
extents, they may have felt the need to reassert their own credibility and legitimacy, and 
how these accounts connect to media and political discourses. As well as exploring how 
practitioners constructed stories about the riots and the rioters that allowed them to frame 
their own work in 2011 as necessary and reasonable, and analysing how they drew on 
shared cultural imaginaries to do so, it is important to consider the ideological and 
political work that these stories do. Practitioners’ claims about the nature of crime, of 
responsibility, and of the public are shaped by and reflective of the political and 
ideological moment in which they emerge; but these claims themselves are not only 
symptomatic of this moment. Rather, as I set out in Chapter 2, they are important in 
maintaining and sustaining these relations, procuring public consent (or rather reinforcing 
a presumption of public consent) and acquiescence for the way things are. My 
methodology, then, expands the focus of my analysis beyond the research interaction 
itself, instead bringing into view the broader social and political relations within which it 
is situated, and – crucially – on which practitioners’ accounts act. My analysis has focused 
on tracing the narratives and discourses that allow practitioners to legitimate the criminal 
justice response to the riots, and the criminal justice system broadly.  
Legitimacy is a crucial concept in academic understandings of criminal justice (Bottoms 
and Tankebe, 2013, 2017; Sparks and Bottoms, 1995). While social scientists have paid a 
great deal of attention to the extent to which criminal justice institutions, policies and 
practices possess legitimacy as a characteristic, or succeed in securing popular legitimacy; 
they have focused less on the activity of legitimation, the process by which individuals and 
organisations stake claims to legitimacy (Barker, 2001). Reflecting on Weber’s famous 
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definition of the state,15 Barker (2001: 14) argues that what characterises the state ‘is not 
the possession of legitimacy’ as an abstract or measurable quality, ‘but the activity of 
legitimation’; a process of self-authorisation and self-justification by which those in 
positions of power assure themselves of their own legitimacy and right to rule. The 2011 
riots seemed to represent a moment of profound crisis of legitimacy and authority for the 
criminal justice system. Most obviously, this crisis was read through the police force’s 
failure to maintain control of the streets, calls for more law and order, and the courts’ 
draconian practices as a way to reassert the state’s authority and ability to maintain order 
(Barker, 2011; Gilson, 2011); but the courts’ highly unusual and starkly disproportionate 
approach to remand and sentencing was also seen as a threat to the legitimacy of the 
criminal justice system as fair, proportionate and independent (Gilson, 2011; Roberts and 
Hough, 2013). While other researchers have been concerned with whether the criminal 
justice response to the riots was legitimate, and on whose terms, my interviews allow me 
to explore the processes by which those within the system seek to justify it in the context 
of the research interview. My analysis of the interviews traces how practitioners navigated 
various critiques (sometimes assumed or implied) of their organisations’ responses to the 
riots, and constructed accounts that positioned themselves, their organisations and their 
work as morally sound. Taking legitimation as ‘an active, contested political process’ 
(Barker, 2001: 28) rather than an abstract resource, I examine the various ways – often 
involving considerable creativity – that practitioners navigate and negotiate the complex 
moral and ethical issues inherent in their work in the criminal justice system, and in 
particular, the discursive mechanisms that allow them to justify and rationalise the morally 
troubling aspects of their roles: the courts’ overwhelming targeting of marginalised 
communities and the violence of punishment.  
I put this approach to legitimation in dialogue with approaches to ‘dirty work’ (Hughes, 
1962; Ashforth and Kreiner, 1999, 2014) to think through how my participants construct 
and maintain positive imaginations of their professional identities. Drawing on Sykes and 
Matza’s (1957) classic work on ‘techniques of neutralisation’, this theory provides a useful 
framework for analysing how workers deal with threats to their individual and 
institutional identities posed by the ‘taint’ of work that is physically, socially or morally 
‘dirty’, and the discursive mechanisms they engage in to avoid themselves becoming 
 
15 Weber defines the state as ‘the human community which (successfully) claims the monopoly of 
legitimate coercion’ (Weber, 1948, cited in Barker, 2001: 2). 
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stigmatised, ‘stained’ or marked by the work (Ashforth and Kreiner, 1999). Though 
researchers using these concepts to analyse discourses of crime and justice have most 
often been used to explain how ‘offenders’ justify and make sense of their criminal acts 
(e.g. Ugelvik, 2012), others have usefully applied these ideas to study how those in 
positions of relative power – such as those in the finance sector (Mackenzie Davey et al., 
2014; Simpson, 2017) or in immigration and other detention systems (Johnston and Kilty, 
2016; Ugelvik, 2016) – make sense of morally and politically problematic work.16  
While research on criminal justice work as dirty work has usually focused on the socially 
tainting effects of practitioners’ association with ‘criminals’ and criminal acts (e.g. 
McIntyre, 1987 on defence lawyers; Tracy and Scott, 2007 on prison officers; Malvini 
Redden and Scarduzio, 2018 on judges), my interviews explore how practitioners 
negotiate and negate the morally tainting aspects of riots work. My analysis has approached 
practitioners’ work in the wake of the riots as a kind of ‘dirty work’ – or, as work that 
holds the possibility of being seen as dirty by some in the context of the interview17 – that 
requires practitioners to undertake work to manage this risk and maintain meanings of 
morality and legitimacy in relation to their work while navigating and negating the ‘taint’ 
of bearing responsibility for a disproportionate, ineffective or unjust response to the riots.  
 
16 These strategies might involve normalisation (rendering the work acceptable and ordinary); 
reframing the meaning of dirty work (infusing it with positive value); recalibrating (adjusting the 
standards used to assess the work and minimising the dirty component); and refocusing through the 
shifting of attention to the non-stigmatised features of the job (Ashforth and Kreiner, 1999, 2014; 
Kreiner et al., 2006). Through such strategies people construct, negotiate, and maintain the 
meaning of their work and its implications for their own sense of self (Simpson and Simpson, 
2018). Scholarship on criminal justice work as emotional labour  also addressed some of these 
questions (Barry, 2020; see e.g. Burke et al., 2020; Humblet, 2020; Lennie et al., 2020; Mastracci 
and Adams, 2020; Tidmarsh, 2020; Westaby, Fowler and Phillips, 2020; Westaby, Fowler, Phillips, 
et al., 2020). 
17 As Penny Dick (2005) argues in her research on how police officers deal with the moral 
ambiguity of the use of coercive force in their work, whether or not work is seen as dirty – either 
by the workers or by others – is complex and highly situated. The kinds of ‘identity work’ that 
professionals will need to engage in to protect against the threat of ‘taint’ posed by their work is 
largely dependent upon the social situations in which they are called to account for themselves 
and their work. 
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I have focused on identifying the claims that practitioners made about the riots, the 
rioters, the public and the criminal justice system that allowed them to position their 
responses to the unrest as reasonable, proportionate and morally sound. In line with the 
framework of critical discourse analysis I situate practitioners’ accounts in a wider cultural 
and ideological context within which they gain coherence, currency, credibility and 
legibility several years after the riots; and ask how these imaginations serve to underpin 
the broader practices of the criminal justice system. In this way my approach to analysis 
allows me to map out what I have described as a cultural political economy of 
punishment.  
Following others’ approaches to CDA, my analysis of practitioners’ accounts illuminates 
‘what has been left unsaid,’ ‘what has been taken for granted, that which is hiding in plain 
sight but is ignored or neglected, and the implicit subtext behind what is said’ (Green, 
2008: 110). I draw particularly on Cohen’s (2001) work on denial and the many ways that 
people and organisations, deal with ‘information that is too disturbing, threatening or 
anomalous to be fully absorbed or openly acknowledged’ and so is ‘repressed, disavowed, 
pushed aside or reinterpreted’, or the information itself ‘registered’ but its 
implications ’evaded, neutralised or rationalised away’ (Cohen, 2001: 1). I identify the 
‘strategies’ that practitioners employ – not only deliberate attempts to manage 
information, but also implicit or even completely unconscious strategies – to manage 
‘uncomfortable knowledge’ (Rayner, 2016: 113). These include straightforward denial 
(refusing to acknowledge or engage with information), and more subtle moves like 
acknowledging the existence of information but dismissing it as erroneous or irrelevant, 
diverting attention away from it, and displacing focus onto another topic.  
In doing so my analysis makes a particular contribution to understandings of the vital role 
of ignorance, in various forms, to processes of legitimation. What was striking about 
practitioners’ accounts of the riots and their aftermath was not only what they claimed or 
emphasised; but what was left out, forgotten, denied, avoided or glossed over. For 
practitioners to construct their responses to the riots – and their work more widely – as 
effective, necessary and appropriate, effectively requires them to ignore, forget or avoid 
certain knowledge about the riots and their context, the ‘rioters’, the public and the prison 
system. Taking an agnotological approach I pay close attention to these absences and 
silences, considering how doubt, uncertainty and ambiguity worked to legitimise and 
naturalise certain imaginations of the riots and the criminal justice system’s response to 
them.  
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Conclusions 
In this chapter I have set out my approach to addressing my research questions, discussed 
my experiences of conducting the research, and considered its implications for our 
understanding of research methods and ethics. Interviews with professionals who were 
involved in designing and delivering the criminal justice response to the disturbances, in 
particular, offer a valuable tool for tracing the cultural and ideological underpinnings of 
the response, but also allow us to consider the significance of the disturbances in the years 
since 2011. The decision to direct my attention ‘upwards’ towards the criminal justice 
system is also rooted in an ethical commitment to look critically at the sites and practices 
of state power, which often remain invisible in studies of ‘crime’. However, conducting 
critical research on the criminal justice system poses significant challenges. Organisations 
like the judiciary and the CPS closely control researchers’ access and their resulting work, 
making it difficult to hold them to account, and, I argue, necessitating a more nuanced 
approach to research ethics. 
However, my experiences of interviewing professionals reveal a much more unclear set 
of power relations that trouble simplistic accounts that presuppose that structural power 
inequities will be directly reflected in research encounters. The interviews provided a 
space where practitioners, far from simply asserting their structural dominance or 
enforcing hegemonic narratives, grappled with politically and morally troubling aspects 
of their work that required complex processes of dismissal, omission and disavowal. The 
relations of power, control and authority in research with professionals, whatever their 
structural and systemic privileges, can be profoundly uncertain and unclear (Neal and 
Mclaughlin, 2009). In light of this, we might more usefully think of power within the 
interview encounter as ‘an ambiguous, fluid, multi-directional dynamic, which can flow 
unevenly across and between different positions in the research relationship’ (Neal and 
Mclaughlin, 2009: 695; see also Smith, 2006).  
By revealing how practitioners negotiate and neutralise the problematic and 
uncomfortable aspects of the punitive response to the disturbances, my interviews offer 
a view on to the processes of legitimation that underpin and sustain the criminal justice 
system. In particular, my experience of discussing the unrest with criminal justice 
professionals shows how ignorance is integral in structuring legitimation, requiring 
analytical concepts that capture the vital importance of agnotology in understanding the 
cultural political economy of punishment. 
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In the following chapters I move on to set out the main arguments from my analysis, 
discussing what my interviews revealed about the shared imaginations of crime, criminals, 
society and justice that practitioners articulated in discussing their work in response to 
the disturbances. The following chapter, the first of these empirically grounded 
discussions, focuses on the narratives that professionals drew on to make claims about 
what the ‘riots’ were, and what they meant, and ask how these can help us make sense of 






Remembering and forgetting the riots: Amnesia and 
dismissal in prosecutors’ accounts of 2011 
 
It was almost like a breakdown of law and order. The society was in meltdown. The 
authorities had to step in and put in place some really harsh measures to make sure that 
the whole thing didn’t collapse.  
Kofi, Senior District Crown Prosecutor, London 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter I made a case for using interviews with criminal justice 
practitioners as a way to investigate the cultural, political and ideological moment in which 
the disturbances and the state’s response to them emerged. In this chapter I turn to these 
interviews, examining how practitioners constructed accounts of the riots that variously 
rationalised and problematised the punitive criminal justice response, and explore the 
ideological implications of differing memories of the events of August 2011. I draw on 
my interviews with lawyers from the Crown Prosecution Service, who had been 
responsible, in different ways, for coordinating and delivering the organisation’s 
extraordinarily punitive response to the riots, both in the immediate midst of the unrest, 
and in the years that followed. Prosecutors’ riot talk, and their stories about the nature of 
the disturbances, were vitally important in allowing them to justify and legitimise the 
CPS’s unusually harsh reaction to the riots. Taking an agnotological approach, I show 
how denial, dismissal and amnesia were central to prosecutors’ accounts of their work as 
reasonable, proportionate, necessary and adequate. 
The chapter is structured in three parts. First, I examine the collective memory of the 
riots that emerged in prosecutors’ accounts, showing how prosecutors articulated an 
imagination of the disturbances as a moment of extraordinary violence that posed a grave 
danger to the city, the country, and to society itself. This shared definition of the unrest 
as a unique and unprecedented threat to law and order was vitally important in 
 
 74 
prosecutors’ arguments that the disorder necessitated and legitimated an equally 
exceptional prosecutorial reaction.  
In Part 2 of the chapter I argue that the coherence of this shared memory of the 
disturbances relies heavily upon forms of amnesia and denial. I show how this 
characterisation of the disturbances as entirely without precedent ignores and obscures 
England’s recent history of unrest; and how prosecutors variously forgot, distorted or 
dismissed Mark Duggan’s killing at the hands of the Metropolitan Police. By ignoring or 
avoiding Duggan’s death, prosecutors were able to deny the political aspect of the riots, 
instead positioning them as a law and order issue necessitating a swift and severe 
prosecutorial reaction. By eliding this vital historical and political context, prosecutors 
effectively foreclosed critique of the criminal justice response to the disturbances and the 
need for structural, rather than penal, remedies. 
In Part 3 I show how foregrounding Duggan’s death and acknowledging the historical 
continuities that the disturbances were embedded in licensed very different readings of 
the criminal justice response to them, allowing more critical practitioners to position the 
punitive response to the riots – and the CPS’s actions, in particular – as problematic and 
counterproductive, or even as a stark moment of state violence reproducing the very 
inequalities that had led to the unrest.   
I conclude the chapter by considering how the harsh prosecutorial response has shaped 
the enduring collective imagination of the ‘riots’ in the years since 2011. Meanings around 
the disturbances, I argue, were not fixed in 2011; but rather have continued to settle and 
shift in the intervening years, with certain narratives being lost along the way while others 
have become reaffirmed by retelling. I argue that the criminal justice response has shaped 
the afterlife of  the disturbances in which they are remembered primarily as an 
extraordinary outburst of  meaningless criminality.  
Part 1. ‘Society was in meltdown, the authorities had to step in’ 
In this part of the chapter I demonstrate how the disturbances were recalled in my 
interviews with prosecutors in 2018, examining some strands of the shared memory that 
ran through prosecutors’ accounts.  
My interview with the senior prosecutor I call Kofi highlighted some of the more unusual 
and controversial aspects of the CPS’s response to the ‘riots’. I met Kofi in October 2018 
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at the Ministry of Justice building in Petty France, in the heart of Westminster, which 
houses the national headquarters of the CPS and their London operations. This was the 
fourth time I had made the journey to the CPS offices: in the months before meeting 
Kofi, I’d come to the same office to interview two other prosecutors, Amar and Jason, 
and also to meet Martin, a civil servant in the Ministry of Justice, housed on the other 
side of the building. Arriving each time, I was confronted by a hulking, turreted, fourteen-
floor brutalist edifice which seemed an apt home for the government departments dealing 
with punishment in the most direct way.18  
Kofi had qualified as a lawyer in Ghana in the 1980s and moved to the UK shortly 
afterwards, joining the CPS as an administrator and working his way up through the ranks. 
When the disturbances began in Tottenham in August 2011, he was part of a team of 
senior lawyers convened by Alison Saunders, who was then Chief Crown Prosecutor for 
London, to coordinate the CPS’s response. 
Kofi: She immediately convened a, if you like, a CPS COBRA19 response team – 
CPS London COBRA response team, I should say… And we had regular meetings; we 
met every afternoon to assess what was going on, what our response would be… and 
literally briefings from Alison who obviously was in touch with the Attorney General’s 
office, and the Director at the time, who would’ve been Keir Starmer, who in turn were 
feeding into the government’s response at Number 10, or Whitehall. So that’s how the 
set-up was. 
In the first days of the disturbances, the CPS’s immediate task was to ensure prosecutors 
were available to cover the large volume of cases appearing before the magistrates’ courts; 
including the all-night court sessions at Highbury Corner, Westminster and Camberwell 
magistrates’ courts. Kofi explained that the first prosecutions of riot-related offences 
happened very quickly, ‘while the fires were effectively raging. People just stepped up and 
 
18 As Carl Cattermole brilliantly puts it in his book Prison: A Survival Guide, for those drawn into 
the criminal justice system the Ministry of Justice building looks ‘like a malevolent concrete 
brutalist spaceship that has come to abduct your friends’ (Cattermole, 2019: 37). 
19 COBR or COBRA is the acronym for Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms, a series of rooms located 
in the Cabinet Office in 70 Whitehall and is shorthand for the Civil Contingencies Committee 
that is convened to handle matters of national emergency or major disruption (The Institute for 
Government, 2020). 
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got on with it.’ Trying to recall exactly what had happened seven years earlier as we spoke, 
Kofi searched his laptop for emails from that time.  
I’m just looking at an email from myself to the team on the 9th of August 2011 here… 
(reading from screen) ‘By way of a further update, police have called this Operation Withern. 
Highbury Corner will be running additional courts from five to nine p.m. tonight, and 
potentially for the rest of the week’… I think that was the first thing that we heard. And 
then I think they realised that with the numbers, they had to really step up the game, 
really, and that’s when they introduced the night courts.  
In the face of these extended and extraordinary court hours, as Kofi explained, his staff 
had ‘just stepped up. I mean, it was amazing.’ Although they had struggled to recruit 
enough prosecutors to cover the cases being dealt with on the first night, before staff had 
had the chance to make arrangements for childcare, by the second night ‘it was fine.’ I 
asked Kofi how prosecutors’ work practices during the riots had differed from their usual 
ways of working:   
Chloe: Other than being there through the night, obviously, and the volume [of cases], 
was there anything about the process that had to be kind of changed to adapt to the 
circumstances? 
Kofi: Yeah, so obviously the papers [from the police] were, literally, the barest minimum. 
In a normal case we would be asking for a lot more… But obviously we couldn’t afford 
to be precious at that time, so really the barest minimum was acceptable to process these 
cases, in the hope that some of them would plead [guilty] because they were caught bang 
to rights and therefore there was no need for a file build. 
Kofi and his, colleagues, then, were prosecuting cases with only ‘the barest minimum’ of 
evidence, ‘in the hope that people would plead guilty’ so that further evidence would not 
be required for cases to go to trial, suggesting a significant departure from their usual 
ways of working. Prosecutors’ work is guided by the Code for Crown Prosecutors which 
sets out a two-step process for deciding whether to prosecute a case: an evidential test 
(requiring the police to have sufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of 
conviction) and a public interest test (Crown Prosecution Service, 2018b). The CPS 
effectively deviated from their usual policy and practices regarding both of these 
standards. As Kofi suggests here, the usual requirements for evidence were substantially 
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lowered, 20 leading to the prosecution of cases that may ordinarily have been dropped or 
returned to the police for further evidence. Equally striking was the CPS’s approach to 
the public interest test for riots cases. Kofi explained that ‘Obviously, in terms of public 
interest, it would almost always be in the public interest to proceed’ with riot-related cases: 
Whereas before you would be thinking, this was an isolated incident, he has no previous 
convictions, it’s at the lower end of the scale – you know, we had a kicking in of a shop 
window, he’s offering to repay the shopkeeper, we think we can deal with this by way of 
a caution or out of court disposal – that wouldn’t be happening around that time. So 
even if that same person then committed that offence during or after the riots, it would’ve 
been dealt with [differently] – you know, we’re gonna prosecute you.  
This was reflected in CPS policy: in August 2011 the CPS issued legal guidance for 
prosecutors, stating: ‘[t]he serious overall impact of the disorder in August 2011 has been 
such that prosecution will be in the public interest in all but the most exceptional of 
circumstances’ (Crown Prosecution Service, 2011).21 Effectively overriding the usual 
public interest test was, like the lowering of the evidential standard, a significant deviation 
from usual policy and practice. Cases were pursued that in ordinary circumstances are 
likely to have been dropped or diverted from the criminal justice system. This was 
especially significant for those cases involving minor offences, children and young people, 
and those with no previous criminal record (Lightowlers and Quirk, 2015). At the same 
time, legal scholars have suggested, the CPS were choosing more serious charges that 
 
20 Police providing incomplete files to the CPS for decisions about charge were advised to explain 
that the on-going nature of the disorder and the strain on police resources meant that enquiries 
could not be completed within the time limits, and to recommend that charging decisions should 
be based not on the usual evidential test but on the lower standard of the ‘threshold test’, requiring 
the prosecutor only to have ‘reasonable suspicion that the suspect has committed the offence and 
reasonable grounds for believing that further evidence will become available within a reasonable 
period (Lightowlers and Quirk, 2015: 70). 
21 The speed at which the guidance was issued drew criticism, since it suggested that ‘a substantial 
policy decision had been made at speed and without consultation’ (Lightowlers and Quirk, 2015: 
70). It is worth noting however that aspects of the public interest test are, even in ordinary 
circumstances, somewhat underdetermined and open to interpretation: for example the 
importance of ‘the impact on the community’ of offending means that the context in which an 
offence occurs, as well as the offence itself and the circumstances in which it was committed, are 
taken into account in assessing public interest. 
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carried considerably longer sentences – for example, categorising offences that would 
normally be treated as theft, carrying a maximum custodial sentence of seven years, as 
burglary, which can receive up to 10 years in prison – significantly raising the stakes for 
defendants (Lightowlers and Quirk, 2015). Despite this central role in the harshly punitive 
response to the disturbances, there has been little research into the culture and practices 
of the CPS, either in relation to these events or more generally (Lightowlers and Quirk, 
2015; Sosa, 2012).   
For Kofi and the other prosecutors who I met, as I will show, the CPS’s approach to the 
disturbances was recalled as largely unproblematic, inevitable, and impressive. My analysis 
in this chapter identifies the particular narratives and definitions of ‘the riots’ that allowed 
them to position such a response as necessary, appropriate, and even worthy of 
celebration. I argue that techniques of denial, silencing and, most importantly, forgetting 
were integral in these accounts. It is only by erasing or ignoring vital aspects of the unrest 
that prosecutors were able to maintain an unproblematically positive sense of their work 
in the wake of the riots. 
As I set out in Chapter 2, my research was not primarily concerned with trying to establish 
the causes of the disturbances; nevertheless, interviews offered valuable insight into how 
practitioners navigated and negotiated competing definitions and explanations, helping 
us to trace how they legitimised their organisations’ responses to the unrest. Interviews 
often began with practitioners setting out a kind of opening statement that outlined their 
role in responding to the disturbances. Beyond simply recounting what they and their 
organisations did in 2011, these accounts consistently provided a series of rationalisations 
and justifications for these actions. These initial narratives of the disturbances were often 
important in setting the parameters for the rest of the interview, providing a kind of 
working definition that helped to situate and support practitioners’ subsequent claims 
about the criminal justice system’s reaction. Central to these justifications were claims 
about what the disturbances were, and what they meant. For the prosecutors I interviewed, 
recalling the unrest as a moment of extraordinary and uncontrollable violence that posed 
a serious threat to society was vital in setting the scene for the controversial prosecutorial 
reaction to the disturbances. In prosecutors’ account the ‘riots’ were figured as an 
unforeseeable and ultimately meaningless outburst of criminality; to borrow Benyon’s 
(1987b: 167) phrasing, an exceptional threat to law and order requiring an exceptional 
response.  
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Amar, who had been a Senior District Crown Prosecutor in London in 2011 and was 
now a Deputy Chief Crown Prosecutor, and who I had met a few weeks prior to 
interviewing Kofi, recalled the disturbances as a frightening time: 
It felt like a breakdown in law and order. So people were getting quite terrified… if you 
were living near Croydon, people could see smoke coming, billowing from an old carpet 
factory, that warehouse that had been there for hundreds of years or something. So it’s 
quite a scary experience for people. And then watching groups of generally young men, 
and others (laughing), you know, helping themselves to, smashing and vandalising shops. 
So it was quite, a very scary experience. 
Fear and terror loomed large in Amar’s account. Not only was the unrest ‘a scary 
experience for people’, for Amar it was defined by the groups of youths ‘smashing and 
vandalising shops’; by ‘five-handed robberies, and violent disorders and people just, you 
know, smash and grab and helping themselves to anything that moved.’ In Amar’s telling 
of the events, this ‘smashing and grabbing’ not only represented a frightening ‘breakdown 
in law and order’, but crucially precluded any interpretation of the riots as politically 
motivated: 
You know, one has to sort of say, we may understand people being unhappy about 
unemployment and all sorts of things, but helping yourselves to the latest 42-inch 
television (laughing) did seem a little bit unusual.  
Amar may have been sympathetic to ‘people being unhappy about unemployment and all 
sorts of things’, but the prominence of looting in Amar’s narrative of the disturbances 
rendered irrelevant these broader structural factors. This narrow focus on acquisitive 
crimes – people ‘helping themselves’ to high-value consumer goods – seemed to foreclose 
any understanding of the disturbances as anything but a meaningless outburst of 
criminality. In 2011 the looted widescreen television, in particular, was a recurring icon in 
the frenzied media and political rush to denounce the riots (Nisco, 2016), seeming to act 
as shorthand for a much bigger set of claims about the primacy of materialism, 
opportunism and greed in the disturbances. It became a screen of another sort, obscuring 
political or structural explanations for the disturbances, and providing seemingly self-
evident and irrefutable proof that the events could be explained as individual acts of 
criminality. Framing the riots as a frightening but ultimately meaningless outburst of 
‘offending’ efficiently strips the events of political significance, relegating them strictly to 
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the realm of individual responsibility and morality, and framing the criminal justice 
response as neutral and rational (El-Enany, 2014).  
Prosecutors’ definitions of the disturbances resonated with the meanings that dominated 
media and political discourse in 2011. Recurring representations of the disturbances as 
lawlessness, anarchy and as mindless mob rule (see Figure 2, Figure 3, Figure 4 below) 
created an imagination of the ‘riots’ as pure chaos that could not possibly carry any 
important information about the social or economic conditions from which they arose 
(Kelsey, 2015).  
 
Figure 2: The Independent, 8th August 2011 
 
Figure 3: Evening Standard, 9th August 2011 
 
 
Figure 4: The Sun, 9th August 2011 
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This also echoed political narratives that sought to swiftly close down explanations of the 
disturbances as a response to structural or systemic political failings, instead narrowly 
framing them as ‘criminality, pure and simple’ in David Cameron’s (2011a) well-rehearsed 
phrasing. Home Secretary Theresa May, too, made clear that ‘the only cause of a crime is 
a criminal’, and that ‘everybody, no matter what their background or circumstances, has 
the freedom to choose between right and wrong’ and that ‘[t]hose who make the wrong 
decision, who engage in criminality, must be identified, arrested and punished’ (May, 
2011). This denial of politics crossed party lines, emerging from Labour politicians’ 
accounts: Sadiq Khan, then MP for Tooting, echoed the same point, writing that the 
disturbances were ‘not a genuine outlet of political angst, nor a reaction to police 
conduct’, but ‘simply criminality on a devastating scale’ (Khan, 2011).  
Like Amar, prosecutor Kofi had also begun our conversation by recalling the fear that he 
thought the public had felt during the disturbances:  
I think it was a really scary time for everybody. I remember, I live in South London, near 
Clapham, and I remember the night that the shops there were the target of the disorder. 
And I could actually hear sirens from where I live, going up and down the road, which 
was pretty scary. Like, oh my God, this is spreading.  
As Kofi reiterated later in our interview, ‘It was kind of scary. You know, you just thought, 
there’s mayhem breaking out everywhere’: 
And it wasn’t just isolated, so it wasn’t just, I don’t know, Notting Hill, or Croydon. It 
was Croydon, Notting Hill, Tottenham. So you’re thinking ‘Oh my God, where’s this 
gonna end? (Laughing) Is it gonna end?!’ 
It was this sense of ‘mayhem’ and the disorder spreading uncontrollably that seemed to 
underpin the dread that Kofi recalled. Kofi recounted asking himself ‘Is it gonna end?’, 
evoking a fear of the unrest being completely beyond prediction or control. For Kofi, like 
for Amar, the disturbances represented an extraordinary breakdown of law and order 
requiring an exceptional response: 
It was almost like a breakdown of law and order. The society was in meltdown. The 
authorities had to step in and put in place some really harsh measures to make sure that 
the whole thing didn’t collapse.  
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Framing the riots as a moment where ‘society was in meltdown’ was a crucial means of 
justifying and legitimising the CPS’s unusually harsh approach to prosecuting riot-related 
offences. For Kofi the unrest required and necessitated ‘some really harsh measures’ to 
prevent a complete ‘breakdown of law and order’. The disturbances were not just a threat 
to retail and commercial properties, to particular neighbourhoods; or even to the city, but 
a threat to society itself. In the face of such a danger, Kofi says, the authorities had to step 
in, not only to protect local businesses and residents but to safeguard society.  
By framing the disturbances as an unforeseen, unpredictable, and ultimately meaningless 
tide of  violence that posed a serious risk to the country, CPS lawyers were able to claim 
a moral responsibility to restore law and order. This identification of  prosecutors as 
guardians of  public safety was key to prosecutors’ accounts. As Kofi explained, 
As a matter of public policy I think that it’s important that (sighing) the primary (pause) 
objective or function of a state is to ensure the safety of its citizens… So in order to do 
that, some measures needed to be taken… If it’s a riot case, [prosecution] almost always 
will be in the public interest at that time, because obviously the public need to feel safe, 
and the state needs to deter that sort of behaviour.  
For Kofi, then, a vital means of claiming legitimacy for the CPS’s response was to frame 
it as a crucial means of ensuring public safety – safety which, in his account, had been 
gravely endangered by the disorder. The legitimacy of the state’s supreme authority over 
citizens is predicated on its claim to protect and regulate people’s ‘most vital interests’ 
(Green, 1990; cited in Bottoms and Tankebe, 2017: 47); that is, to ensure their safety and 
security. Against the Hobbesian images of the disturbances as frightening disorder, chaos, 
mayhem and lawlessness, Kofi positions the CPS as centrally concerned with protecting 
the public. By framing the unrest as meaningless criminality, the ‘measures that needed to 
be taken’, in this account, were clear: rather than any broader consideration of  the social 
causes of  the disturbances, prosecuting as many cases as possible, as quickly as possible, 
to secure convictions that would bring the unrest to an end by ‘sending a message’ to 
those rioting, or considering joining in.  
In this way, the definition of  the ‘riots’ was an important mechanism for justifying the 
CPS’s adoption of  unusually harsh prosecution practices, allowing Kofi to frame the 
prosecution of all cases, regardless of whether they met the usual criteria, as a matter of 
public interest, and as a vital means of protecting the citizenry as a whole (itself a 
contentious notion that I discuss in Chapter 6). As Bauman (2000b) notes, when crime is 
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framed as a threat to society, acting to apprehend and ultimately exclude those posing a 
danger can be positioned as ‘an act of good sense and justice’ (Bauman, 2000b: 25). While 
the CPS’s approach to prosecuting riot-related offences courted controversy (Bawdon 
and Bowcott, 2012), framing the disturbances as a danger to society allowed prosecutors 
to effectively neutralise this potential ‘taint’, instead positioning their work as benevolent; 
as ‘an act of human care and charity, a profoundly moral duty’ pursued in the interests of 
the public, allowing prosecutors to see themselves as ‘sensible and righteous, as becomes 
the defenders of law and order’ (Bauman, 2000b: 25 emphasis added). 
In the subsequent sections of the chapter I examine the forms of denial and amnesia 
inherent in this account. I show how prosecutors’ stripped-back accounts of the 
disturbances elided and obscured the crucial historical and political context that 
problematises this simplistic narrative of crime and justice. 
Part 2. ‘We don’t have much of a history of that’: Forgetting the 
historical and political context of the disturbances 
Framing the unrest as apolitical and completely unprecedented was crucial in legitimising 
the harsh prosecutorial reaction, but this narrative necessitates a sort of amnesia and 
blinkered or selective knowledge. First I show how prosecutors’ claims that the 
disturbances were unprecedented ignored or minimised the clear parallels in England’s 
recent history – most notably, the widespread urban unrest of the 1980s. When 
prosecutors did acknowledge these historical precedents, it was in highly selective terms 
that allowed them to frame 2011 as comparatively apolitical. Second, I show how these 
framings of 2011 as meaningless and lacking any legitimate political motivation relied 
upon forgetting the more immediate context for the disturbances, Mark Duggan’s killing. 
As well as legitimising a severe criminal justice response, stripping the 2011 riots of their 
political and historical context, instead focusing solely on their rareness and 
exceptionality, obscures the clear continuities of racialised state violence that run through 
England’s riotous history. 
Prosecutor Amar had worked alongside Kofi and other senior CPS staff to plan the 
organisation’s response to the disturbances in London. Amar recalled convening a 
meeting to coordinate CPS lawyers to cover magistrates’ courts, where all the people 
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arrested for riot-related offences were initially being dealt with. His memory of some of 
the detail was, unsurprisingly, slightly hazy after several years: 
You must forgive me, the day seems to have escaped my mind but I remember the details 
of it. Whether it was a Thursday or a Friday, I forget… But the main thing is that it was 
about four or five in the afternoon and all was going wrong in London (laughing). So there 
were riots in Tottenham and Croydon and a whole host of other places. So our job was 
simply to assist the court to see whether, if the police were arresting people, would there 
be prosecutors available? So that was our main job. And we worked with HMCTS,22 the 
courts service, and I arranged rotas to dispatch prosecutors off to various courts.  
Amar was quick to point out that this process had happened very rapidly:  
People were being arrested and they were being charged and prosecuted very, very 
quickly. So, but I think you have to view that, and look at it in the sort of context of what 
happened at the time. And in this country’s history it’s quite rare.  
Amar seemed to acknowledge or at least anticipate criticism of the speed at which people 
were charged and prosecuted, but was quick to point out that this needed to be seen ‘in 
the context of what happened at the time’, and specifically in relation to the unusual 
nature of the events: ‘in this country’s history it’s quite rare’. Later in the interview Amar 
explicitly addressed the critical attention that the punitive response to the disturbances 
had received: 
I can’t remember whether it was academics, but there was a lot of critical journalism after 
the event, after they’d finished, saying, look, you know, [the] criminal justice system had 
just shut down, and it was like everybody was just being locked up etcetera. Well yes, it 
probably did feel like that. But then I think they were very unique circumstances… It was 
quite extraordinary at the time.  
For Amar and others, the notion of  the riots being unique and extraordinary was a crucial 
factor in justifying the criminal justice system’s deviation from normal policy and practice 
and its punitive treatment of  rioters. David, who had been a magistrate in 2011, similarly 
told me that the riots were:  
 
22 HM Courts and Tribunals Service 
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a very, very unusual set of circumstances, and something that the English justice system 
had never had to tackle, in modern history.  
Framing the 2011 disturbances as unique – or even anomalous and atypical – obscures 
vitally important historical context that reframes our reading of  the unrest and the 
response to it. Though the 2011 disturbances were certainly unusual, and in some senses 
unique – in terms of their geographical spread and the speed at which unrest occurred in 
different locations across the country – seeing 2011 as entirely unprecedented requires a 
significant amount of  amnesia. As I set out in Chapter 2, England has a long history of  
unrest, with events of  the 1980s providing the clearest precedents and parallels. These 
episodes of  unrest were precipitated by a context of  a Conservative government, high 
unemployment, especially among young people, and increasing tensions with the police, 
with the spark very often provided by the assault or killing of  a black resident at the hands 
of  the police. Tottenham in particular is ‘an area uniquely saturated with histories of  
conflict between the community and the police’ (Gilroy, 2013). Perhaps ‘the most 
surprising thing’ about the disturbances, then, was ‘the surprise that greeted them; as if 
we had not seen their like before’ (Jefferson, 2012). As I will go on to discuss in the next 
part of  the chapter, the Metropolitan Police’s killing of  Mark Duggan’s on Ferry Lane 
draws attention to the historical continuities that played out in the 2011 riots. Yet for 
many professionals, this history was either denied – signalling a powerful ‘historical 
amnesia’ (Benyon, 1987b: 167), a ‘cycle of perpetual forgetfulness’ (Hall, 1987: 50) so that 
every new episode of urban unrest is met with shock and bewilderment, as if nothing like 
it had ever happened before – or its relevance is swiftly dismissed, as I show below. This 
was a powerful means of  legitimising the exceptional response.  
‘It wasn’t based on the deprivation or the racism which Toxteth and Brixton 
were’ 
When prosecutors recalled the disturbances of the 1980s, they drew a clear distinction 
between the two periods, effectively disarticulating 2011 from its historical context and 
obscuring the lines of racialised and classed state violence that run through this past.  
Having pointed out that rioting is ‘quite rare’ in English history, Amar did briefly 
acknowledge the unrest of the 1980s: 
I mean we’ve had, you know, Brixton riots and whatnot. You may be younger than I am, 
certainly (laughing) but most people don’t really remember that. And I was probably at 
school still when the Brixton riots happened, and it’s just a vague memory of people 
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being unhappy, and disturbances being caused etcetera. But we don’t really have much 
of a history of that.   
For Amar, in his middle age, the Brixton riots were ‘just a vague memory of people being 
unhappy’, rendered obsolete or irrelevant by their temporal distance from the present. 
Moreover, Amar suggested, these events weren’t meaningfully comparable to 2011: 
Well, when did we have riots? Maybe back in ‘81 or something, and probably something 
in Tottenham. But they weren’t really – they were violent disorders. We’ve had loads of 
violent disorders. Football’s a good example, isn’t it, from the game, to the fights and all 
the rest of it. So we’ve had quite a lot of that. But that’s about the only sort of 
comparators one would have. 
In this telling, the widespread urban unrest of  the 1980s has more in common with 
football hooliganism than with 2011, despite all of  the parallels in the context and the 
precipitating events. While reluctantly acknowledging the historical precedents, then, 
Amar dismissed their significance, denying the connections that give the 2011 
disturbances a very different set of  meanings from those he attributed to them – an 
exceptional outburst of  meaningless offending.  
Similar strategies of  dismissal emerged in my conversations with other professionals. As 
Roger, a criminal defence solicitor, told me, the unrest in 2011 ‘wasn’t based on the 
deprivation or the racism’ that riots in the ‘80s had been:  
Brixton and Toxteth in the 1980s were deeply deprived areas with real problems. And I 
mean, the Scarman report was, you know, a real eye-opener to people. Whereas I don’t 
think this set of riots was the same issue at all. I mean, certainly in deprived areas the kids 
thought ‘Gosh, this is exciting’, but it wasn’t based on the deprivation or the racism which 
I think both Toxteth and Brixton probably were. 
Though Roger acknowledged that some of the unrest in 2011 had taken place in ‘deprived 
areas’ and recognised the context of austerity and cuts to local services, he was clear that 
2011 was different. In particular, it was the perceived prevalence of acquisitive crime that 
marked the 2011 disturbances as senseless: ‘The looting was silly. It was just silly. And 
the fires were serious, but the looting was just nonsense’. For Roger, a generation older 
than Amar, the riots of  the 1980s were not just a vague memory of  unhappiness but were 
in fact imbued with meaning as reactions against profound social inequalities. But far 
from highlighting the historical parallels between the two periods of  unrest, Roger drew 
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a bold dividing line between them. He positioned the 2011 riots as decisively not about 
poverty or racism, but solely about ‘excitement’, entirely stripping the unrest of  political, 
social or economic meaning. Such representations of the riots as motivated by nothing 
more than greed, destruction or fun ‘provide a concerted concealment’ (Hirsh and 
Swanson, 2020: 222), actively obscuring and rendering invisible the structural and 
systemic context from which they emerge, and normalising the punitive reaction. 
As Gilroy (2013) pointed out, the idea that ‘thirty years earlier there had really been things 
to complain about, while nowadays, things were not so bad as to justify the rioters’ 
“mindless violence”’ became a curiously common refrain in media and political 
commentary in 2011. The narrative that the riots of  the 1980s, unlike these ones, were a 
response to genuine structural problems permeated even the most deeply conservative 
commentaries in 2011. The Daily Mail, for example, made a clear-cut distinction between 
the two periods: 
To blame [the riots on] the cuts is immoral and cynical. This is criminality – pure and 
simple – by yobs who have nothing but contempt for decent, law-abiding people. No, 
regardless of the propaganda being pumped out by the Left-wing establishment, this is 
not a repeat of the political riots that scarred the early 1980s, which were sparked by mass 
unemployment and alleged police racism. 
(Daily Mail Comment, 2011) 
The Mail positions the 80s unrest as political – ‘sparked by mass unemployment’ and police 
racism (or, at least, alleged racism) – while 2011 is decisively defined as a matter of  
criminality ‘pure and simple’. Political responses echoed this logic; contending that while 
the earlier riots were rooted in racism, as Scarman showed, what happened in Tottenham 
was mindless, copycat violence. The Parliamentary Home Affairs Committee observed 
that while there could have ‘been an element of disengagement’ among some of those 
involved in the riots, nonetheless, ‘unlike some events in the past, including the riots in 
the 1980s, there does not seem to be any clear narrative, nor a clear element of protest or 
clear political objectives’ (Home Affairs Committee, 2011: 31).23  
 
23 In contrast, the Scarman report – though far from radical and highly problematic in its focus 
on ‘cultural’ problems (Barker and Beezer, 1983; Gilroy, 2002) – nevertheless set the scene for 
this enduring cultural memory of the 1981 Brixton disturbances. Scarman’s acknowledgement of 
economic, social and political inequalities, and in particular the need for changes to racist policing 
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These claims embodied a kind of perverse nostalgia, harking back to a golden age of 
unrest where riots meant something; when they clearly and incontrovertibly signalled 
profound social inequalities. Of course, like all nostalgia, this narrative appeals to a 
putative past that is largely imagined. Prosecutors’ accounts pointed to a widespread 
consensus that emerged in 2011, acknowledging the 1980s disturbances as rational 
responses to legitimate grievances. Yet this is dramatically different from the meanings 
that were ascribed to the events at the time. ‘After every outbreak of rioting in the UK, 
the government responds in exactly the same way’, argue Stott et al. (2019): ‘Previous 
riots, they say, may have had social and political causes – deprivation, inequality, racism 
– but this time, these riots are an exception’. Past disturbances are held up as legitimate, 
as a politically pure and morally authentic example against which to define these riots as 
illegitimate and immoral, effectively ‘mobilising the past to justify an authoritarian 
clampdown in the present’ (Sim, 2009: 79). Even the 1981 disturbances ‘were not as neat 
to categorise and interpret as they look in hindsight’ (Smith, 2013). Unrest in the 1980s 
was routinely perceived as ‘entirely unexpected and unprecedented in recent British 
experience’ (Benyon, 1987b: 166), and far from universally recognising the  riots as a 
legitimate reaction against structural violence, media and government rhetoric in 1981 
and ‘85 was dominated by discourses of a pathological black culture that framed the 
unrest as aberrant, irrational and entirely unjustifiable (Benyon and Solomos, 1987b; 
Burgess, 1985; Gilroy, 2013; Keith, 1993; Murdock, 1984). The 1980s riots, then, were 
imbued with political legitimacy and credibility only in retrospect, providing an ideal of 
authenticity against which contemporary riots could be compared, measured and found 
to fall short.  
This selective acknowledgement of history was clear, too, in my conversation with Martin, 
a senior civil servant who had led the prison service’s response to the riots. Comparing 
2011 to the 1985 Broadwater Farm riots, Martin recalled the earlier disturbances as 
decisively more political: 
 
practices arguably shaped a shared understanding (at least in the longer term) of the riots as the 
actions of ‘a normal community with a legitimate grievance’ (Lea, 2011) which took the form of 
a rational, if not acceptable, outburst of anger and resentment. 
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They were a response to stop and search and stuff like that, and police intimidation, as 
were the Brixton riots and that sort of stuff. These [2011 riots] weren’t a response to 
that… If I remember rightly, they came out of a single incident, didn’t they? 
Rather than being a reaction against systemic patterns in police practices, Martin said, the 
2011 disturbances were set off by ‘a single incident’. I reminded Martin that it was the 
killing of Mark Duggan that had precipitated the unrest. After a brief moment of 
confusion, he recalled Duggan’s death: 
Martin: That’s it, that’s right, the Tottenham stuff. I couldn’t- I was thinking of De 
Menezes24 for a while there. I was thinking, ‘that’s not the right one’. 
Chloe: No, that was a few years before. So yeah, Mark Duggan’s death and then 
Martin: That’s right. So that was it, and that then created the spark. But it wasn’t sort of 
brewing in Tottenham as far as I can tell, in the same way as Broadwater Farm, or 
Brixton, or Toxteth or any of that was brewing for quite some time.  
In this way Martin positioned Duggan’s killing as an isolated and anomalous incident, 
entirely unrelated to the racialised police practices that caused the 1980s disturbances. 
While he recognised Duggan’s death as a ‘spark’ for the riots, he pulled it firmly out of 
its political context, in contrast to earlier riots that had been a response to long-standing 
tensions. This framing obscures the significance of Duggan’s death; ignores the politics 
behind it, and the clear lines that run through England’s recent history of urban unrest.  
‘I can’t really remember what triggered it’: erasing Mark Duggan’s killing 
Defining the 2011 disturbances as qualitatively different from the 1980s ‘riots’, as 
unforeseeable and entirely apolitical criminality, provided a powerful means of 
normalising the harsh prosecutorial reaction against them. The clearest challenge to this 
imagination is that these disturbances, like so many others in England’s recent history, 
 
24 Jean Charles de Menezes was a 27-year-old Brazilian electrician who was shot dead by a 
Metropolitan Police officer after boarding a tube train at Stockwell Underground station on 22nd 
July 2005. In an apparent case of mistaken identity, he was taken to be a suspected terrorist who 
had attempted to bomb London the previous day, two weeks after the ‘7/7’ attacks that killed 52 
people. De Menezes was shot seven times in the head and once in the shoulder at point-blank 
range. In 2008 an inquest jury recorded an open verdict after being barred by the coroner from 
returning a verdict of unlawful killing (Siddique, 2016). 
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were a direct reaction to the killing by the police of a person of colour in a relatively 
deprived and over policed neighbourhood. Mark Duggan’s killing, then, represented a 
sticking point in prosecutors’ justifications of the criminal justice response to the 
disturbances. I look here at how prosecutors navigated this obstacle; showing how the 
killing of Mark Duggan was variously erased, distorted, or neutralised, allowing 
professionals to maintain the claim that the prosecutorial response to the disturbances 
was appropriate and just. 
A sense of amnesia about Duggan’s killing was common in my interviews with 
prosecutors, and others across the criminal justice system. Sometimes this was a question 
of where practitioners’ accounts began and ended, and what was left out. Often, 
practitioners’ ‘opening statements’, the narratives they presented at the outset of the 
interview began at a point in time where the disturbances were in full flow. Amar’s 
account simply made no mention of Mark Duggan at all; rather, his account started when 
‘all was going wrong in London’, with ‘riots in Tottenham and Croydon and a whole host 
of other places’. As Scheppele (1989: 2096–2097) notes, ‘where to begin’ is a significant 
question; legal narratives are often tightly bounded and miss out vital context that would 
suggest different conclusions. By simply leaving out Duggan’s killing and cutting straight 
to the riots, Amar maintains a coherent narrative in which the CPS’s role was ‘simply to 
assist the courts’ in dealing with a dangerous and senseless outbreak of violence. 
For senior prosecutor Kofi this vital – or, rather, lethal – context had, over the years, 
simply slipped out of his recollection of events. 
Kofi: I have to really think about how it actually came about, because I can’t really 
remember what triggered it. There was something in Tottenham, was it? 
Chloe: Yeah, it was Mark Duggan, the police shooting. 
Kofi: Mark Duggan’s police stop, that’s right. He was killed, wasn’t he? He was stopped 
because they suspected he was carrying a firearm, or something? 
Chloe: That’s right. 
Kofi: And that’s what was the trigger, yeah… It’s very, what word am I looking for, 
inauspicious. It’s just, you know, obviously a tragic event for those concerned, the shooting by 
officers of a person in the car. But, you know, you wouldn’t hear that and think ‘Oh my 
god, we’re gonna be in conflagration tomorrow, the whole country’s gonna be on fire’. 
(Emphasis added) 
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Rather than eliding Duggan’s death entirely, Kofi’s framing might be read as a kind of  
interpretive denial (Cohen, 2001); not negating the fact that something happened, but 
imbuing it with an alternative meaning from what might seem apparent to others. Kofi 
frames Duggan’s death as a personal and private tragedy: ‘a tragic event for those 
concerned’ (presumably Duggan and his family, though maybe the police officers too) 
but essentially an unfortunate and anomalous event, and the disturbances as a 
disproportionate reaction that couldn’t possibly have been anticipated. Again this was 
consistent with the dominant political interpretation of  Duggan’s death. On the 11th 
August 2011 David Cameron stated that though ‘initially there were some peaceful 
demonstrations following Mark Duggan’s death’ the killing ‘was then used as an excuse 
by opportunist thugs in gangs, first in Tottenham itself, then across London and then in 
other cities’ (Cameron, 2011d):  
It is completely wrong to say there is any justifiable causal link. It is simply preposterous 
for anyone to suggest that people looting in Tottenham at the weekend, still less three 
days later Salford, were in any way doing so because of the death of Mark Duggan. 
(Cameron, 2011d) 
Kofi, like Cameron, decisively disarticulates the ‘trigger’ of  the riots from what 
subsequently happened, denying any ‘justifiable causal link’, in Cameron’s words, and 
insisting the riots were essentially unrelated. 
Unlike Kofi and Amar, Jason – a senior prosecutor who had been in charge of  more 
serious Crown Court cases during and after the disturbances – did clearly recall Duggan’s 
death. He remembered the riots being linked to ‘a long-term issue’ involving: 
a significant proportion of the society in general being really disenfranchised and 
disillusioned by (pause, intake of breath) society in general, which is why they were rioting. 
You know, as a result of primarily, you know, the Mark Duggan case and others.  
Initially, then, Jason pointed to Duggan’s killing as a cause of  the disturbances, alongside 
a broader context of  austerity and political disillusionment. Pointing out that ‘a significant 
proportion of  the society’ were disillusioned by ‘the Mark Duggan case’ and others 
suggested an awareness of  the systemic nature of  the issues of  police brutality in 
Duggan’s death. But he seemed to hesitate in his analysis when we returned to the topic 
later in the interview. Some, he said, ‘would have been triggered by concerns about certain 
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cases; others would have been triggered by their general view about politics, society in 
general’: 
It would be interesting to know, actually. I don’t think any real research has been done 
into actually what caused it. I mean it’s easy to say ‘it was triggered by’ – which initially it 
was triggered by the concerns over the Duggan case, from memory, I think that’s right… 
But actually, were those people involved in it because of that? Who knows? I’d question 
whether that actually is right.  
Jason somewhat backtracks here; casting doubt on whether people had really been 
motivated by Duggan’s killing. As I discussed in Chapter 2 (and in contrast to Jason’s 
notion that no ‘real research has been done into what caused it’) explanations for the 
disturbances have proliferated in the years since 2011, and pinning down any simple, 
singular explanation for the diverse and complex set of actions and events is difficult. In 
some ways, then, Jason’s reluctance to identify a definitive cause for the disturbances is 
understandable. But given the vast amount of academic research into the causes of the 
unrest that has been published in the years since 2011 (see Chapter 2), Jason’s seeming 
unawareness seems also to suggest a disconnect between academic research, and criminal 
justice policy and practice, perhaps reflecting another way in which criminal justice policy 
is produced through and imbricated with selective knowledge and ignorance (see e.g. 
Slater, 2008; Gregg, 2010; Hayden and Jenkins, 2014 on ‘policy-based’ or ‘decision-based 
evidence making’ in punitive social and penal policy). Besides his seeming lack of 
knowledge of the research, Jason’s agnostic attitude (‘Who knows?’) signals an 
unwillingness to accept the political salience of Duggan’s death without robust evidence 
and fits into the broader organisational narrative offered by his colleagues, framing the 
riots as a largely, if not entirely, criminal rather than political phenomenon.  
Sentencers’ accounts similarly dismissed or minimised the significance of Duggan’s death 
in the unrest. Retired district judge Leonard told me that: 
Although the riots appeared to start because of the shooting of the young man in 
Tottenham, that clearly wasn’t the grievance, if there was a grievance, from other parts 
of the country.  
Though he acknowledged that Duggan’s killing had ‘appeared’ to play a role in the start 
of the riots, as least, it certainly couldn’t explain the spread of the unrest to other towns 
and cities, where there may, Leonard suggests, have been no real ‘grievance’ at all. Rather, 
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Leonard said, ‘There were other factors at play. It wasn’t our job to worry about what 
those factors were.’ Again, this points to a reasonable unwillingness to provide a universal 
explanation for diverse episodes of rioting across the country. But Leonard’s framing of 
Duggan’s death as a one-off, isolated event that could not possibly be connected to unrest 
in other locations, again obscures the systemic and structural violence that Duggan’s 
killing in some ways represented or revealed, and that the state’s response to the riots so 
completely failed to recognise, let alone address. Leonard’s insistence that the grievances 
that led to the disturbances were irrelevant or outside the scope of the judiciary’s concern 
(‘it wasn’t our job to worry about what those factors were’) also points to the ways that 
the bureaucratic architecture of the criminal justice system allows its constituent 
organisations to disavow moral responsibility for the cumulative impacts of the system 
of which they are a part (I discuss this in more detail in Chapter 7). 
Like Leonard, David, who had been a magistrate in 2011, recognised that a police 
shooting had sparked the disturbances – but, like in many others’ accounts, Duggan’s 
name had been lost along the way:  
David: I know this all started because some- the police shot and killed, and I can’t 
remember the man’s name, you’ll probably remember it.  
Chloe: Mark Duggan. 
David: That’s right, shot and killed him. And there’s all sorts of rumours around that. 
There’s allegations that apparently a police, one of the police’s mobile phones would 
appear to have had a bullet embedded in it. How true it is I don’t know. 
That David had remembered that a bullet had become embedded in a police device, but 
not that the bullet had unambiguously been fired by a police officer – instead implying 
that Duggan had shot at the police – was telling of  how the shape of  events had solidified 
over the years that had passed between the riots and the point at which I was doing my 
research, in 2018. David’s recollection is perhaps not surprising when we consider how 
Duggan was represented by the media following his death. On the day of Duggan’s killing 
by police, the Telegraph for example reported ‘A policeman’s life was saved by his radio 
last night after gunman Mark Duggan opened fire on him’ (The Telegraph, 2011b), and an 
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initial statement from the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) referred 
to a ‘shoot out’, though this was withdrawn within days.25  
 
25Duggan had not fired any shots; the gun that he had allegedly been carrying was found in bushes 
about five metres from where he had been shot, but no witnesses described seeing him throw it. 
‘Independent’ investigations into Duggan’s death were desperately disappointing, reflecting 
decades of similar conduct in cases of deaths at the hands of the police. Though Duggan’s family 
and community quickly raised grave concerns about the IPCC’s conduct (Scott, 2011), it wasn’t 
until January 2013 that the public inquest into Duggan’s death was announced. When the inquest 
was held in the autumn of that year, the police officers directly involved in the shooting 
maintained that Duggan had emerged from the cab holding a gun, concealed inside a sock, and 
that he had raised the gun as if to shoot, forcing the police officer ‘V53’ to fire in self-defence. 
The inquest heard from only one civilian witness, who said that he was watching through the 
open window of a ninth-floor flat on the other side of the road, and who described what he saw 
as ‘an execution’ (Prodger, 2014). He said Mark Duggan was not holding a gun, but a mobile 
phone, and that having tried to flee, was ‘trapped’ and was holding his arms up as if to surrender 
when he was shot at close range. In January 2014 the jury concluded by a majority of eight to two 
that Mark Duggan had been lawfully killed by police. Despite deciding that Duggan was unarmed 
at the time he was shot (though all ten jurors agreed that there had been a gun in the taxi with 
Mark Duggan, eight of them were sure the gun was not in his hands when he was shot dead) they 
found that ‘V53’ ‘honestly believed’ that Duggan was armed and was about to shoot at the police 
(Prodger, 2014). Their explanation for the whereabouts of the gun was that Duggan must have 
thrown it from the taxi before it was surrounded, despite no witnesses giving evidence to support 
this idea (Prodger, 2014). The verdict was met with dismay and disbelief by Duggan’s family. They 
appealed the inquest verdict, arguing that the coroner should have directed the jury to consider 
whether the police officer’s ‘honest belief’ that Duggan was armed and about to shoot was 
reasonable, and that the coroner should have made clear that if the jury found Duggan to be 
unarmed they could not return a conclusion of lawful killing. Yet in October 2014 three High 
Court judges upheld the verdict. Meanwhile, the IPCC’s long-awaited report into Duggan’s killing 
was released in March 2015, more than three and a half years after he had died, and was deemed 
a ‘whitewash’ by many (Scott, 2015). The family were given permission to take the case to the 
Court of Appeal, which in March 2017 again upheld the verdict of lawful killing (Taylor, 2017). 
In October 2019, Duggan’s family agreed a settlement with the Metropolitan Police, reaching ‘an 
agreed position without acceptance of liability on the part of the Metropolitan Police Service or 
its officers’ (BBC News, 2019). The struggle to hold the police to account, however, has continued 
– most recently, with research group Forensic Architecture scrutinising the officially sanctioned 
version of events and finding it untenable (Dodd, 2019). 
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Duggan’s killing represented a kind of  ‘uncomfortable knowledge’ (Rayner, 2016) that 
challenged the CPS’s narrative about the disturbances as a uniquely dangerous outburst 
of  meaningless violence and criminality. Maintaining a coherent sense of  their work as 
meaningful and moral required prosecutors to neutralise this potentially troublesome or 
problematic knowledge. For some, as I have shown, Duggan’s death was simply left out 
of  their accounts, while for others it was neutralised by positioning it as an isolated 
incident, an individual tragedy unrelated to broader questions of  police racism, and 
unconnected to the disturbances that followed it. This denial or dismissal of  the 
significance of  Duggan’s death is an important means of  maintaining the widespread and 
‘well-rehearsed disavowal that [the 2011 riots] had anything to do with racism’ (Back, 
2014). While acknowledging the role of racism in causing the disturbances ‘would call for 
structural remedy’ (Allen and Taylor, 2012: 15), denying racism serves to absolve the state 
of responsibility to respond to the unrest in anything other than ‘law and order’ terms.  
In the next section of  the chapter I show how foregrounding Mark Duggan’s death 
licenses a very different reading of  the disturbances, as a response to systemic inequalities 
that require structural remedies.  
Part 3. ‘We basically re-enacted Mark Duggan in a different 
format’: Resisting narrow framings of the unrest 
I have argued that shared understandings of the disturbances as absolutely unique and 
out-of-the-blue, and as meaningless, ignore and obscure the deep-rooted systemic and 
structural problems that would require another kind of response aside from the law and 
order backlash that we saw. I now turn to look at what happens to definitions of the riots 
if Mark Duggan’s death is not ignored or dismissed but centred. Drawing on interviews 
with professionals who, unlike the prosecutors and sentencers I have focused on so far, 
worked closely with people who had been involved in the disturbances, I show how they 
challenge and counter the definition of the riots as senseless criminality; instead seeing 
them as a response to a long history of police brutality towards marginalised communities. 
This imagination of the riots opens up very different ways of thinking about the criminal 
justice response to the riots; not as a benevolent restoration of public safety, but as an 
emblematic example of deeply racialised and classed processes of criminalisation and 
punishment. 
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I met Ashley at the offices of the North London local authority where he managed the 
youth offending service, working with children and young adults who had been brought 
into contact with the criminal justice system. In contrast to prosecutors, whose accounts 
often began by emphasising the terror of the riots, Ashley started our conversation by 
setting out the causes of the disturbances as he saw them. 
Thinking back to 2011, I’m aware of the fact that the young people were quite disaffected 
around that time… They were also quite upset about some of the cuts which they had 
faced… The young people basically felt that no-one was listening to them. They couldn’t 
get the right type of job that they want, or some of them felt that there was no point in 
going to college, because actually they’re not going to get a decent job at the end of it. 
And those who were going to college had their grants slashed.  
For Ashley, the riots needed to be understood within this context; the disturbances 
occurring a year into the Coalition government, with the austerity agenda having 
profound consequences for young people’s opportunities and prospects: 
And I know obviously we had quite a large financial deficit, nationally, in [2011], but still. 
They’re taking from the poor. It’s really not the best way of dealing with those sorts of 
issues. It just moves the problem elsewhere… And I think that people who are intelligent 
enough to know what the social problems were within the country were able to see that 
these disturbances were a symptom of what certain groups of young people were feeling.  
I got the sense that for Ashley the interview was a chance to tell a different story about 
2011; to represent and advocate for the young people he worked with. This 
acknowledgement of  austerity wasn’t entirely absent from CPS lawyers’ accounts – Jason, 
too, had mentioned the cuts – but Ashley put it in far more politicised terms. Ashley 
located the disturbances decisively as the result of  a punitive government policy agenda 
that had ‘taken from the poor’, overwhelmingly impacting upon already marginalised 
communities. In contrast to prosecutors, who stripped the riots of  any political meaning 
by isolating them from their political context, or carefully qualifying any suggested link 
between the riots and the austerity agenda, Ashley connected the unrest firmly to the 
broader political and social context. 
Ashley also framed the disturbances clearly as the result of  Mark Duggan’s death, and – 
crucially – situated Duggan’s death within wider patterns of  discrimination and 
victimisation: 
Remembering and forgetting ‘the riots’ 
 97 
Those riots started with the incident with Mark Duggan, didn’t it?… I think it was a 
culmination of tension and people feeling disempowered, powerless and discriminated 
against. I think it was a combination of all those factors. ’Cause there had been tensions 
between certain groups, BME young people, in particular, also some white young people 
who are from working-class backgrounds, or from lower- less affluent backgrounds. So 
tensions had been brewing for quite a while in a way. And I think with the stop and search 
policies, that made them feel more victimised, also, because they were much more likely 
to be stopped. And that’s what happened with Mark [Duggan] wasn’t it?  (Emphasis 
added) 
While civil servant Martin had claimed that the issues leading to the 2011 unrest had not 
been simmering ‘in the same way as Broadwater Farm, or Brixton, or Toxteth’, Ashley 
directly contradicted that, stating that tensions between the police and marginalised young 
people had been building over a number of  years, and that these were at the heart of  the 
disturbances. In contrast to Kofi, Jason and Martin, who understood Duggan’s death as 
an anomalous and isolated event that had nothing to do with the wider rioting it sparked; 
Ashley challenged this interpretive denial (Cohen, 2001), reframing Duggan’s death as 
inherently linked to broader patterns of  starkly classed and racialised policing practices. 
For Ashley, it was this context that needed to be addressed if  future riots were to be 
avoided. It was the increasing social and economic inequalities between communities (not 
least the likely impact of  the UK’s impending exit from the European Union on the 
poorest regions of  the country, he pointed out) and the persistent problematic policing 
practices targeted at the most marginalised communities, that would lead to further 
unrest. Rather than pointing to prosecution and conviction as the best way to bring the 
disturbances to and end and prevent them from occurring in the future; Ashley argued 
that meaningful change in social, economic and political inequalities was needed. 
‘Otherwise’, he said, ‘we’re just going to see a repeat of  these issues that we saw in 2011’. 
This understanding of  the disturbances as a response to issues of  unfair criminal justice 
practices was also taken up by Sadie, who I met at her office in a Law department at a 
central London university. Now an academic, in 2011 Sadie had been a newly qualified 
barrister, and had defended a number of  people for riot-related charges at magistrates’ 
courts. Of  the participants I interviewed, Sadie was perhaps the most sharply critical in 
her assessment of  the state’s response to the unrest. Like Ashley, she saw the disturbances 
as a direct response to Mark Duggan’s killing, and positioned Duggan’s death not as an 
anomaly, but as part of  a wider pattern of  discriminatory policing practices. But Sadie’s 
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analysis went further, by emphasising how the criminal justice reaction to the unrest was 
not only inadequate, but actively counterproductive, perpetuating the racialised violence 
that had led to the unrest:  
In some ways it is ironic that if you take the Duggan example, part of what, or a significant 
part of what sparked the riots was a response to oppressive law and order practices which 
impact particular communities in disproportionate ways. And yet it seems to me that the 
outcome of the criminal justice system in relation to the riots was basically exactly the 
same thing: an oppressive law and order policy (laughing) which impacted on particular 
communities in disproportionate ways. So we basically re-enacted Mark Duggan in a 
different format, but with equal problems, or similar problems. Um, and nobody seems 
to think that’s a problem, so far as I can tell (laughing).  
For Sadie the reaction of  the criminal justice system to the riots was not an adequate or 
rational response to the unrest but a reflection of  the same systemic problems – 
‘oppressive law and order practices which impact particular communities in 
disproportionate ways’ – that had led to Duggan being killed.  
In my interviews with prosecutors, Duggan’s killing had been ignored altogether, or his 
death stripped of  history and context so that it became an individual tragedy that bore no 
meaningful relationship to the resulting disturbances. Prosecutors’ elision or dismissal of  
Duggan’s death allowed them to frame the riots as a senseless breakdown in law and 
order. In this telling, it was possible to position the state’s immediate reaction to the unrest 
– the rapid prosecution of  a vast number of  riot-related acts as serious criminal offences 
– as a proportionate and necessary means of  restoring public safety and deterring 
potential rioters. In stark contrast, by putting Duggan’s death – and the ingrained 
inequalities of  race and class that it highlighted – at the centre of  their narrative of  the 
riots, Ashley and Sadie problematise the criminal justice response to the riots, highlighting 
the inadequacy of  a criminal response to an inherently social and political set of  events. 
Sadie, moreover, points out that the harsh criminal justice response to the riots fed 
straight back into the problems that had led to the disturbances in the first place26; 
 
26 Commentators similarly noted that the state’s harsh approach to policing, prosecution and 
sentencing was likely to increase the likelihood of future unrest. By ‘reinforcing the adversarial 
relationship that the police already have with many people within the riot-torn communities… 
disproportionate sentences for apparently minor crimes, and politically inspired collective 
punishments of whole households could create incentives for future disorders’ (Gilson, 2011). 
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troubling the narrative of  law and order that seemed so self-evident in prosecutors’ 
accounts.  
These more critical accounts serve to remind us that the meanings that settle around 
disturbances are subject to constant challenge and contestation, not only from outside 
the criminal justice system but also from within it; and that the meanings surrounding the 
response to the riots are not fixed or secure but rather requires an ongoing process of  
reproduction. For those like Ashley as a youth offending service manager and Sadie as a 
former defence barrister, these critical views posed ethical tensions and ambiguous 
feelings about their own roles within a system that they saw as profoundly unfair. While 
prosecutors neutralised the uncomfortable knowledge (Rayner, 2016) that Duggan’s 
killing represented, and maintained a presentation of  their work as justified; for others 
their riots work retained a distinctly ‘dirty’ taint that could not be easily neutralised.  
Conclusions  
This chapter has examined the shared meanings and definitions of  the ‘riots’ that emerged 
in my conversations with criminal justice professionals. Drawing on my conversations 
with prosecutors Kofi, Amar and Jason, I have drawn out the threads woven through 
their accounts of  the disturbances that served to position the CPS’s extraordinarily harsh 
approach to the disturbances as legitimate, necessary, and proportionate. For prosecutors, 
defining the disturbances as a moment of  unprecedented fear and disorder provided an 
effective means of  deflecting criticisms that have been levelled against the CPS, and the 
criminal justice system more broadly. Kofi, Amar and Jason’s accounts of  the unrest can 
be read as efforts to legitimise, justify or defend a set of  prosecutorial policies and 
practices that were, by any measure, unusual, with an apparent uplift in the charges being 
chosen, and a significant diversion from the usual public interest test and level of  evidence 
required. 
Prosecutors told a story of  the riots as disorder of  the most fundamental kind: a 
frightening and chaotic breakdown of  law and order, and a grave danger to public safety. 
In this way, prosecutors recalled a situation in which they were morally obliged to rapidly 
restore order and safeguard society. Swiftly prosecuting as many ‘rioters’ as possible was 
framed as a vital measure to protect the country. I have argued that the coherence of this 
powerfully legitimating imagination of the riots is contingent upon processes of amnesia, 
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denial and ignorance. Decontextualised, selective and circumscribed imaginations of 
‘crime’, I contend, are an integral aspect of the cultural political economy in which the 
harsh criminal justice reaction to the disturbances was widely accepted as appropriate and 
fair.  
My analysis demonstrates how prosecutorial narratives of the 2011 disturbances, like legal 
discourse more broadly, is predicated on the privileging of selective accounts and claims 
to objective truth, at the same time silencing, excluding, dismissing and discrediting the 
alternative narratives and stories which fall outside of its narrow purview (Scheppele, 
1989: 2079). Certain stories are ‘officially approved, accepted, transformed into fact’ while 
alternative or contradictory narratives that would lead to different conclusions and ‘other 
ways of seeing’ are written out entirely, dismissed or discredited (Scheppele, 1989: 2079). 
The claim that the 2011 disturbances were entirely unprecedented played a crucial role in 
prosecutors’ justifications of  the CPS’s response, allowing them to frame the ‘riots’ as 
exceptional events requiring an extraordinary reaction. In doing so, their accounts ignored 
and obscured England’s long history of  urban unrest, signalling the continuation of  a 
‘cycle of perpetual forgetfulness’ (Hall, 1987: 50) that has characterised public responses 
to urban unrest over the past forty years, so that each outbreak of unrest is met with 
surprise and disbelief. I noted that this amnesia is intimately connected to a deep 
wistfulness for earlier disturbances: where prosecutors recalled past periods of unrest, 
they were cast in a golden glow of nostalgia, as understandable responses to genuine 
political grievances, providing an ideal against which the 2011 riots were compared and 
unfavorably contrasted (Stott et al., 2019).  
Mark Duggan’s death represented a sticking point in the narrative of the disturbances as 
unprecedented, apolitical and meaningless; representing a stark reminder of the deep-
rooted social, political and racial inequalities that have consistently given rise to unrest in 
the post-war period. Properly acknowledging the significance of Mark Duggan’s death 
would require a reckoning with the history and the ongoing issue of racism inherent in 
the very system within which practitioners work. I showed how prosecutors effectively 
navigated this challenge; either by excluding Duggan’s death altogether or by denying its 
relevance. As the very different accounts from youth offending manager Ashley and 
defence barrister Sadie showed, putting Duggan’s death front and centre enables a very 
different view of  the prosecutorial reaction to the riots – as, at best, an irrelevant and 
woefully inadequate response that fails to address the manifold social inequalities 
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underlying the events; or at worst, a brutally upscaled re-enactment of  the discriminatory 
criminal justice practices that led to Duggan’s death.  
Such critical readings of  the riots and the response, though, have remained relatively 
marginal to public debate in the years since 2011. As Stuart Hall noted in the wake of 
riots in the 1980s, the definitions of unrest that are rapidly established are hard to unsettle:   
alternative explanations of a deeper and more searching kind may occasionally come to 
the fore and raise matters for the agenda, but never with the urgency or vigour or 
commitment or collective political will necessary to bring about fundamental change. 
(Hall, 1987: 45) 
Imaginations of the 2011 disturbances as meaningless violence, and the punitive backlash 
as a proportionate and necessary response, meanwhile, have retained their ideological 
currency, underpinning and legitimating a series of punitive policy agendas in the 
aftermath of the riots (in the following chapter I discuss the Troubled Families and gangs 
projects that the riots catalysed). The claims about the nature of the unrest that animated 
prosecutors’ accounts were echoed by other practitioners, including sentencers, civil 
servants and even some defence lawyers, and closely reflected the narratives that 
dominated media, political and policy discourses in 2011. The circumscribed story of the 
riots that flowed through my interviews with prosecutors, then, points to a widely shared 
cultural imaginary of the disturbances; albeit one that is contested and opposed by critical 
voices within and outside of the criminal justice system. That prosecutors designing and 
delivering the state’s punitive response so closely reproduced these narratives signals that 
the prevailing definitions of  the disturbances that emerged in 2011 has not only cultural 
but profoundly practical implications. The delimited definition of  the unrest seemed to 
furnish prosecutors with the terms of  reference and vocabulary to pursue their 
prosecutorial agenda, to effectively justify it and to deflect criticism; perpetuating 
historical patterns whereby narrating and defining unrest, uprising and insurrections as 
irrational and violent acts that must be crushed to restore order and enforce the rule of 
law has provided a key means of legitimising racialised regimes of punishment throughout 
the twentieth century and into the twenty-first (Camp, 2016: 17). 
Prosecutors’ stories, told seven years after the riots, illustrate how decontextualised and 
delimited imaginations of  the disturbances have served to normalise and justify a violent 
criminal justice response to the unrest; but interviewing practitioners at this moment in 
time also offers a view onto how this response itself  has played an important role in 
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shaping the meanings that have coalesced and settled around the events in the years since 
2011. The dramatic reaction to the riots has not only been licensed and shaped by these 
definitions of  the disturbances as ‘criminality pure and simple’ but has also inflected our 
understandings of  the ‘riots’ themselves. The meanings that coalesce in the aftermath of  
riots are intimately connected to the state’s response to them (Hall et al., 2013 [1978]); 
and the imaginations of  the unrest that permeated my conversations with prosecutors in 
2018 are inherently entangled with the extraordinary criminal justice response, the 
spectacle of  widespread arrests, rapid prosecutions, the night courts and the long 
sentences handed out. By treating the disturbances as an outburst of  unprecedented and 
inexplicable criminality, the criminal justice system actively moulded the enduring cultural 
memory of  2011 which was so clear in my interviews. Moreover, the definitions that 
attached to the disturbances are not neutral but are mobilised to achieve or to underwrite 
political and ideological ends.  
The forms of denial I have described worked to maintain an imagination of criminal 
justice work, and prosecution in particular, as neutral, just and necessary, pointing to the 
vital role of ignorance, amnesia, ‘misrepresentation, evasion’ and ‘structured blindnesses’ 
(Mills, 1997: 19) that are vital to legitimise and reproduce a criminal justice system that 
disproportionately targets racialised and marginalised communities. The shared memory 
of  the disturbances in 2018 – and conversely, the amnesia about the unrest’s immediate 
causes, and its longer history – as an anomalous, unprecedented, unprovoked and 
senseless outburst of  violence has provided a potent resource to legitimise the criminal 
justice system in the longer term; equipping professionals with a set of  discourses that 
normalise its race- and class-based practices. The legitimacy of these practices, I have 
argued, depends upon erasing or refusing to recognise the material histories, social relations, 
and structural conditions that criminalise marginalised and racialised populations (Cacho, 
2012: 9). In the next chapter I build on this analysis by exploring the ideological and 






Surprising and typical ‘rioters’: Diversity, race and 
cultural constructions of criminality 
 
We found a lot more people you wouldn’t normally expect, just joining in.  
Jason, Senior District Crown Prosecutor, London 
Introduction 
The previous chapter explored how criminal justice professionals’ claims about the 
meaning (or meaninglessness) of the disturbances served to variously naturalise or 
problematise the harshly punitive law and order response to them. In this chapter I turn 
to examine the understandings of  ‘the rioters’ that interviewees evoked. I show how 
imaginations of  two contrasting figures – the surprising rioter and the typical rioter – 
personify and reinforce long-standing cultural connections between race, class, criminality 
and guilt. I argue that these shared understandings of  the rioters work as important 
ideological conductors, normalising and legitimising a criminal justice response that 
disproportionately targeted marginalised and racialised communities. 
In Chapter 4 I showed that prosecutors’ and sentencers’ accounts of  the disturbances 
largely echoed the definitions that circulated in media and political discussions. In this 
chapter, however, I discuss how our conversations about the rioters revealed a very 
different set of  imaginations. While I had expected practitioners to draw on the starkly 
classed, racialised and stigmatising stereotypes like the ‘chav’ and the ‘gang member’ that 
dominated popular debate in 2011, such crass figures were absent from our discussions. 
In contrast, practitioners were keen to emphasise the apparently unanticipated diversity 
of  those who were involved; and in particular the presence of  middle-class, educated and 
privileged young people. Yet far from subverting the racialised stereotypes that populated 
popular debate, the ideas about race, class and criminality that ran through practitioners’ 
descriptions of  these ‘surprising’ rioters subtly placed responsibility for the unrest on 
racialised and working-class communities, implicitly justifying their punishment.
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The chapter is organised in three parts. First I consider how the rioters were portrayed in 
the media, arguing that ‘race’ – though often communicated in coded and tacit ways – 
retained a powerful role in structuring common sense narratives about who was 
responsible for the disturbances. Though the cultural politics of  race and class in 2011 
largely precluded the kind of  starkly explicit scapegoating of  economically marginalised 
black communities that dominated discourses of  urban unrest in the 1980s, political and 
media commentators conjured a series of classed and racialised figures that undertook 
the same semantic work. 
In Part 2 I turn to my interviews with criminal justice practitioners. In stark contrast to 
political and media framings, I show how interviewees emphasised the diversity of  the 
rioters in 2011 – and in particular, the involvement of  middle-class, white people in the 
disturbances. But practitioners’ accounts of  the heterogeneity of  the rioters, far from 
subverting or overturning the long-established associations between race, class and 
criminality that dominated media and political discourse in 2011, in subtle ways 
reproduced them, implicitly shifting blame for the unrest onto the imagined ‘usual 
suspects.’ 
In Part 3 I discuss the challenges of  resisting these racialised and classed discourses of  
criminality for professionals working within the criminal justice system. Even where 
practitioners had critical appreciations of  the implications of  racialised and classed 
discourses of  criminality, I show how the political and policy context within which they 
work delimits the extent to which they are able to resist them, instead rendering 
individuals complicit in their perpetuation. I conclude the chapter by arguing that 
practitioners’ accounts of  the rioters point to a broader context in which insidious ideas 
about race, class and criminality take different forms in different moments and in 
different discursive spheres, but remain remarkably durable, flexible and resilient.  
Part 1. Race, class and criminality in popular representations of 
‘the rioters’ 
Widely circulating media and political discourses about the rioters drew on and shored 
up long-standing cultural connections between race, class and crime. Mobilising ‘a 
battlefield of ideological constructions’ (Kelsey, 2015), these representations served as 
important cultural ballast for the punitive criminal justice response to the riots and its 
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disproportionate targeting of racialised and marginalised young people. Despite the 
widespread denial of racism as an explanation for the riots, as I discussed in Chapter 4, 
distinctly racialised and classed ideas about who the rioters were and why they were 
involved abounded in public debate in 2011. By framing the rioters in terms which are 
already associated with danger and disorder, I argue, these representations paved the way 
for a racialised and classed punitive reaction.  
In some cases, the linking of the rioters and race was overt and unambiguous. Though 
even the most regressive and reactionary commentaries acknowledged that the rioters 
were not all – or even predominantly – people of colour, they framed the riots as a 
symptom of an uncontrollable and pathological black culture. Historian David Starkey’s 
infamous Newsnight appearance on 12th August 2011 was perhaps the most remarkable 
example of the linking of the rioters and black identity. Starkey claimed, in startlingly 
melodramatic tones, that the riots fulfilled Enoch Powell’s ‘Rivers of Blood’ prophecy 
that immigration would result in violent conflict:  
His prophecy was absolutely right in one sense. The Tiber didn’t foam with blood, but 
flames lambent wrapped round Tottenham and wrapped round Clapham, but it wasn’t 
inter-communal violence, this is where he was completely wrong. What’s happened is 
that a substantial section of the chavs have become black. The whites have become black. 
(Starkey, 2011, cited in Phoenix and Phoenix, 2012: 62) 
The riots, Starkey acknowledges, weren’t actually ‘inter-communal’ or ‘race riots’, and 
many of the ‘chavs’ rioting may have been white, but their actions were framed squarely 
in terms of their black culture:  
A particular sort of violent, destructive, nihilistic gangster culture has become the fashion 
and black and white, boy and girl operate in this language together. This language which 
is wholly false, which is a Jamaican patois that’s been intruded in England, and this is 
why so many of us have this sense of literally a foreign country. 
(Starkey, 2011, cited in Phoenix and Phoenix, 2012: 62) 
Similarly, commentator David Goodhart (2011) blamed the riots squarely on an ‘African 
Caribbean culture’ that had influenced, or more precisely infected, British cities: a ‘culture 
of disaffection’ with a ‘black core’, a violent, ‘vicious’, ‘self-pitying’, ‘angry, destructive 
and self-limiting’ ‘inner city culture’ with ‘roots in the black American ghetto, 
subsequently crossing the Atlantic on the back of hip hop and rap culture’ (Goodhart, 
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2011). Goodhart’s framing of a ‘culture of disaffection’ and Starkey’s impression of black 
culture as an ‘intrusion’, are stark examples of ‘what is now old “new racism”’ (Phoenix 
and Phoenix, 2012: 63), whereby immigration and multiculturalism are ‘regarded as 
having brought to Britain a population that destroyed the cultural homogeneity of the 
nation and… threatened to “swamp” the culture of “our own people”’ (Miles and Brown, 
2003; cited in Phoenix and Phoenix, 2012: 63).27 By binarising black and white – with 
blackness positioned firmly as problematic and pathological – Starkey revives and ‘creates 
afresh an old racialised hierarchy of belonging’ (Miles and Brown, 2003; cited in Phoenix 
and Phoenix, 2012: 63) that endures in the twenty-first century. Commentators like 
Starkey are able to draw freely on these discourses of stigmatised and infectious ‘black 
culture’ with little or no need to appeal to empirical evidence; instead drawing on 
imaginations of black identity that are ‘easily evoked and recognised because they have 
sedimented into common sense’ (Phoenix and Phoenix, 2012: 63). 
Explicitly racist accounts like Goodhart’s and Starkey’s – echoing the widespread 
references to problematic and pathological ‘black culture’ that had been common 
‘explanations’ for disturbances in the 1980s (Barker and Beezer, 1983; Gilroy, 1982a; 
Solomos, 1988) – were rare in 2011. Partly this was because of the shifting terrain of what 
was politically ‘say-able’ (Back, 2014) around race: by and large, what we saw in 
representations of the rioters was instead ‘a form of racism that disavows that it is racism 
at all, that knows it cannot speak in openly racist terms’ (Back, 2014). While the language 
used to talk about the disturbances may have, on some levels, been ‘deracinated’ (Murji, 
2017: 171) – overtly denying or ignoring the central role of race and racism in the riots – 
more subtle, ‘hidden racial narratives’ (Back and Solomos, 1995: 5) of criminality, disorder 
and danger were nevertheless effectively communicated.  
Political and media discourses conjured a series of classed and racialised figures that 
encoded and communicated race without speaking it. Against Starkey’s wildly offensive 
remarks about ‘black culture’ his mobilisation of ideas about ‘gang culture’ (see page 122 
for more discussion) and ‘chavs’ went relatively unnoticed, but are equally potent in 
conveying messages about race. Starkey’s claim was not only that ‘the whites have become 
black, but more specifically that it was ‘chavs’ who had been tainted by black culture and 
 
27 In Chapter 6 I will explore in more depth how the boundaries of the nation were redrawn in 
the wake of the riots, with rioters positioned as threatening outsiders and regressive notions of 
Britishness reinforced. 
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criminality. The ‘class disgust’ (Tyler, 2008: 25) inherent in Starkey’s reference to chavs is 
also intimately connected to issues of racial difference: ‘chav disgust is always racialising… 
chavs are not invisible normative whites, but rather hypervisible “filthy whites”’ (Tyler, 
2008: 25). Along with discourses of ‘scum’ (arguably the favoured class pejorative in 2011 
(Tyler, 2013b)) and ‘the underclass’, references to ‘chavs’ acted similarly as a ‘semantic 
battering ram’ (Tyler and Slater, 2018) marking ‘the rioters’ with racialised class stigma, 
highlighting how racialised imaginations of deviance, pollution and criminality underpin 
representations of the rioters, even where race is not explicit. 
Images, as well as language, were mobilised to link the rioters to ‘black culture’, effectively 
conveying what could not freely be said in the current political context (Back, 2014). One 
photograph in particular, a photo loaded with racialised, classed and gendered meanings, 
dominated newspaper front pages on the worst days of the unrest in London (see below 
Figure 5, Figure 6, Figure 7 and Figure 8). 
 
 
Figure 5: The i, 9th August 2011 
 
 
Figure 6: Daily Mail, 9th August 2011 




Figure 7: Daily Express, 9th August 2011 
 
 
Figure 8: Daily Star, 9th August 2011 
The photograph, evocatively described by Lamble (2013: 577) ‘depicts a lone male figure 
in the street, stepping brazenly in front of a burning car’: 
Clothed in a gray tracksuit and black sneakers, with hood up and stance defiant, he 
embodies the demonized figure of the ‘hoodie’ that has come to symbolize dangerous 
and troubled youth in Britain. The black scarf that covers his face adds to his ominous 
persona; though his skin is not clearly visible, he evokes the aura of stigmatized blackness. 
(Lamble, 2013: 577) 
As Lamble argues, this image conveyed a message of racialised danger and threat without 
articulating or even showing blackness itself, symbolising profound and persistent 
associations between blackness, deviance and criminality, and providing ‘semiotic 
shorthand’ for a ‘particular set of classed meanings’ about who was rioting (Jensen, 2013). 
Representations of rioters drew on ‘hatreds that connect to the enduring legacy of racism’, 
‘not marked linguistically in racial terms’, but ‘shown everywhere visually and symbolically 
through a cast of racialised and classed characters’: the ‘morally degenerate Chavs, the 
hooded strutting rioters pictured in front of burning cars, the out of control under-classes, 
the nihilistic “bad man” gangsters’ (Back, 2014). In this way, race was not directly spoken 
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but was displayed and communicated nonetheless, providing a powerful imagination of 
the rioters that served to rationalise and normalise over-representation of racialised and 
poor people criminalised in the wake of the disturbances. 
Those brought before the courts for riot-related offences in the months following the 
disturbances were disproportionately likely to be from economically marginalised 
backgrounds. Thirty-five per cent of the adults appearing in court for riot-related offences 
were claiming out-of-work benefits, compared to 12 per cent of the working age 
population (Home Office, 2011); while 42 per cent of young people appearing before the 
courts were, or had been, in receipt of free school meals, compared to the 16 per cent 
average; and 64 per cent of those young people lived in one of the twenty most deprived 
areas in the country, while only three per cent lived in one of the twenty richest areas 
(Home Office, 2011). Data from the Ministry of Justice reveals stark inequalities along 
the lines of ‘race’, too, with disproportionate numbers of black people, in particular, 
arrested, charged, remanded to custody and receiving immediate custodial sentences 
(Ministry of Justice, 2012a). While people from black ethnic groups made up 3.3 per cent 
of the overall population in England and Wales in 2011, 39 per cent of those brought 
before the courts for riot-related offences identified as black (Ministry of Justice, 2012a).28 
In stark contrast, white people make up 86 per cent of the population, but accounted for 
only 41 per cent of those appearing in court in the wake of the disturbances29. Black 
people were disproportionately unlikely to be granted bail: among those cases that had 
not come to a final conclusion at court by September 2012, only 26 per cent of black 
defendants, compared to 31 per cent of white defendants, were granted unconditional 
bail (Ministry of Justice, 2012a). For those cases where defendants had been sentenced, 
68 per cent of black defendants, compared to 64 per cent of white defendants, were given 
an immediate custodial sentence (Ministry of Justice, 2012a).  
These disparities are largely reflective of wider patterns in the ordinary functioning of the 
criminal justice system in England and Wales (Ministry of Justice, 2012a), and attest to ‘a 
quantifiable reality of racial disparity’ in criminal justice (Williams and Clarke, 2018: 2). 
 
28 The Ministry of Justice statistics included are based on defendants’ self-defined ethnicity as 
recorded by the courts, based on five categories: White, Black, Asian, Mixed, Other and Not 
Stated (Ministry of Justice, 2012a). 
29 Twelve per cent were from the mixed ethnic group, seven per cent the Asian ethnic group, and 
two per cent were from the Chinese or other ethnic group (Ministry of Justice, 2012a). 
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Black, mixed race, Asian and other people from ‘minority’ ethnic groups are eight times 
more likely than white people to be stopped and searched by the police, more likely to be 
arrested, charged, tried, found guilty in the Crown court and are at greater risk of receiving 
custodial sentences (Lammy, 2017; Williams and Clarke, 2018). While only 14 per cent of 
the general population are from a minority ethnic group, they make up a quarter of the 
prison population (Lammy, 2017); this disparity is especially stark for black people, who 
make up 12 per cent of adult prisoners, meaning that there is a greater disproportionality 
in the number of black people in prisons in England and Wales than in the United States 
(Lammy, 2017). 
Like broader patterns of over-representation in the criminal justice system, the starkly 
disproportionate presence of racialised and working-class people drawn into the system 
following the riots was, in public discussion, often ‘(mis)read as criminological fact’ 
(Williams and Clarke, 2018: 2); interpreted as a straightforward reflection of differences 
in criminality along the lines of race and class. Rather than reading these figures as a 
depiction of the demographics of ‘the rioters’ or those who commit criminal offences 
more broadly, I maintain that they reveal less about ‘crime’ than about the cultural and 
political conjuncture within which the riots and the response to them emerged.  
In the wake of the riots, popular representations of the rioters evoked racialised and 
classed images of criminality that licensed and legitimised the criminal justice system and 
its discriminatory practices. These representations of the rioters are an important element 
of the cultural political economy that helps us to make sense of the criminal justice 
backlash against the rioters. The excessively punitive responses to the unrest were made 
possible, as Lamble writes, ‘in part because they disproportionately targeted 
disenfranchised populations… that were already so widely demonized that the public was 
willing to accept their mistreatment’ (Lamble, 2013: 582–583; see also Sim, 2012). As well 
as procuring public consent for the harsh punishment of rioters, I argue that specific 
imaginations of the rioters – and specifically their class and race positioning – were 
important in shaping criminal justice practitioners’ accounts of their responses to the 
riots. Yet my interviews, as I show below, reveal a different configuration of ideas about 
race, class, responsibility and criminality, requiring a distinctive analysis.  
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Part 2. ‘The range of people caught up in it was extraordinary’: 
Diversity and the surprising rioters 
In contrast to media and political representations that squarely blamed the disturbances 
– in explicit or tacit terms – on racialised and working-class ‘culture’, if not directly on 
marginalised communities, the practitioners I interviewed were often keen to emphasise 
the role of a contrasting demographic. I draw here on my interviews with solicitor Roger, 
senior civil servant Martin and prosecutor Jason, showing how each of them expressed 
the idea that the rioters were strikingly diverse and heterogenous, and drew distinctions 
between their usual clients (or ‘suspects’ or ‘offenders’), implicitly figured as working-class 
and often racialised, and the unusual rioters, positioned as middle-class and white. Yet 
rather than subverting the classed and racialised imaginations of criminality that I have 
discussed, practitioners’ accounts of these ‘extraordinary’ rioters in fact subtly reproduce 
and shore up long-established imaginations that connect working-class and racialised 
communities to criminality. Though my interviewees’ interpretations were undoubtedly 
more nuanced than the ‘scum semiotics’ (Tyler, 2013b) that prevailed in media 
representations of the riots, my analysis reveals the persistence and pervasiveness of 
cultural connections between race, class and criminality within professionals’ accounts.  
I turn first to my conversation with criminal defence solicitor Roger, who I introduced 
briefly in the previous chapter. Roger was one of the first people I interviewed for this 
thesis. Heading up a large law firm that his uncle had started in the 1920s, he seemed to 
be an integral part of the London legal landscape. We met at the firm’s offices on a busy 
main road in East London. Dressed smartly in a three-piece suit, Roger greeted me 
warmly, and was keen to show me the pieces of art that he had bought from a friend of 
his son’s. ‘Did I promise you coffee?’ he asked, leading me into a small but neat and tidy 
office, while the young receptionist fetched our drinks. As we sat down, Roger prompted 
me to get out my phone and switch on the audio recorder, completely unfazed by being 
having his words recorded. He spoke fluently, articulately and confidently, drawing on 
his long career and rich experience as a criminal defence lawyer for over forty years.  
For Roger, there was an important differentiation to be made between two categories of 
people who were involved in the disturbances, one expected and one very surprising. On 
the one hand, there were those who made up the ‘normal client base’ that made up the 
bulk of business for Roger’s East End criminal law firm:  
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I mean, for our normal client base it was something to do, you know. Something was 
happening in their rather boring lives – ‘Ooh, let’s have a bit of that.’  
For these individuals, Roger said, the riots were simply a diversion from their ordinarily 
‘boring lives’: 
Being unemployed is not fun, and we don’t have the facilities we used to have in the East 
End. The boys’ clubs and things, they don’t exist anymore, there’s no fun things. And so 
if something’s happening, ‘Gosh, let’s go and be part of it.’ 
This ‘normal client base’ – figured as working-class – are the seemingly unremarkable, 
unsurprising rioters who understandably took advantage of an opportunity for 
excitement. Emphasising the structural challenges facing young people, Roger’s 
characterisation of these rioters contrasts with the demonised figures portrayed in the 
media. For Roger, ‘they were just ordinary kids, most of them’, whose prospects had been 
made worse by the loss of jobs, local leisure and social amenities in recent years. 
But Roger was quick to point to the unexpectedly wide variety of people who were 
involved in the unrest: ‘The range of people caught up in it was extraordinary,’ he said; ‘I 
mean, every social group got caught up.’ In contrast to his regular clientele, Roger had 
been surprised to come across a more incongruous group of people who’d been arrested 
for their participation in the riots:  
You know, there were middle-class kids in there, getting involved; there were kids who’d 
never have got involved except for the atmosphere of the time. 
Roger recalled one particular defendant he had represented who seemed to fit in the 
category of those who would ordinarily ‘never have got involved’ were it not for the 
exceptional conditions.30 In the autumn of 2011 this young man had been identified in 
CCTV footage taking cigarettes from a newsagents during the riots, and had come back 
from Abu Dhabi, where he had since moved for work, to face charges. Roger’s 
description of this client, who he pointed out was a young professional working overseas, 
the son of a consultant cardiologist, and from ‘such a nice family’, bestowed on him a 
solidly middle-class and respectable identity. As Roger explained,  
 
30 I have changed the identifying details of this case. 
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The lad from Abu Dhabi just went into a shop and stole a couple of packets of cigarettes. 
He’d never have thought of doing that in normal circumstances. 
His getting ‘caught up’ in the disturbances, stealing ‘a couple of packets of cigarettes,’ 
seemed to Roger an anomaly, a deviation from his normal life, something he’d ‘never 
have thought of doing’ in his ordinary life. This case had really stuck in Roger’s memory, 
partly because he had worked for the  family on a previous occasion, and felt personally 
invested in securing an acquittal or lenient sentence:  
I can remember… putting an enormous amount of personal effort into that case which 
is why I’m boring you with it. Not least because I’d actually had, his father was a 
consultant cardiologist who had kissed his niece at a party and was prosecuted for 
indecent assault. It’s one of the very few occasions that I’ve cried when a jury came back. 
You know, they just got it right – they knew it was rubbish. And then for his son to come 
in, having done something really stupid during the riots, you know, you really wanted to 
get a good result for them. They were such a nice family. 
For Roger, this young man had done something ‘really stupid’ and entirely out of 
character, that could be explained only by the extraordinary circumstances. This was in 
stark contrast to Roger’s ‘normal client base’ for whom the disturbances were simply 
‘something to do’, an opportunity for entertainment to alleviate the mundanity of their 
lives. 
Like Roger, Martin, a senior civil servant at the Ministry of Justice with responsibility for 
managing the prison estate’s response to the disturbances, had been surprised by some 
of the people who were coming into the criminal justice system, and in particular, being 
put into prisons: 
It did cause us to think about some of the people coming in. You know, lots of people 
from stable, decent families with good educations who had got caught up in the moment. 
’Cause a lot of these places were, you know, they were student locations. 
Though Martin didn’t talk explicitly in terms of social class, his reference to people with 
‘good educations’, from ‘stable, decent families’ in ‘student locations’ evoked middle-class 
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identity and respectability.31 Like Roger, Martin framed these unusual rioters as having 
‘got caught up in the moment’:  
(Conspiratorially) And of course a lot of the people were caught up in the rioting rather 
than active in creating it. They anticipated, but they weren’t the sort of people who you 
would demographically have picked out as those most likely to be part of a riot… Which 
is a bit of a shame, to ruin your life like that, isn’t it really?  
For Martin – as for Roger – the middle-class rioters were positioned as passive participants 
in the disturbances, having been ‘caught up in the rioting rather than active in creating it.’ 
They might have ‘got caught up,’ but presumably would not have got involved were it 
not for those who were more instrumental in leading it. 
That’s the terrible thing about rioting, isn’t it? You know, it’s created by energy, often, 
and people do silly things when they’re caught up in it.  
For this group, who didn’t fit Martin’s expectation of ‘rioters’, criminal activity was seen 
as aberrant, anomalous, and out of character, due solely to the dynamics of the moment. 
Like Roger who was especially keen to secure a good result for his client ‘from such a 
nice family’, it was the unusual rioters for whom Martin expressed particular concern. For 
these young people with bright futures, being arrested for riot-related offences held the 
potential to seriously affect their future prospects or ‘ruin their lives’. Those who they’d 
expected to see – the ‘normal client base’ who presumably had been ‘active in creating the 
unrest’ seemingly elicited relatively little worry (in Chapter 7 I return to this question of 
discerning care and concern among criminal justice practitioners). By expressing their 
profound surprise at seeing relatively privileged people involved, and emphasising their 
lack of intention, I argue that Roger and Martin’s accounts excuse and exculpate these 
surprising rioters; instead subtly shifting responsibility on to the other rioters, implicitly 
positioned as working-class. In this way, their emphasis on the diversity of the rioters 
does not subvert the idea of working-class rioters as essentially to blame for the unrest, 
but rather reinforces it.  
 
31 In the context of the discussion I presumed Martin was referring to university towns and cities 
rather than to school pupils. 
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Like Roger and Martin, Jason, the senior prosecutor at the Crown Prosecution Service 
who I introduced in the previous chapter, also made a clear distinction between the kinds 
of ‘offenders’ he’d come across in the riots: 
We saw, you know, a significant range of (pause) offenders. You know, from those we 
would expect, or see more frequently. You know, some of the disad, people who are 
disadvantaged, generally, who generally unfortunately end up becoming criminals 
because of the circumstances which they find themselves in, where they live, etcetera. 
On the one hand, those who he’d expected to see, and who were in line with those he 
saw more often in his work as a prosecutor, were described firmly as working-class: those 
‘disadvantaged’ people who ‘unfortunately end up becoming criminals because of the 
circumstances which they find themselves in’. Jason took a clear view on what motivated 
this group of ‘offenders’: 
There would undoubtedly have been a criminal element that would have got involved 
just to commit crime. You know, I remember reading stories in the press about, you 
know, people saying ‘Well, this is my opportunity to get my part of (pause) get these 
trainers which I can’t buy,’ basically. You know, people saying that on national television! 
‘This is why I’m doing this, because actually I can’t afford this, whereas Joe Bloggs down 
the road can, and I’m committing this because I can’t [afford it], and this is, taking my 
bit is my entitlement.’ But I suspect those people would probably be involved in crime 
anyway. 
Though these rioters claimed to be motivated by a sense of inequality embedded in income 
and opportunities to acquire consumer goods – or at least, by a sense of ‘entitlement’ – 
Jason made clear that in his view they had ‘got involved just to commit crime’. But Jason, 
too, had been surprised by encountering a number of people who were demographically 
different from those he saw more frequently in his work as a prosecutor: 
Actually, we found a lot more people you wouldn’t normally expect, just joining in. So a 
lot more, weirdly, sort of educated, er, middle-class (pause) white people. Probably more 
of a proportion of those, probably again, were getting caught up in it as well.  
Jason, unlike Martin and Roger, explicitly pointed out that he had been surprised to see 
so many white people being arrested and charged. While race remained stubbornly 
unspoken in Martin and Roger’s accounts, this brief and somewhat hesitant emergence 
in Jason’s account of race as a key category in how the unusual rioters were figured, helps 
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us to better understand the imagination of the typical rioters. Like Martin and Roger, Jason 
drew a clear distinction between these two groups of rioters, seeing this group of 
conspicuously middle-class, educated, white people as ‘getting caught up in it’, ‘just 
joining in’ with behaviour that they would not ordinarily have been involved in; subtly 
shifting culpability back to the ‘disadvantaged’ and implicitly racialised majority.  
Jason went further, suggesting that middle-class rioters perhaps had more noble, 
legitimate reasons for getting involved in the riots: 
You know, there were clearly those who actually became involved in it because it was 
opportunistic, um, criminal activity, who may have been involved in crime anyway. As 
opposed to those who perhaps took a political stance and were doing it to demonstrate 
against, because of the, their perceived concerns about politics, society and their 
motivation for sort of getting involved in it.  
For Jason it was specifically the middle-class rioters who he saw as having political 
concerns:  
So when I say about the sort of more educated, middle classes, that may have been 
because they’re politically more, er (pause) motivated by political concerns, and may have 
found themselves embroiled in it… ’Cause actually those people probably would not 
normally become embroiled in criminal activity themselves, but actually would get swept 
up in it. 
In stark contrast to the ‘criminal element’ who ‘got involved just to commit crime’ and 
‘would probably be involved in crime’ regardless of the specific circumstances, it was 
striking to see Jason’s complex and somewhat contorted efforts to draw a clear dividing 
line between white, middle-class identity on the one hand, and criminality and immorality 
on the other. Framing the middle-class rioters as more politically motivated than other 
rioters was a somewhat novel strategy of delegitimating working-class rioters. More often, 
in a context where the riots had already been decisively defined as meaningless and 
apolitical (as I discussed in the previous chapter), highlighting the involvement of middle-
class rioters simply served to further reinforce the reading of the riots as an outburst of 
sheer criminality. By focusing on the ‘unlikely mob’ (Kelsey, 2015) – those like the 
‘millionaire’s daughter’ who seemed to have no discernible economic or political 
grievance – journalists were able to undermine the unrest as a whole; denying that anybody 
involved was motivated by structural inequalities (Kelsey, 2015). While the media invoked 
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this unlikely mob to delegitimise all the rioters, in contrast Martin, Roger and Jason 
instead draw distinctions between these two groups: the middle-class, educated, white 
rioters who would never ordinarily be involved in crime but were simply ‘caught up in it’, 
or were in fact protesting about legitimate political concerns, and the ‘normal client base’ 
or ‘criminal element’ who were essentially responsible for the riots. 
In my interviews, the participation of white people in the riots was often contrasted to 
the episodes of unrest in the 1980s. Probation manager Adam pointed out that in his 
view, the 2011 riots were ‘much more multi-racial than the 80s’ and for civil servant 
Martin, unlike earlier episodes of unrest, 2011 ‘wasn’t felt to be race riots.’ Rather than 
reflecting a clear distinction in terms of the demographic constituency of the rioters 
across these two periods, I argue, this imagination of the unique diversity of the rioters 
in 2011 reflects the shifting cultural and political ground on which understandings of 
social unrest are formed. As scholars in the 1980s pointed out, ‘rioters’ in Brixton and 
Toxteth were in fact mixed in terms of ethnicity and social class (Benyon, 1987a), though 
this diversity was largely marginalised in public debate, with media coverage portraying 
the rioters as almost entirely black (Hirsh and Swanson, 2020). In that instance, ‘race, read 
as black, became the co-ordinate that the 1980s urban unrest was positioned and explained 
through’ (Murji and Neal, 2011, emphasis in original). As I have argued, media 
representations of the 2011 disturbances similarly framed the unrest in racialised terms, 
if in more indirect ways, reflecting a moment where old cultural assumptions about black 
criminality could not be said aloud, but continued to filter through words and images that 
portrayed the riots as essentially a race problem.    
In contrast, in practitioners’ accounts in 2018 it was precisely the diversity of the rioters 
that came to the fore. On one level, practitioners’ emphasis on the involvement of a wide 
range of people in the disturbances echoed the narrative in more liberal media outlets, 
providing a challenge to the starkly racialised depictions in the right-wing press (in Part 3 
of this chapter I show how some practitioners drew on the diversity of the rioters to 
criticise political and media rhetoric that held marginalised communities accountable for 
the disturbances, and for crime more broadly). The Guardian for example reported that 
while the debate in the aftermath of the unrest ‘could easily have left the impression that 
those involved were exclusively young, black gang members with long criminal histories’, 
the data that emerged revealed that ‘the makeup of those involved in the disorder was far 
more varied’ (Ball et al., 2011). But, I argue, practitioners’ accounts of this diversity 
warrant deeper critical attention. The seemingly surprising diversity of the rioters in 2011 
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– that is, the presence of middle-class and white rioters – is less remarkable than the 
meaning that came to condense around them. Tracing how practitioners make sense of 
these ‘unusual’ rioters – positioned as anomalous and out of place – points to deeply 
ingrained assumptions about ‘normal’ offenders. These surprising rioters, then, came to 
carry a set of messages about race, class and criminality that serve to normalise and 
legitimise the racialised and classed violence of the criminal justice response to the riots, 
and more widely.  
While some have argued that the marked heterogeneity of the rioters – and, in particular, 
the highly visible and often noted presence of white and middle-class people – posed a 
serious challenge to established imaginations of riots as entwined with black culture and 
criminality, I argue that these racialised ideas retain ideological power even where the 
diversity of the rioters is foregrounded. Gargi Bhattacharyya (2013) argues that the 
application of the term ‘riot’ to such a heterogeneous set of events as took place in August 
2011 served to unsettle the ‘racialised coding’ of the term. In Britain, Bhattacharyya points 
out, ‘riots’ have come to signal events that are understood as intrinsically related to race, 
and so the ‘revelation’ of a multi-ethnic constituency of rioters in 2011 signalled ‘a move 
away from [the] more usual formulation of the riot as an always somehow racialised event’ 
(Bhattacharyya, 2013: 188). However, my analysis suggests that in professional criminal 
justice discourses, racialised schemas of criminality and culpability are in fact intensely 
durable and flexible. While the visible presence of relatively privileged and white rioters 
posed a challenge to established notions of racialised criminality, practitioners effectively 
neutralised, absorbed and incorporated the ‘diversity’ of rioters into existing structures of 
meaning that connect criminality to racialised and working-class identities, while subtly 
absolving white and middle-class people of responsibility. Rather than disrupting the 
fiction of white innocence (Bhattacharyya, 2013) or the ‘myth of black criminality’ 
(Gilroy, 1982b), distinguishing between the typical rioter and the extraordinary or 
surprising rioters, who had ‘got caught up’ in it, the practitioners I interviewed effectively 
placed the blame for the unrest firmly back onto racialised and working-class groups, 
normalising the response that targeted these groups. 
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Part 3. ‘It wasn’t just lower income or BME people’: Contesting 
classed and racialised accounts of the disturbances  
While Roger, Martin and Jason characterised the ‘unusual’ rioters in terms that I have 
argued reproduced racialised assumptions about criminality and culpability – interpreting 
the presence of middle-class and white rioters in ways that allowed them to maintain an 
imagination of working-class and racialised rioters as responsible for the unrest – other  
practitioners actively sought to use the diversity of the rioters to counter these cultural 
constructions of crime. In this part of the chapter I consider how Ashley, Claire and 
Adam, who had all been working in probation and youth offending services in 2011, 
pointed to the involvement of a wide range of ‘rioters’ to challenge and critique the 
representations of rioters in mainstream media and political rhetoric. But, I argue, the 
organisational and political contexts within which they work constrain their ability to 
resist these discourses, and instead pull them into policy agendas that actively reproduce 
them.  
Ashley, who I introduced in the previous chapter and who had managed youth offending 
services across London, highlighted how the media had portrayed the rioters as 
overwhelmingly black and working-class, and wanted to counter this representation:  
The media did try to portray it, particularly [in] London, that it was more of a BME or 
black issue… they would just show the black kids in Hackney. And there was quite a few 
white children that were involved as well. So to me, it wasn’t about race, but it became 
like that in a way, in terms of how it was sensationalised and portrayed… It’s like ‘well, 
we’re getting blamed again’. 
Ashley’s characterisation of the involvement of white and middle-class ‘children’ (a term 
I rarely heard used by other professionals) and young people in the riots was qualitatively 
different from those I heard from Roger, Martin and Jason, who had been surprised by 
the diversity of the rioters. In contrast to Roger, Martin and Jason who acknowledged the 
participation of white, middle-class rioters but found ways to excuse them of 
responsibility, Ashley actively resisted this configuration of blame. For Ashley, himself a 
black man in his thirties who had worked for many years with criminalised young people, 
this seemed to reflect personal, political and professional commitments. It seemed 
important for Ashley to resist the condemnation that had been heaped upon young, black, 
working-class people, not just for the riots, but for crime more broadly (‘we’re getting 
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blamed again’). Asserting that many white and middle-class people were in fact involved 
in the riots seemed to be a strategy for challenging the demonising and stigmatising 
associations between working-class identities, blackness and criminality that were 
reproduced and reinforced through right-wing political and media framings of the rioters.  
Ashley’s account, however, revealed a tension between these critical personal views and 
the demands of his professional position. In the wake of  the riots Ashley had been 
responsible for implementing the council’s ‘troubled families’ agenda. Launched in 
December 2011, the government’s nationwide Troubled Families Programme mobilised 
the riots as ‘evidence’ of ‘a culture of disruption and irresponsibility that cascades through 
generations’ (Cameron, 2011c) and the need to ‘turn around’ the lives of 120,000 families. 
The programme funded a raft of punitive policy interventions, conducted by local 
authorities on a payment-by-results basis, to tackle unemployment, crime, antisocial 
behaviour and educational exclusion and truancy (Crossley, 2016, 2018). This was a 
controversial social policy response that was made possible by, and actively bolstered, the 
political narratives that explained the riots in terms of  problematic and deficient working-
class culture and parenting (Allen and Taylor, 2012; De Benedictis, 2012). As in the 1980s, 
when black communities’ familial pathology was central to media and state interpretations 
of the riots and the measures supposedly needed to address them (Barker and Beezer, 
1983; Gilroy, 2013), the family has been a crucial node in political and cultural discourses 
that, in turn, legitimised a set of vindictive policy responses to the riots (Allen and Taylor, 
2012; Bristow, 2013; De Benedictis, 2012). David Cameron’s diagnosis of the riots as a 
symptom of a ‘slow motion moral collapse’ and ‘broken society’ (Cameron, 2011b) 
established the family as the key locus of responsibility for the riots,32 obscuring the role 
of structural inequalities, ‘worsening poverty, burgeoning social and economic 
polarisation [and] fiscal policies that hit the poorest hardest’ (Angel, 2012: 24). This 
discourse was also starkly gendered, placing parental responsibility – or, conversely, 
irresponsibility and failure – firmly on mothers, with particular vitriol reserved for single 
mothers (Allen and Taylor, 2012). The blaming of the riots on irresponsible, reckless and 
‘feral’ parents has been vital in catalysing targeted intervention that aim to push parents 
 
32 Other commentary also bemoaned a moral crisis in authority and personal responsibility caused 
by, among other things, growing social disapproval of parents ‘smacking’ their children (Durodié, 
2012).  
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into work, however poorly paid and insecure, and ‘to inscribe middle-class values of 
parenting’ on working-class mothers (De Benedictis, 2012).  
For Ashley, the linking of the unrest to ‘troubled families’ had placed responsibility onto 
working-class families, and obscured the fact that middle-class young people had also 
been involved:  
It wasn’t just the ‘troubled families.’ It’s such a horrible term, to call it the troubled 
families. Some of the people involved were middle-class. It wasn’t just lower income 
families or children who were part of the disturbances. It wasn’t just BME people either.  
Ashley also acknowledged the limitations of the project to make a tangible difference: 
There were deeper social issues within those children’s lives, which caused them to 
become involved with the disturbances, in a way, so I think that the launch of that 
programme was useful but it didn’t necessarily deal with the social issues, really, that still 
exist… it didn’t deal with those issues at all.  
Despite Ashley’s critical reading of the way that the media had ‘blamed’ working-class 
and racialised communities for the unrest, this very blame had made possible a 
programme of much-needed funding for local authorities: 
The troubled families funding was quite controversial, but it gave local authorities the 
opportunity to spend money on early intervention and prevention in a way that they saw 
fit… local authorities received quite a lot of money initially to actually deliver what they 
felt was required to those families. 
While Ashley recognised the problematic politics of  the project, he also appreciated the 
financial opportunities it afforded for services that he saw as valuable and necessary, 
posing a tension between his personal views and a pragmatic approach to the political 
and policy context he was working in. While resisting the classed and racialised framing 
of  the rioters, Ashley’s professional position meant that he implemented a programme 
directly responsible for perpetuating the regimes of  responsibilisation and blame he was 
critiquing.  
My conversation a few weeks later with Ashley’s colleague Claire, who headed up the 
council’s programme of youth and community services, similarly highlighted the intrinsic 
tensions facing practitioners trying to reconcile their personal, critical stances with the 
broader context of their work. Claire, like Ashley, was quick to point out that popular 
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perceptions of who had been involved in the riots were not necessarily accurate. While 
immediate media and political interpretations placed a great deal of emphasis on the role 
of organised criminal activity in the riots, Claire’s team had quickly found that gangs had 
actually been peripheral to the rioting in the borough:  
We said, hang on a minute, let’s actually look at what happened here; who was involved. 
And the stuff that’s being said in the media isn’t necessarily true – especially around, ‘it’s 
all gangs, and it’s all organised.’ And that wasn’t our experience, certainly. 
Other practitioners also pointed out the connection that was quickly made between the 
riots and gangs. Adam, who had in 2011 been a senior manager for the probation service 
in South London, with responsibility for their gangs work, told me that:   
When the riots occurred, obviously the big debate for us was whether gang members, 
particularly the most serious ones who – and we were working with Trident33 in the Met 
at the time – were instrumental in causing the conflict.  
The scale of the events and the almost simultaneous eruption of unrest and looting across 
a number of cities and towns meant that the police and other organisations were quick to 
conclude that there must be a network co-ordinating and facilitating the disturbances. As 
Adam explained:  
It was thought at one point, are these events being orchestrated? And if they are being 
orchestrated, the only people who could do that are gang members because they are 
clever enough to already have sorted out some sort of institution… But really we didn’t 
find that was the case. And as a result we were very much telling our troops on the ground 
to sort of keep calm, and not pander to the panic that seemed to be going on amongst 
some of the rest of the criminal justice system. 
Like Claire’s team, Adam’s probation service found that only a very few individuals with 
connections to gangs were involved in the unrest. Rather, their view, Adam said, was that 
‘gang members used the literal smoke screen of the riots to actually get up to their daily 
criminal business – selling drugs, settling scores, doing that sort of stuff’ while the police 
were preoccupied with the disturbances.  
 
33 Trident was a Metropolitan Police Service unit established in 1998 to tackle gun crime and 
homicide in black communities. 
 
Surprising and typical rioters 
 123 
But despite the marginal, even negligible, role of organised criminal groups in the 
disturbances (Amnesty International, 2018; Lewis et al., 2011; Williams, 2018), gangs 
played a central role in political and media discourses around the riots and were a focal 
point for the state’s punitive response. Cameron’s speech to the House of Commons 
during the disturbances asserted that Duggan’s death had been ‘used as an excuse by 
opportunist thugs in gangs, first in Tottenham itself, then across London and then in 
other cities’ (Cameron, 2011d) and days later he announced a ‘concerted, all-out war on 
gangs and gang culture’, ‘a major criminal disease that has infected streets and estates 
across our country’ (Cameron, 2011b). This narrative licensed a major acceleration in 
highly controversial measures purportedly targeting organised crime. In 2012 the 
Metropolitan Police Service introduced the Gangs Violence Matrix, a database to monitor 
and manage people purportedly involved in criminal activity. The matrix has attracted 
strident criticism for its overwhelming targeting of black young people: over three 
quarters of those on the database are black, while even the Metropolitan Police’s own 
data suggests only 27 per cent of people accountable for serious youth violence are black 
(see especially Amnesty International, 2018; Williams, 2018). 
This focus on gangs was a key node in connecting the riots to ideas about racialised 
criminality. Rhetoric around gangs in contemporary politics is inextricably entangled with 
ideas about race; an important site for securing and strengthening ties in political and 
public imaginations of race and criminality (Angel, 2012; Brotherton and Hallsworth, 
2011; Williams, 2015). The figure of the gang member has provided a potent ‘black folk 
devil’ that legitimises increasingly excessive police and penal powers (Elliott-Cooper, 
2016); ‘an ideological device that drives the hypercriminalisation of black, mixed, Asian, 
and other minority ethnic (BAME) communities’ (Williams and Clarke, 2018). The focus 
on gangs and gang culture as a ‘cause’ of the 2011 riots, then, became a pivotal moment 
in the contemporary moral panic around black youth (Elliott-Cooper et al., 2014). 
The political rush to explain the riots as the result of gang activity led to a host of projects 
and programmes to tackle gangs. As Claire put it, the riots ‘did kind of get caught up with 
the gangs thing, because that was so just so high on people’s agenda at that time’. While 
Claire was aware of the inaccuracy of the political rhetoric around the role of gangs in the 
riots, she was also strategic, and saw the opportunities it presented for her team. As a 
result of the intense political focus on gangs in the wake of the riots, Claire was able to 
secure funding for a new service to provide social and therapeutic support to young 
people involved in gang activity: 
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The thing about the riots for us… [was] that it did create a lot of noise, and it helped 
make the case for this new team and new way of working, even though when we unpicked 
the data it wasn’t really about the gangs at all.  
For Claire, this situation presented a certain amount of dissonance. With gangs and gang 
culture serving as effective bywords for black culture, countering the idea that gangs were 
central to the riots was an important means of resisting these racialised constructions of 
the rioters. While Claire was keen to correct the inaccurate representations that pinned 
the blame for the riots on racialised and marginalised young people and stigmatised those 
she worked with, this misrepresentation also provided a means of making the case for a 
project she believed in.  
For Claire and Ashley – who framed their work in terms of supporting young people drawn 
into the criminal justice system – challenging the inaccuracies of media and political 
representations of the rioters as overwhelmingly black and working-class, or as gang 
members, was a way to shield the young people they worked with from blame and 
censure. Yet these attempts were constrained by the broader circulating meanings around 
the riots, crime and criminality. Though Ashley was keen to counter the way the media 
had represented the rioters as largely ‘black kids’ from ‘lower income families’, simply 
highlighting the diversity of the rioters, as I have argued throughout the chapter, does not 
on its own necessarily override or disrupt the blaming of the riots on racialised and 
marginalised groups. Rather, the exceptional diversity of the ‘surprising rioters’ in some 
ways simply reaffirmed the longstanding idea of the usual rioters as racialised and 
working-class. The structures of meaning that shaped debate about the rioters, in my 
interviews as well as in political, media and public discussions, reveal ingrained myths of 
black and working-class criminality that are less easily undone.  
These conversations also speak to the often-uncomfortable fit between practitioners’ 
personal convictions and the institutional politics and organisational priorities that they 
work within. The problematic constructions of the rioters provided opportunities for 
projects that – though controversial – practitioners saw as valuable. For Claire, the 
renewed prioritisation of gangs in the months following the riots – though misinformed 
and potentially damaging – allowed her to launch a new service for young people, and for 
Ashley, the contentious troubled families agenda afforded some additional support for 
his clients. At a structural level these agendas have been vitally important in shoring up 
revanchist race- and class-based neoliberal politics at odds with the personal positions 
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and intentions of those individuals whose day-to-day work involves coordinating and 
delivering these programmes.  This signals both the complex ways in which neoliberal 
ideology is translated into practice, not directly but through a series of negotiations, 
compromises and bargains (Billig et al., 1988); and the complex emotional and cognitive 
work that practitioners engage in to square their own views with the demands of their 
roles.  
Conclusions  
This chapter has argued that representations of ‘the rioters’ were crucially important in 
legitimising the criminal justice response to the riots. I have shown how practitioners’ 
accounts, in different ways, shore up long-standing imaginations of criminality that place 
the blame for crime on working-class and racialised communities; thereby positioning the 
targeting and punishment of these communities as rational and reasonable.  
For the last half a century ‘riots’ have been key moments in the creation and articulation 
of long-standing common sense ideas that connect race, culture, violence and disorder 
(Camp, 2016; Gilroy, 2002). Media and political representations of the rioters in 2011 
foregrounded racialised and working-class communities, framing the riots as a result of a 
pathological and infectious black culture and reproducing and reinforcing ‘the idea that 
any black, all blacks, are somehow contaminated by the alien predisposition to crime’ 
(Gilroy, 1982b: 52). I have examined how criminal justice practitioners’ accounts draw on 
and perpetuate this racist common sense. Though the professionals I interviewed did not 
use the starkly stigmatising language we saw in media and political discourse; 
practitioners’ descriptions of who was involved in the riots nevertheless subtly reinforced 
these racialised imaginations of crime and criminality, constituted and revitalised not just 
through discourses or images of blackness, but through articulations of the apparently 
remarkable heterogeneity of the rioters.  
Far from challenging or unravelling entrenched cultural conceptions of race-and-crime, 
shared understandings of ‘the rioters’ as unusually heterogeneous in many ways 
reinforced racialised imaginations of criminality and culpability. While Martin, Roger and 
Jason noted the surprising presence of middle-class, educated and white rioters, they 
contrasted this with their ‘usual client base’, a ‘criminal element’ positioned tacitly as 
working-class and racialised. Practitioners imbued these two distinct figures with very 
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different kinds of responsibility, motivation and concern. In different ways, Roger, Martin 
and Jason’s accounts of the white, middle-class rioters each absolved them of blame and 
responsibility for the disturbances: by emphasising their passive role in the riots, by 
highlighting how it was only the extraordinary circumstances that led to them committing 
offences, and by imbuing their actions with political legitimacy. It was striking to see the 
complex and somewhat contorted efforts to which professionals went to draw a dividing 
line between white, middle-class identity on the one hand, and criminality and immorality 
on the other.  
The imagination of this surprising rioter as out of place relies upon an understanding of 
the involvement of others as unsurprising. What remained unremarkable in these 
discussions was the participation in the riots (and the subsequent arrest, prosecution and 
sentencing) of the imagined majority of rioters, positioned (usually tacitly) as non-white 
and working-class; the ‘normal client base’ whose involvement in crime and entanglement 
in the criminal justice system is seen not as troubling or aberrant but as unsurprising and 
almost inevitable. The subtle ways in which professionals drew distinctions between their 
usual clients, and the unusual rioters reveals the persistence and pervasiveness of long-
established links between racialised, working-class identities, culpability and criminality. 
Framing the participation of white, middle-class people as anomalous, atypical and out of 
character, minimising their involvement as passive and peripheral, and diverting 
responsibility for their actions, in some ways reaffirmed the idea that the riots were 
essentially a black, working-class issue. Rather than disrupting or overturning the myth of 
black criminality, the focus on the diversity of the rioters leaves entirely intact, and 
reinforces, long-standing imaginations of race, class and crime, and in particular ‘the 
ideological construction of black and brown people as exceptionally crime-prone’ 
(Williams and Clarke, 2018: 2), normalising a punitive response that predominantly 
targeted poor and racialised people.  
Moreover, the race- and class-delineated criminal justice reaction and the suite of punitive 
social policy ‘solutions’ to the unrest played an important role in shoring up this 
construction of crime and further rationalising and legitimising discriminatory criminal 
justice practices more broadly. The overrepresentation of racialised people in court in the 
wake of the riots lent support to a deep-rooted and ingrained ‘public consciousness in 
which non-white people are disproportionately engaged with and predisposed to 
criminality’ (Williams and Clarke, 2018) and legitimises a criminal justice system that 
regulates and controls them accordingly. As my discussions with Claire and Ashley 
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showed, the framing of the rioters in racialised and classed terms had tangible 
implications; legitimising projects like the gangs agenda that have further entrenched the 
criminalisation and punishment of racialised communities while ‘the systemic and 
rampant criminality of the powerful, inside and outside of the state, mostly perpetrated 
by well-educated individuals from allegedly well-integrated, functional and respectable 
families’ remains marginal to political debates about crime and punishment (Sim, 2018: 
167–168). 
Finally, my analysis has raised questions about how we can make sociological sense of  
practitioners’ accounts by remaining attentive to their own positions in relation to the 
structures of  power that their accounts reproduce. Roger (heading up a long-established 
law firm), Martin (a senior civil servant), and Jason (a Senior Crown Prosecutor) were all 
in high status professional careers; all three were middle-aged white men, and all, to 
different extents, offered glimpses of middle-class (or in Roger’s case, upper middle-class) 
subjectivities, through accents and modes of speech, and references to their homes, their 
schooling and other markers of class position. In some ways I was not surprised that they 
echoed narratives that exculpated white, middle-class young people while shifting the 
blame to marginalised groups. Yet in Chapter 4 I argued that Kofi and Amar, as people 
of  colour with backgrounds rooted in migration from former British colonies, also told 
stories that served to legitimise the racist practices of  the CPS and the criminal justice 
system more broadly. This raises the question of  what it means for people of  colour to 
be at the heart of  a system that targets black and brown people for punishment. Not 
least, this highlights the need to think more carefully about how race and class are 
imbricated and entwined, and to consider how inequalities of  race are intersect with and 
are refracted through privileges of  class, education and gender.  
Practitioners’ reproduction of depoliticising and demonising discourses points to the 
complex ways that people navigate discourses that demean or devalue them. Like Fanon’s 
(2007 [1952]) work on how people of colour become drawn into and reproduce racialised 
and institutionalised discourses and hierarchies, sociological literature on stigma 
highlights how people resist and contest – but, crucially, also internalise and reproduce – 
cultural narratives relating to intersecting structures of class, gender, race and migration 
status that blame and stigmatise them (Chase and Walker, 2012; Dhaliwal and Forkert, 
2015; Jensen, 2014b; Paton et al., 2017; Pemberton et al., 2015; Shildrick and MacDonald, 
2013; Skeggs, 2011; Taylor-Gooby, 2013; Walker, 2014). It also prompts us to think 
critically about the current emphasis on the importance of  the representation of  
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racialised people as professionals within the criminal justice system. Government efforts 
to tackle racial discrimination in the criminal justice system have focused significantly on 
increasing the presence of black, Asian and other ethnic ‘minority’ groups among workers 
(Ministry of Justice, 2020). The CPS’s strategy for example emphasises ‘the link between 
a diverse workforce and inclusive culture, and public confidence and trust in the CPS… 
particularly… for BAME groups where trust in the Criminal Justice System is low’ 
(Ministry of Justice, 2020: 38). The CPS prides itself on having one of the most diverse 
workforces of all the civil service agencies  (Ministry of Justice, 2020), and yet its practices 
and the narratives that sustain it, I argue, are deeply imbricated with racism. Tracing how 
these narratives are rehearsed and reproduced by people of colour points to the 
limitations of diversity initiatives that, in practice, may have little effect on the structure 
and culture of institutions, or their implication in racist practices. In a context where the 
‘insertion of minorities into white spaces is governed in a way that sustains [their] very 
whiteness’ (Saha, 2018: 83), representation is far from a simple solution to the racism of 
the system and its practices. 
In the following two chapters I further develop these themes. In Chapter 6 I consider 
how practitioners’ imaginations of the public, like their descriptions of the rioters, were 
bound up with imaginations of class, race and Britishness that were mobilised to legitimise 
the criminal justice response. In Chapter 7 I examine how professionals assigned concern 
and vulnerability to different people brought into the criminal justice system (and prisons 
in particular) after the riots, tracing how these discriminating patterns of care and concern 






Summoning the punitive public: Configuring citizenship 
in the wake of the disturbances 
 
I’m afraid society expected condign punishment. 
Leonard, District Judge, London 
Introduction 
The previous two chapters have explored how practitioners drew on shared cultural ideas 
about the nature of the disturbances, and the demographics of those involved, to 
naturalise and legitimise the severely punitive criminal justice response against them; and 
how others have resisted these meanings. In this chapter, I examine how practitioners 
articulated a third set of interrelated ideas and assumptions, about the imagined audiences 
for the state’s display of criminal justice might. I argue that a shared imagination of a 
punitive public animated and underpinned my discussions with practitioners and was 
essential in justifying the unusual practices of the courts in the wake of the unrest. 
I focus on the most spectacular element of the criminal justice response to the 
disturbances: the courts’ ‘lightning-fast and brutal’ reaction (Slater, 2011: 107). The courts’ 
response to the unrest was highly unusual in many ways, marked by an exceptionally rapid 
process of bringing those arrested before the courts, the use of all-night and weekends 
courts, the remanding of an extraordinary number of ‘rioters’ to custody, and 
exceptionally harsh sentencing (discussed in more detail in Chapter 7). Alongside claims 
that the courts’ response was necessary to deter rioters, the idea that the public demanded 
a swift and severe punitive reaction from the courts flowed through many of my 
interviews with practitioners, imbuing the response with a kind of popular legitimacy. The 
claim that ‘society expected condign punishment’, as district judge Leonard put it, was a 
powerful means of rationalising the courts’ unusually severe treatment of people charged 
with riot-related offences, while simultaneously providing a way for practitioners to 
disavow moral responsibility for their and their organisations’ punitive actions in the wake 
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of the riots. Moreover, I argue that this imagination of a monolithically punitive public, 
defined in opposition to the ‘rioters’, served to obscure the deep divisions of race and 
class that the criminal justice response to the unrest both reflected and further 
reproduced. 
The chapter is structured in three parts. In Part 1 I show how this imagination of a public 
that demanded harsh punishment served as a powerful rhetorical device in practitioners’ 
accounts, allowing them to normalise, and defer responsibility for, their organisations’ 
unusually punitive responses to the riots.  
Questioning the idea that the criminal justice system was simply responding to public 
desire for law and order, in Part 2 of the chapter I show how media, political and criminal 
justice discourses worked together to produce, reinforce and instrumentalise a politically 
and ideologically potent imagination of a punitive public. I argue that popular rhetoric 
around the riots conjured a public that was shaped by contemporary cultural 
configurations of citizenship and the nation, drawing in particular on regressive and 
exclusionary imaginations of Britishness, positioning the public firmly against ‘the rioters’ 
and, more importantly, on the side of the state and its harsh penal reaction.  
Part 3 considers how this cultural context came to shape the criminal justice response. 
While practitioners spoke of the need to show the public that the system was responding 
swiftly and severely to the riots; I argue that they were also reacting to the intertwined 
pressures, explicit and implicit, exerted directly and indirectly, on the criminal justice 
system by media and political discourses.  
In the chapter’s conclusion I contend that this limited understanding of ‘the public’ as 
monolithically supportive of the criminal justice system, obscures the startling severity of 
the courts’ reaction in comparison to empirical measure of ‘public opinion’ and elides the 
profound inequalities that the state’s response to the riots engendered and entrenched. 
Part 1. ‘The public expected a tough response’  
In this part of the chapter I introduce the concept of the imagined punitive public that 
flowed through practitioners’ accounts. I show how practitioners articulated a shared 
assumption that the public demanded a harshly punitive reaction from the courts; and 
argue that these ideas of the public as monolithically retributive served to naturalise and 
justify the courts’ response to the disturbances; characterised by the highly unusual use 
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of all-night sittings, the swift processing of cases and the extraordinarily harsh approach 
to remand (see page 15 for detail); as well as the uncommonly long sentences handed 
down, which I discuss in Chapter 7. 
Practitioners’ imaginations of the public were most often articulated in terms of the 
courts’ need to ‘send a message’ to society. Though practitioners argued that the courts 
needed to send a specifically deterrent message to rioters and potential rioters, at least as 
important was the notion of sending a message to a more amorphous ‘public’ (but one 
with specific boundaries, as I will argue). Showing the public that the criminal justice 
system was in control – thereby reasserting its legitimacy in the face of a serious challenge 
to it – was absolutely central to professionals’ justifications for the courts’ harsh response.   
Sending a message to the rioters 
First, practitioners talked about the need to use the criminal justice apparatus to send a 
message to those who were already involved in the disturbances, or who might be 
tempted to join in; effectively using the courts as a means to help bring the disorder to a 
swift end.  
For Leonard, who had been a district judge in 2011, the courts’ response to the unrest 
had been wholly positive: ‘my overwhelming view’, Leonard told me, ‘is that this was a 
great success’. Leonard had retired in 2016, having worked for twenty years as a legal aid 
defence solicitor in East London at the start of his legal career, then spending some years 
as a prosecutor before becoming a judge in the 1990s, presiding over cases at magistrates’ 
courts in South East London. In 2011 Leonard had played an important role in 
coordinating the magistrates’ courts during the disturbances, as well as sitting as a district 
judge in London.  
I met Leonard on a bright spring morning in 2018 at Westminster magistrates’ court. 
Opened in September 2011, shortly after the riots, this new court had replaced the 
previous one at Horseferry Road, which had since been demolished to make way for ‘The 
Courthouse’, a development of 129 high-end luxury flats. The new court on Marylebone 
Road, a modern building of light stone and expansive glass, houses ten courtrooms, and 
deals with all of the country’s extradition and terrorism-related cases in addition to its 
local cases. After passing through the security scanners at the entrance to the court 
building, a smartly suited middle-aged man met me, and escorted me to the area of the 
court building inaccessible to the public. He led me to a large, sunlit office – the brass 
plaque on the heavy wooden door told me this was the office of the Deputy Chief 
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Magistrate, whose formal black and white robes hung from a hat stand in the corner of 
the room – and introduced me to Leonard. I noted the walls lined with shelves of books 
and files; and a framed cartoon with the caption ‘Law: the only game where the best 
players sit on the bench.’ In contrast to the pared-back furnishings of the public waiting 
areas with their basic metal and plastic chairs, the back offices were ornate and plushly 
carpeted. Leonard sat at a large, polished wooden table in the centre of the large room, 
reclining in his chair and sipping a cup of tea from a white china cup and saucer. I was 
nervous about the interview – while researching Leonard’s background in preparation for 
the meeting, I had come across photos of a stern-faced judge in gown and wig, or an 
austere charcoal suit and tie. I had read some of his sentencing remarks in which he had 
admonished defendants and had rather assumed he would have the same brusque manner 
in our meeting. However, he immediately got up to greet me, with a warm smile and 
handshake. In a gingham brushed cotton shirt, open at the collar, and a blue-grey tweed 
jacket, Leonard was dressed smartly, but a world away from the intimidating images I had 
come across. Almost immediately the Chief Magistrate – dressed in robes and with a cut-
glass accent befitting her aristocratic background – popped her head round the door to 
say hello, clearly pleased to see her old friend and share some jokey chat. Leonard 
bashfully excused his casual appearance and apologised for not having had a shave that 
morning.  
After I briefly introduced myself and my research, Leonard took the lead in the interview, 
saying ‘I’m sure you’ve got questions you want to ask, but would it be helpful if I gave 
you some background?’ It was only when I went back to the recording of the interview 
to transcribe it that I realised that Leonard then proceeded to talk for nearly twenty 
minutes without further prompting about the response of magistrates’ courts to the 2011 
disturbances. Leonard must have been the best-prepared of all those I interviewed, his 
answers being comprehensive and carefully structured; perhaps a result of the extra time 
and leisure afforded by his recent retirement, as well as a long career spent honing the 
craft of convincing and authoritative speech.  
For Leonard the courts’ response was justified by the need to bring the riots to a swift 
end: 
There was a real risk, we felt in the very, very early days, of people going back, re-joining 
the riots. And really until the riots were over, you know there was a feeling that people 
who’d – forgive me for putting it this way – got the balls to join in the riots, burn people’s 
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properties and steal things in that way in the first place, probably would be prepared to 
go back if they were let out.  
The courts’ widespread denial of bail, then, represented to Leonard a pragmatic means 
‘to stop people reoffending’: the courts, he said, had ‘hoped that if enough of the rioters 
were off the streets and in custody, [the rioting] would stop, and it did. It stopped almost 
immediately.’ In part, this was about physically detaining those who were involved in the 
unrest; a pragmatic measure to keep those arrested from going back out and ‘re-joining 
the fray’, as barrister Lawrence had put it in another interview. 
Others saw remanding rioters not just as an effective way of incapacitating those already 
arrested; but as a means of sending a message to others who might be considering getting 
involved. Defence solicitor Roger, despite his concern about the disproportionately long 
sentences handed down, had been greatly impressed by the spectacle of the courts staying 
open throughout the night to deal with the huge influx of cases resulting from arrests. 
The night courts, he said, ‘were brilliant, I have to say. I mean, that was a real message’:  
They were incredibly effective. That you would be arrested and be in court at two o’clock 
the next morning, and on your way to prison and serving your sentence before twenty-
four hours had gone by, was a very, very clear message that was sent. 
For Roger, the value of the night courts was in their ability to show potential rioters that 
the courts were responding quickly and effectively to the disturbances. District Crown 
Prosecutor Jason similarly saw the courts’ controversial approach to remand as an 
effective deterrent. He felt that during the riots there was deep concern among the 
criminal justice system that the unrest ‘would actually get worse and be a significant issue 
across the country.’ As he explained: 
Part of the thing about making sure that those cases got prosecuted effectively and 
efficiently and quickly was to send out that message to society that actually if you commit 
these offences then actually this is the eventual outcome.  
The pace at which people were brought into court, then, and the rate at which they were 
remanded to custody, was seemingly intended to discourage others from joining the 
disorder: 
I think to some extent keeping as many people remanded on first appearance probably 
assisted with that, because it was sending out that message that actually you will be 
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remanded in custody if you commit these offences, even if on the face of it it’s, what, 
you know, shoplifting, effectively.    
Like bringing rioters into court ‘effectively and efficiently and quickly,’ Jason framed the 
courts’ exceptionally harsh attitude to granting bail as a way of ‘sending out a message to 
society’; in particular, to deter people by showing that they could not rely on the courts 
to deal with them according to normal policy and procedures. The idea of sending a 
message was used to rationalise and legitimise the courts’ controversial actions, not least 
remanding to custody very young people with no previous convictions, and no risk of 
evading justice, for minor offences like shoplifting. The need to show that ‘you will be 
remanded in custody if you commit these offences’ seemed to trump considerations of 
the nature of the offences and the circumstances of the individual that normally determine 
decisions around remand, where deterrence should not be a factor (Bail Act, 1976). 
Similarly, practitioners justified the court’s extraordinarily punitive approach to sentencing 
in terms of its supposed deterrent power. David, who had been a magistrate in 2011, saw 
the swift and severe sentencing – starting while the unrest was still ongoing – as an 
important means of discouraging people from continuing the disturbances or getting 
involved: 
I think the feeling was, we’ve got such a large number [of cases], we can’t put these off 
for six weeks, to deal with, if we can deal with them quickly to show that if you continue 
these riots, this is the sort of punishment, strong punishment, that you might receive. 
District Crown Prosecutor Amar explained that the idea of the courts handing down the 
kind of lighter, non-custodial sentences that offences like shoplifting would normally 
attract was, in the context of the riots, laughable:  
If we’re dealing with, for example, people still smashing and burning things, I mean the 
last thing we want to do is say ‘actually, carry on; well, it’s a conditional discharge’34 
(laughing). It’s simply not going to happen.  
 
34 A conditional discharge is a sentence whereby the ‘offender’, having been found guilty, is 
released and the offence registered on their criminal record, but no further action taken unless 
they commit a further offence within a time decided by the court (https://www.cps.gov.uk/cps-
page/sentencing). 
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For Amar, handing out a less punitive sentence would have effectively encouraged and 
permitted people to commit further offences. Practitioners rationalised the courts’ 
exceptional approach to the riots, then, partly as a means of sending a message to those 
already involved in the disturbances, or those who might be tempted to get involved. This 
was a relatively targeted message, aiming to deter further ‘offending’ and bring the riots 
to an end. Other practitioners, however, were highly critical of the idea that the courts 
could send an effective message to rioters or potential rioters. Defence barrister Sadie 
doubted that harsh sentences would work as a deterrent: 
Someone who has otherwise behaved well in the course of their life and got caught up 
in something is not deterred by a prison sentence, because either they wouldn’t behave 
like that again because they are generally a law-abiding person; or entirely possibly, if 
there was such a big event they would be equally sucked into it. 
For Sadie, the peculiarly affective and spontaneous nature of disturbances meant that 
severe punishment was particularly unlikely to deter.. Literature on the 2011 unrest also 
casts doubt upon the deterrent role of sentencing. Becky Clarke (2012b), in her in-depth 
research with young people who had been involved in the 2011 rioting in Manchester, 
also expressed doubt that the sentencing would work as a deterrent; instead highlighting 
that for many of the young people who were already caught up in the criminal justice 
system, the harsh sentences they received for riot-related offences simply entangled them 
deeper in a cycle of marginalisation and criminalisation. For the young people she worked 
with, the loss of stability, accommodation and employment caused by a prison sentence 
was likely to increase, not decrease, the risk of re-offending. 
Defence barrister Lawrence, too, was doubtful that long sentences would act as a 
deterrent, echoing an established body of research literature that argues that more severe 
sentencing has little deterrent effect on potential offenders (Pina-Sánchez et al., 2017): 
Whether there actually is any deterrent effect, I’d be very surprised. I mean I doubt that 
any of your average rioters have the faintest clue what the ordinary sentence for, say, 
aggravated trespass or burglary or affray is, or indeed the fact that it’s more serious if you 
commit it in a public order context… And that does suggest that maybe the motivation 
behind it was more showing the public that something was being done. 
The logic of deterrence, Lawrence points out, depends on people knowing the likely 
consequences of their actions and making a rational, calculated decision about whether 
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to commit an offence or not. For these practitioners, then, the ‘message’ the courts were 
sending was not really intended for the rioters, but, as Lawrence put it, to show the public 
that something was being done. While practitioners invoked the deterrent effect of the 
courts’ extraordinary practices, this imagined public, I argue, worked as a powerful 
discursive resource that allowed practitioners to legitimise the harsh reaction. 
Sending a message to the (punitive) public  
In my interviews, professionals from across the system emphasised the need to show the 
public that they were taking the disturbances seriously and responding effectively; not 
just to act swiftly but to be seen to be in control. In part, as I have argued, practitioners drew 
on ideas of incapacitation and deterrence, justifying the courts’ unusual practices in terms 
of their potential to prevent or discourage people from ‘offending.’ But my interviews 
also revealed a deeply ingrained assumption that the public demanded to see order 
reinstated and, crucially, that they expected the rioters to be punished, regardless of 
whether this would have an effect on the situation on the streets. There was, then, a 
distinctly retributive or vengeful dynamic at play in how practitioners imagined the public. 
In our discussions about the riots, an imagined punitive public seemed to outweigh or 
surpass other considerations about whether harsh punishment was necessary or 
appropriate. Rather than reflecting an objective reality, I contend that this punitive public 
is a cultural, political and ideological construction – but with real consequences.  
District judge Leonard pointed to a widely held belief among the judiciary that the public 
expected and wanted to see the courts not just stopping the riots but also handing out 
harshly punitive prison sentences: 
There was a widespread feeling that if people took part in riots where people died, you 
know, where buildings burned, where properties were trashed, shops, shopkeepers went 
out of business; then I’m afraid society expected condign punishment… And, you know, 
there is an element of which the offence is so serious that people would be outraged if a 
person didn’t go to prison. 
For Leonard, the potential ‘outrage’ of the public seemed to leave the courts with little or 
no choice but to take an extraordinarily tough stance. Invoking the imagined punitive 
public provides an important way for Leonard to justify the courts’ harsh treatment of 
rioters and to position himself as somewhat helpless, his hands tied by society’s presumed 
desire for punishment.  
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The idea that the public expected offenders to be punished posed a profound challenge 
for other practitioners too. Claire, who managed a local authority youth offending service, 
grappled with this tension in her day-to-day work:  
It’s that conflict all the time, between understanding [and punishment]. And I really get 
that, ’cause I think if any of us were victimised tomorrow, we’d be really angry and we’d 
want something. Unless you’re a really big person, especially if something really bad 
happened to you, you would want that person to be punished, wouldn’t you? 
For Claire, this common sense understanding of the public’s desire for punishment 
normalised, or at least rendered inevitable, a system that she personally felt would be 
more effective focusing on supporting vulnerable young people. While Claire’s work 
aimed primarily to support young people and to keep them from being drawn into the 
criminal justice system, she was troubled by what she saw as almost a natural or universal 
impulse to retribution or vengeance.  
Martin, a senior civil servant at the Ministry of Justice, similarly expressed a contradiction 
between his own professional or personal views, and public opinion. He explained that 
he suspected the custodial sentences handed out by the courts probably had not been 
effective in either deterring further rioting or ‘rehabilitating’ the rioters but saw them as 
necessary in the circumstances: how, he asked, could the criminal justice system ‘be seen 
to be doing anything else?’ In particular, it was the public who had to be shown that the 
system was in control: 
A system response to the events that happened had to be seen to be strong. Yeah. Swift 
and sure, you know. I can’t remember what the term was that was used at the time, it was 
‘swift and sure justice’, wasn’t it?35 
Chloe: So you’re thinking about public perception, or-?  
Martin: Well, public perception and public desire. Because, you know, politicians – and 
everyone else, actually – were behind the idea that ‘this isn’t right, this has to be dealt 
with and it has to be dealt with head on’. So it wasn’t that politicians were getting up and 
 
35 A year after the riots the Ministry of Justice (2012b) published a report entitled ‘Swift and Sure 
Justice’, setting out its plans for reform of the criminal justice system. The report framed the 
criminal justice response to the disturbances as a benchmark for this work and set out an aim of 
‘normalising’ the speed at which cases had been dealt with during the unrest. 
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saying something for effect. It was that they were reflecting, I think, what the vast 
majority of the population were saying, which is ‘you’ve got to deal with this’. 
Martin points to the role of political rhetoric in shaping and legitimising the criminal 
justice response (which I discuss in more depth in Part 2 of this chapter), but also makes 
an important claim about the public: that ‘everyone else’, too, wanted the disturbances to 
be dealt with ‘head on’. In calling for an immediate and decisive response, characterised 
by exceedingly severe sentences, he felt politicians spoke on behalf of ‘the vast majority 
of the population’. This is a powerful assertion and a compelling means of legitimising 
the state’s highly unusual and punitive reaction to the riots, framing it not as a set of 
actions carried out by a disconnected state, but a direct reflection of popular will. 
Invoking public opinion and desire in this way is an effective way of ‘closing the 
consensual circle’ and ‘providing the lynch-pin of legitimation‘ (Hall et al., 2013 [1978]: 
136). But it is important to consider what, exactly, the criminal justice system had to be 
seen to be doing. In professing to represent the public, itself a contentious claim, 
practitioners asserted that what the public wanted was a retributive or vengeful reaction. 
Across practitioner’s accounts, this imagination of a punitive public seemed to be so 
obvious as to require no further substantiation.  
But we must be cautious about accepting without question the notion acting on behalf of 
the public meant not just bringing the disturbances to an end but punishing those 
involved. It is not at all clear that society did expect and want to see condign punishment, 
as Leonard put it; or that the vast majority of the population would have been outraged 
if harsh custodial sentences had not been handed out so widely. Research on popular 
attitudes to riot-related sentencing found that the public were much less punitive in their 
approach than the courts, and that the courts’ extraordinarily punitive response to the 
riots far surpassed the public’s desire for severity (Roberts and Hough, 2013). A public 
opinion survey commissioned by the Prison Reform Trust shortly after the riots found 
far higher levels of support for ‘restorative’ sentences than for punitive custodial 
sentences. An ‘overwhelming majority’ (94 per cent) wanted people who had committed 
offences such as theft or vandalism during the riots to be required to do unpaid 
community work; and there was widespread support for ‘better mental health care’ (80 
per cent); ‘making amends to victims’ (79 per cent); and ‘treatment to tackle drug 
addiction (74 per cent). In contrast, less than two-thirds (65 per cent) considered that a 
prison sentence would be effective in preventing crime and disorder (Prison Reform 
Trust, 2011b). Yet regardless of the veracity of this claim that the public expected 
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retribution, it provided a powerful cultural resource that practitioners drew on to 
legitimate the extraordinary treatment in the courts of those charged with rioting. 
Even if the public had been as punitive as practitioners imagined, we might ask whether 
such views should be reflected in the criminal justice system’s treatment of rioters. Public 
opinion about crime, note Hall and colleagues (2013), does not simply form at random. 
Rather, it ‘exhibits a shape and a structure,’ it ‘follows a sequence’ and is ‘structured by 
the dominant ideologies about crime’ (Hall et al., 2013 [1978]: 135). Moreover, public 
attitudes to punishment are notoriously rooted in ignorance and misinformation: people 
simultaneously tend to overestimate the prevalence and seriousness of crime, and 
underestimate the harshness of existing criminal justice policy and practice (Cheliotis and 
Xenakis, 2016). Where public attitudes do lean towards punitiveness, then, this cannot be 
separated from the cultural context in which these attitudes are formed. As I have pointed 
out, the meanings that were constructed around the riots and the rioters, created a 
moment in which many might well have expected condign punishment. I have argued 
that the excessively punitive response we saw in 2011 was made possible in part by the 
profoundly depoliticising and stigmatising, starkly classed and racialised representations 
of the riots and the rioters that dominated media and political rhetoric. These 
representations, and the pervasive and popular hostilities they licensed, meant that the 
public were primed to accept such extraordinary punishment. If the public were willing 
to see rioters punished so excessively, then, this was not a natural or inevitable fact that 
the courts simply had to respect and reflect; but was made possible by a very particular 
combination of cultural and symbolic forces.  
Some practitioners were clearly aware of this. As civil servant Martin remarked,  
The vast majority of the population, we know, is both infinitely well-informed but 
infinitely ill-informed [about crime]… Everybody’s got an opinion, but not everyone’s 
opinion is actually right (laughing). And it’s ill-informed as to the facts of the matter and 
what was going on at the time [of the riots] in those localities.  
Though Martin felt that the politicians’ calls for punitive penal reaction to the riots were 
directly reflecting the public’s desire for a strong response, and used this as a means of 
justifying the courts’ harsh response, he was also acutely aware of the inaccuracy of public 
opinion. 
District judge Leonard, too, noted the mismatch between reality and popular perceptions 
of crime and justice: 
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There are often swings, pendulum swings that you’re not aware of until it’s all 
happened… People didn’t believe there was a fall in crime, people didn’t believe drug 
consumption had gone down significantly… it was only, you know, as the facts come 
through that it becomes obvious that that has happened.  
This highlights a significant tension in these accounts of public opinion: Leonard and 
Martin both acknowledged the ignorance underlying public views on criminal justice; 
while at the same time maintaining that criminal justice responses to the riots had to meet 
the public’s demands for a tough response. Their own personal and professional 
judgements about sentencing were subsumed or made secondary to public punitiveness, 
figured as a regrettable but inevitable force to which the courts simply had to respond. 
I argue, then, that we should read practitioners’ appeals to public punitiveness as a potent 
cultural resource which allows them to legitimise the criminal justice response to the riots. 
In some ways, whether the public did in fact want or expect ‘condign punishment’ was 
less important than the ability to call upon an assumed or imagined public desire for 
punishment. Professionals and politicians evoked a punitive public whose desire for 
harshly retributive sentencing must be met, regardless of practitioners’ own views, or the 
effects that the courts’ approaches to remand and sentencing would have on individuals. 
‘What society wanted’, or the risk of the public being ‘outraged’, appeared to work as a 
seemingly inevitable and immoveable force that proscribed and curtailed what sentencers 
could do, and provides a kind of way out of the weighty political and ethical considerations 
inherent in prosecution and sentencing. Invoking the public works as a powerful claim to 
legitimacy and, at the same time, a disavowal of moral responsibility. The idea of a 
punitive popular opinion shifts accountability for the state’s actions away from its 
organisations, institutions and individuals, instead placing responsibility with the public.   
Moreover, I argue, this construction of the public as punitive is highly selective and 
discriminating: it does not encompass or evoke society at large but, rather, a strictly 
delineated public that actively excludes and side-lines those outside its boundaries. 
Practitioners were invoking and responding to a very particular imagination of the public; 
one that was constituted and refracted through political and media renderings.  
Part 2. Configuring the punitive public 
‘Those thugs we saw last week do not represent us’ 
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David Cameron, 15th August 2011 
In this part of the chapter I show how practitioners’ imaginations of a punitive public 
were made possible by the specific cultural and political context in which the 
disturbances, and our subsequent conversations about them, took place. The idea of the 
punitive public that was so ideologically powerful in my interviews is not simply factual 
or ‘neutral’ but is entangled with contemporary cultural constructions of citizenship and 
morality. Although declarations about public opinion seem ‘to promise an unmediated 
window onto “how the public really feels”’, in fact we must read them as part of a process 
that ‘involves pulling ordinary, normally invisible, people into a staged public 
conversation, something that looks like public debate but is in fact a highly structured 
exchange’ (Jensen, 2014a). Public opinion ‘is orchestrated via cultural sites… far from 
being “spontaneous” or “organic”, it is powerfully structured and editorialised’ (Jensen, 
2014a). I argue that practitioners’ claims that ‘the public wanted punishment’ emerged in 
a moment when shared meanings around the public were being renegotiated and remade, 
and when shifting configurations of citizenship and Britishness created the conditions of 
possibility for practitioners to invoke a public that definitively excluded the ‘rioters’ and 
which demanded their punishment and exclusion from the social body. 
My conversation with prosecutor Amar underscored the question of precisely who is 
encompassed in this rendering of the punitive public, and crucially, who is excluded. 
Discussing the CPS’s unusually severe approach to prosecuting riot-related cases, 
bringing before the courts cases that ordinarily may not have met the public interest test, 
Amar said: 
You can understand why it’s a tough response. If it’s a need for law and order to be, er, 
maintained, then you would expect – well, you may not necessarily – but the public would 
expect, say, quite a tough response from those in authority.  
For Amar, an important justification for the CPS and the courts’ reaction was that the 
public expected a ‘tough response’. But his casual, off-hand qualification of this point – 
that I personally might not expect or want to see a punitive response, but nevertheless the 
public would – raises important questions about the constituency and politics of the public 
that is being summoned. It wasn’t clear on what basis I was excluded from Amar’s idea 
of the public; whether as an academic researcher with a specific understanding and critical 
perspective on crime and justice, or on the basis of my own class position, or otherwise; 
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but Amar’s comment suggests an imagination of a punitive public that is bounded and 
delimited.  
Media and political rhetoric around the disturbances was vital in creating the common 
sense or self-evident notion that the public demanded retribution. Simplistic and 
unsubstantiated assertions about public desire for a punitive response abounded in media 
and political debate in the wake of the riots, licensing and legitimising a whole range of 
policy decisions that targeted the rioters. The Riots Communities and Victims Panel report, 
for example, stated that:  
People want rioters to be punished, but they also want to make sure we do all we can to stop 
those people from continuing to offend in future. Victims and the wider public deserve 
a justice system that is effective at both. 
(Riots Communities and Victims Panel, 2012: 10, emphasis added) 
The report offered no evidence to support the repeated claim that ‘people want rioters to 
be punished’; rather the idea of punitive popular opinion is presented as so self-evident 
that it does not require empirical backing. Yet, as I have shown, the public were by no 
means monolithically punitive in their attitudes. How, then, were such statements made 
possible and rendered legible, both in 2011 and in the period in which I was conducting 
this research? 
Media and political discourses around the riots created an important symbolic bifurcation 
between the rioters, on one side, and the public on the other. David Cameron’s statement 
to Parliament on Thursday 11th August 2011 neatly encapsulates the way that political 
rhetoric summoned and convened a public in support of the state’s punitive backlash: 
To the law-abiding people who play by the rules, and who are the overwhelming majority 
in our country, I say the fightback has begun… We are on your side. And to the lawless 
minority, the criminals who’ve taken what they can get. I say this: We will track you down, 
we will find you, we will charge you, we will punish you.  
(Cameron, 2011d) 
Cameron addresses a law-abiding majority, reassuring them that the government and the 
courts are on their side. Cameron evokes a distinctly punitive public: it is on their behalf 
that the criminal justice system will track down, charge and punish the ‘criminals’. Being 
‘on the side’ of the public means not only bringing the unrest to an end but punishing the 
lawless minority. In another speech a few days later, Cameron (2011b) made clear that 
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the ‘security fightback’ led by the criminal justice system was to be matched by a ‘social 
fightback’; a set of policy measures (including the work on gangs and troubled families 
mentioned in Chapter 5) to tackle the ‘slow-motion moral collapse’ and ‘broken society’ 
on which he blamed the riots; epitomised by ‘children without fathers, schools without 
discipline, reward without effort, crime without punishment, rights without 
responsibilities, [and] communities without control’ (Cameron, 2011b). Cameron framed 
this fightback, too, as a project mandated by the public: 
I have the very strong sense that the responsible majority of people in this country not 
only have that determination [to confront all this]; they are crying out for their 
government to act upon it. 
(Cameron, 2011b) 
In Cameron’s rhetoric it wasn’t just the government ‘fighting back’ but a ‘responsible 
majority’ of citizens ‘crying out’ for it; clamouring for a punitive penal and policy response 
against the rioters. The imagination of the punitive public, I argue, hinges upon a strict 
division between the immoral, irresponsible and uncivilised rioters on the one hand, and 
on the other, a public who embodied all the virtues the rioters were so sorely lacking: 
responsibility, morality and civility. 
Conservative papers like the Daily Mail echoed the rhetoric of a ‘fightback’ against the 
riots (Figure 9) and similarly addressed a public that was decisively against the riots and 
rioters, and, moreover, aligned with and in support of the punitive state backlash. This 
process perhaps reached a pinnacle in the ‘name and shame‘ campaigns run by local 
papers and by the national right-wing press (Figure 10), encouraging readers to identify 
rioters from CCTV images, echoing those coordinated by police forces (Figure 11) and 
illustrating the right wing press’s increasing role in ‘inciting a “vigilante state of mind”’ 
(Cheliotis, 2010: 175). Such campaigns aimed not only to win legitimacy for the state’s 
law and order response, but to recruit the public into it, configuring and constructing a 
public that was not only calling for surveillance and punishment but actively enlisted in 
pursuing it, ‘summoning the public as citizens to aid the reprimanding of those deemed 
responsible’ for the unrest (De Benedictis, 2012). 
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Figure 9: Daily Mail, 10th August 2011 
 
Figure 10: The Sun, 10th August 2011 
 
 
Figure 11: Manchester Police’s ‘Shop A Looter’ campaign (photo: Greater Manchester Police/PA) 
 
More broadly, right-wing papers rallied in support of a public mobilising against the riots 
and the rioters. Groups of residents and business-owners ‘defending the streets’ were 
broadly praised as ‘heroes’, particularly in the right-wing media (Figure 12; Figure 13). 
The Telegraph praised the Turkish shopkeepers in Hackney – who guarded their businesses 
against looters during the riots, armed with knives and baseball bats – as ‘decent citizens’ 
and ‘the heroes of recent days’, linking their actions explicitly to Cameron’s ‘big society’ 
rhetoric (Moore, 2011). 
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Figure 12: Daily Mirror, 10th August 2011 
 
Figure 13: Daily Star, 11th August 2011 
Those who assisted in the prosecution of their own children received particular approval, 
in contrast to the irresponsible and feckless parents who were blamed for allowing their 
children to riot (Figure 14). The parents of Chelsea Ives, an 18-year-old athlete and 
‘Olympic ambassador’ from East London (Figure 15) were celebrated in the media as 
responsible individuals, epitomising neoliberal ideals of active, entrepreneurial citizenship 
(De Benedictis, 2012). Having turned their daughter in to the police after spotting her in 
TV news coverage of the looting, Chelsea Ives’ mother reportedly said ‘These riots 
happen because good parents do nothing… As parents we had to say, “She can’t get away 
with that”… I had to do the right thing’ (Daily Mail, 2011). The teenager was subsequently 
jailed for two years after being convicted of burglary and damaging property (Freeman 
and Moore-Bridger, 2011). 
In this way the right-wing press created and proliferated punitive discourses, that in 
concert with political rhetoric worked to assert a punitive common sense that made it 
possible for criminal justice practitioners to state they were doing what ‘everyone’ wanted 
them to. At the same time these representations worked to draw a solid and impermeable 
line dividing ‘rioters’ from society at large, providing a powerful rhetorical resource for 
criminal justice practitioners to reframe their work as on behalf of and with ‘the vast 
majority of people’.  
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Figure 14: Daily Express, 11th August 2011 
 
Figure 15: Daily Mirror, 13th August 2011 
 
The best of British  
Discourses of nation and citizenship played a vital role in creating this cultural cleavage 
between the dangerous rioters and the fearful, punitive public; a binarisation that 
underpinned practitioners’ claims to be acting in response to the demands of society. The 
way in which questions of nation, citizenship and belonging were being reconfigured in 
2011 provided a set of cultural resources that practitioners drew upon to align the public 
closely with the punitive reaction to the riots.  
Divisive and exclusionary discourses of Britishness, in particular, were vital in the 
construction of a public defined in opposition to the racialised and othered rioters. 
Cameron (2011b) made a clear distinction between Britain, figured as ‘a great country of 
good people’, and the rioters who had committed ‘the most sickening acts on our streets’:  
Last week we didn’t just see the worst of the British people; we saw the best of them too. 
The ones who called themselves riot wombles and headed down to the hardware stores 
to pick up brooms and start the clean-up. The people who linked arms together to stand 
and defend their homes, their businesses. The policemen and women and fire officers 
who worked long, hard shifts, sleeping in corridors then going out again to put their life 
on the line… Because this is Britain. This is a great country of good people. Those thugs 
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we saw last week do not represent us, nor do they represent our young people – and they 
will not drag us down.  
(Cameron, 2011b) 
This rhetoric – symbolically casting rioters outside of the borders and boundaries of 
citizenship – was ubiquitous across media and political commentary. While the rioters 
decisively did not represent British people, or Londoners (Evening Standard, 2011) those 
who mobilised against them, either as cosy, local ‘riot wombles’ or as part of the criminal 
justice system, were the epitome of national character. 
These regressive and exclusionary discourses of citizenship coalesced most clearly around 
the ‘clean-up’ operations (Jensen, 2013). Characterised by some as a symbolic ‘social 
cleansing’ of the city by a gentrifying ‘broom-wielding bourgeoisie’ (Himmelblau, 2011) 
the clean-up was refracted through a rhetorical division between the rioters and those 
who cleared up, figured as the ‘real’, ‘true’ Londoners, the ‘respectable middle-class’ who 
came ‘to clean up the streets, to sweep away the dirt and debris, and to cleanse the events 
that shook fear into “middle England”’ (Lamble, 2013: 577–578). Representations of the 
‘broom army’ (Figure 16) painted a picture of a responsible, entrepreneurial and moral 
community – a ‘civilised majority’ of broom-wielding citizens ‘reclaiming the streets’ 
(Castella, 2011) – that stood in direct opposition to the irresponsible, immoral and 
pathological ‘scum underclass’ of the rioters (Tyler, 2013).  
 
Figure 16: Daily Express, 10th August 2011 
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Figure 17: Social media images of the riot ‘clean-up’ (reproduced from Jensen, 2013) 
Reported on social media using the hashtags #theRiotWombles and #OperationCupOfTea 
(Evening Standard, 2011), coverage of the clean-up was saturated with regressive and 
nostalgic notions of the nation. An Evening Standard journalist reported ‘the blitz spirit 
was in evidence all day… The broom, raised aloft, plus cups of tea carried on riot shields 
seemed so very English’ (Evening Standard, 2011). As Tracey Jensen (2013) argues, the 
‘mythology of Blitz spirit is periodically reanimated in times of crisis’ and is always 
saturated with classed and racialised meanings (see also Kelsey, 2013). In 2011 this 
nostalgic rhetoric was mobilised to evoke the virtues of ‘resilience, community, and 
Londoners uniting in response to a common enemy’; highlighting ‘urban antagonisms 
between the respectable gentrifiers of the so-called “broom army” and the “feral 
underclass” of the rioters’ (Jensen, 2013). 
The criminal justice system’s response, too, was cast in this patriotic light. My discussion 
with prosecutor Amar echoed this rhetoric of the backlash against the riots as a reflection 
or expression of national character. He described how the CPS’s response to the riots 
(characterised by an extraordinary diversion from ordinary policy and practice) had really 
brought the organisation together, and turned out to be an enjoyable moment of co-
operation and solidarity: 
Summoning the punitive public 
 149 
There was a lot of work, a lot of work to do. But yes, we all got stuck in, and actually, 
you know, we enjoyed it at the time. I mean it was quite frightening, obviously… but it 
was good, it was good work. 
For Amar this response, stoic and steadfast in the face of adversity, was also 
quintessentially British:  
I think that the challenging aspect for us, and the good thing for us, was that we came 
together… which is something, I think, very British, I think, in many respects… At 
moments of adversity people seem to sort of get together. Rather than people saying 
‘You know what? It’s five o’clock. Cheerio, goodbye, have a good weekend.’ There was 
none of that nonsense… People were like ‘Right, what do we do?’ People volunteered to 
go and cover courts in places that you probably wouldn’t want to go to in the middle of 
riots… So, there was all that, but people went off and did it. They did it, and I thought it 
brought people together. I mean, in terms of us here, it was a great atmosphere. 
What specific imaginations of the nation are at play here, making it possible for Amar to 
understand his organisation’s extraordinary approach to prosecuting riot-related offences 
as indicative of a particular national character? In some senses Amar seems to be 
appealing to the same traditionalist and conservative view of Englishness that Policing the 
Crisis identified in 1973: an imagined national character typified by shared values and 
moral codes of responsibility, hard work, discipline, respect for authority, tolerance and 
practicality – especially at moments of crisis and most notably in wartime (Hall et al., 2013 
[1978]: 144–145). In 2018 this image of national identity was still at work and, as I argue 
below, had taken on an additional set of meanings in relation to the context of austerity.  
My interpretation of Amar’s recollection of the riots was undeniably shaped by a small 
detail: as we talked, he sipped tea from a mug emblazoned with a now-faded, red-and-
white ‘Keep Calm and Carry On’ motif. The mug had been a gift from his manager after 
the riots, Amar explained as we sat down to start the interview. It was a memento to 
thank him for his team’s good work during the riots, when ‘keep calm and carry on’ had 
been something of a motto for Amar and his colleagues. I suggest that Amar’s account 
of the criminal justice response to the riots as typically British draws on a romanticised 
and backward-looking imagination of what it means to be British that is typified by the 
‘keep calm’ motif. The message – taken from an unused 1939 Ministry of Information 
poster designed to stiffen British citizens’ resolve in the event of a Nazi invasion 
(Hatherley, 2016) – has, alongside a host of other references to Britain’s imagined ‘golden 
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age’ of the second world war, become ubiquitous across popular culture in the last decade. 
‘Tapping into an already established narrative about Britain’s “finest hour”’ such emblems 
hark back to the war as ‘a moment of entirely indisputable – and apparently 
uncomplicated – national heroism’ (Hatherley, 2016). This nostalgic discourse is imbued 
with a very particular imagination of citizenship and nation that is ‘implicitly defined by a 
‘racial’ characteristic, that is, whiteness’ (Bowling and Phillips, 2002: 30). The ‘blitz’ has 
maintained a peculiar symbolic potency, representing a glorious moment ‘before the 
country lost its moral and cultural bearings’ (Gilroy, 2004: 97), painted in stark contrast 
to the anxious and insecure state of contemporary national identity engendered by 
multiculturalism.  
The disturbances took place at a moment in which questions of citizenship, belonging 
and national identity, and the imaginations of the public that it engendered, were being 
contested and reconfigured (Bhattacharyya, 2013). The riots occurred in the midst of a 
series of ‘very public and highly staged enactments of shared identity’ that started with 
the royal wedding of Prince William and Kate Middleton in April 2011 and included the 
Queen’s jubilee and the London Olympics (Bhattacharyya, 2013). It is against this 
background that responses to the unrest (and specifically revanchist reactions against the 
rioters) came to be framed, and indeed celebrated, as symbols of ‘British’ values and 
character. Popular cultural imaginations of the public, filtered through racialised 
discourses of the nation were central to representations of the disturbances, and in 
particular to the configuration of the punitive public demanding a tough reaction from 
the courts. It is this cultural context – in which notions of citizenship were increasingly 
figured as exclusive and exclusionary – that made it possible for practitioners to imagine 
and invoke a punitive public whose priority was the removal of the dangerous and 
threatening rioters who represented the antithesis of Britishness. 
Backward-looking notions of Britishness configured a public that was defined by its 
racialised others, embodied in the figure of the rioters. The riot clean-up, in particular, 
was popularly cast in terms of ‘blitz spirit’, evoking a regressive imagination of ‘middle 
England’ of which rioters were not a part. The exclusionary and racialised ideas of nation 
that animated this discourse were echoed in Amar’s memories of his organisation’s ‘very 
British’ response to the riots, and his ‘keep calm and carry on’ souvenir. What this 
discourse signalled was not only the marking of the rioters as outsiders; but the imagination 
of those mobilising against the riots – whether as riot wombles proclaiming ‘looters are 
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scum’, as prosecutors working late into the evening to bring rioters to ‘justice’, or as ‘the 
public’ demanding ‘a tough response’ – as the real embodiment of British values.  
I contend that practitioners’ imaginations of the public were refracted through these 
popular anxieties about national identity and increasingly exclusionary notions of 
citizenship. Practitioners, recollecting events from the vantage point of 2018, construed 
a ‘Middle England’ public that has in some senses come into being with the seismic social 
and political events of the last few years, in particular Brexit and the cultural 
reconfiguration of notions of nation, citizenship and belonging that it has entailed. 
Popular understandings of the riots and the courts’ response to them mobilised a 
regressive and nostalgic idea of Britishness that cast the rioters firmly outside of the 
closely policed categories of the city and the nation, and structured a specific imagination 
of ‘the public’. Exclusionary notions of citizenship ran through representations of those 
‘fighting back’ against the rioters – either as clean-up wombles or participants in the 
media-led vigilante campaigns – casting them as the embodiment of civilised, moral, 
responsible citizens. As well as providing the cultural resources for practitioners to frame 
their own work in bringing the rioters to ‘justice’ as peculiarly ‘British’, this configuration 
of ‘the public’ made it possible for practitioners to invoke a public who demanded a tough 
response from them.  
In the final part of the chapter I consider more carefully how these circumscribed and 
delimited imaginations of ‘the public’ filtered through practitioners’ accounts. 
Part 3. Mediating ‘public opinion’  
In this part of the chapter I consider the mechanisms through which the imagination of 
the punitive public, which I have mapped out above, came to shape the courts’ reaction 
to the riots. Criminal justice practitioners do not have a direct, unmediated view on public 
attitudes; rather, their understandings of the public are culturally and ideologically 
contingent. Imaginations of what the public wanted – which are so powerful in 
legitimising punitive policy – are refracted through and entangled with sources that claim, 
explicitly or implicitly, to speak for ‘society’. Despite practitioners’ emphasis on their 
neutrality, objectivity, and independence, I argue that political and media discourses were 
crucial in moulding practitioners’ ideas about what the public wanted, and in doing so, 
set the scene for a punitive reaction to the unrest. 
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As I have argued, right-wing media and political rhetoric orchestrated an imagination of 
the public that was defined in opposition to the rioters, and which celebrated those who 
mobilised against the riots, whether as vigilant citizens, responsible parents or as ‘tough’ 
prosecutors and judges. This construction of the public as opposed to and in conflict 
with ‘the rioters’ put pressure on the criminal justice system to be seen to be taking a 
punitive stance; but this pressure, I argue, was exerted through and orchestrated by media 
and political discourses.  
Prosecutor Amar highlighted the media scrutiny that he thought had played a part in the 
courts’ extraordinary approach to remand and sentencing: 
Nobody likes to be accused of being soft on crime, do they, especially the judges, as you 
know. So you do feel that perhaps in that time they were being super tough, and then as 
the months go by and the dust has settled… the anger and the upset caused by the 
disturbances etcetera lessens, doesn’t it?  
For Amar, the judges’ ‘super tough’ treatment of defendants was a direct response to the 
public’s ‘anger and upset’, but also – crucially – was a means of avoiding being accused 
of being ‘soft on crime’. Not being seen to be taking the riots seriously seemed a significant 
source of anxiety for the criminal justice system at such a moment of crisis, and the media 
played an important role in stoking this fear. Indeed the first mention of sentencing on 
the front pages of the major newspapers came on Friday 12th August, with the Evening 
Standard proclaiming the police’s ‘fury at soft sentences’ (Figure 18); and the Telegraph’s 
indignation over ‘child looters freed by the courts’ to go ‘back on the streets’ ( 
Figure 19). This demand for punishment – not from the public but from the media – was 
explicit, with commentators calling for ‘zero tolerance’ from the criminal justice system. 
One Telegraph journalist stated that 
the only immediate response to this kind of mindless violence is zero tolerance from the 
police and the government in power, and a willingness to put those responsible behind 
bars… Britain is on the precipice of unprecedented levels of public disorder which must 
be decisively met with a firm determination to quell the riots and bring every one of these 
violent thugs to justice.  
(Gardiner, 2011) 
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Figure 18: London Evening Standard, 12th August 2011 
 
Figure 19: Daily Telegraph, 12th August 2011 
Such media discourses – in which lenient sentences are framed as a failure of justice and 
essentially enabling the riots to continue – contributed to the pressure on the courts to 
respond quickly and harshly to the disturbances. My conversation with Claire, the local 
authority manager I introduced in Chapter 5, pointed to the nature of the particular media 
constructions that put pressure on the courts to show themselves to be acting ‘tough’: 
It was a bit of a PR thing, wasn’t it?… It was like, they have to, we have to act, and we 
give out this message, but we know that locking up young people doesn’t deter them… 
It’s having the courage to say that, isn’t it, when you’ve got all that media pressure… 
They say ‘they’ve got PlayStations’, or ‘they’ve got that’, or ‘they’ve got this’… And I 
think it is that narrative you get in the press and the media, isn’t it? ‘It’s soft on crime’… 
It’s this constant thing in the media, isn’t it? And it’s a constant thing in politics – all that 
‘hug a hoodie’36 stuff. 
 
36 In 2006, as Leader of the Opposition, David Cameron gave a speech widely heralded as a new, 
more progressive approach to crime and justice, in which he criticised a shopping centre’s ban on 
young people wearing hooded tops. Cameron pointed to the need to address the social causes of 
crime, and emphasised the need for young people to be shown love (Cameron, 2006). The Labour 
Minister Vernon Coaker immediately retorted that ‘Cameron’s empty idea seems to be “let’s hug 
a hoodie”, whatever they have done’ (Hinsliff, 2006) and the speech became widely derided as a 
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For Claire, the media played a vital role in driving the courts’ approach to the disturbances 
Similarly, barrister Lawrence saw pressures from the media as a key factor in punitive 
sentencing: 
If your real motivation is to show Daily Mail readers that the criminal justice system is 
taking this seriously, then I suspect a bunch of headlines saying ‘so many years in prison 
for X’ and ‘so many years in prison for Y’ may well do the trick. 
 Judges’ real motivation in sentencing, Lawrence suggested, was to show that they were 
taking a tough stance, and to demonstrate this to a very specific audience. ‘Daily Mail 
readers’ seems to act as a byword for the imagined ‘Middle England’ public I described 
earlier in the chapter, embodying all the social anxieties and highly conservative, punitive 
values that the courts were under pressure to play to. ‘English tabloid readers’ David 
Green argues ‘have arguably become at once the most uninformed yet most politically 
influential segment of the population’, driving increasingly punitive penal policy (Green, 
2008: 126).   
Though Claire and Lawrence pointed in abstract terms to ‘media pressures’, in other cases 
practitioners recalled a clear and direct link between the intense media focus on the courts 
during the riots, and the courts’ unusually severe policies and practices. Defence solicitor 
Roger recalled how the tabloid papers had picked up on an early case where the defendant 
was treated relatively leniently, in that they were not given a custodial sentence:  
We represented somebody at Camberwell, and it was a lay bench, and we got a fine, which 
was remarkable at the time of the riots. And it got into the Daily Express or one of the 
media, and from very shortly afterwards lay magistrates weren’t allowed to hear riots 
cases anymore, and they stopped deputy district judges hearing them – it had to be a 
district judge.  
Roger saw the reporting of this particular case leading to a change in how the courts dealt 
with riot cases, with most cases appearing before district judges, who are known to take 
a harsher approach to both remand and sentencing than magistrates (Ipsos MORI, 2011). 
For Roger then, pressure from critical press coverage had directly shaped the judiciary’s 
approach to dealing with riot-related offences at court. 
 
misguided move towards being ‘soft on crime’; one from which Cameron soon retreated, 
returning to the Conservative’s traditional tough on crime agenda. 
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As Claire points out, the fear of being accused of being ‘soft on crime’ is ‘a constant thing 
in politics’. The kind of law and order rhetoric espoused by David Cameron, along with 
media discourses, created an ideological atmosphere in which the courts were under 
immense pressure to display unusual severity. In this way we might read the courts’ 
reaction as an example of a theatricalised performance of state power and legitimacy (Rai, 
2015; Jones et al., 2017).  As Jones et al. (2017) note in their work on the government’s 
efforts to be seen as ‘tough on immigration’, such performances do not necessarily 
succeed in delivering their message of solid sovereign power, since the population is in 
reality diverse and divided in its views on issues like crime and immigration, so that these 
messages may in fact have unintended effects. Yet what such performances reveal or help 
us to understand is the imagination of the audience – the public – that is at work. 
Unsurprisingly, prosecutors and sentencers were keen to disavow any notion of direct 
political pressure on the decisions they made in responding to the riots. District judge 
Leonard recalled that journalists in 2011 had suggested ‘the administration seemed to 
have an evil hand’ in judges’ decisions about sentencing, but stated emphatically that this 
criticism was absolutely mistaken: 
One of the key things is that nobody from the government administration contacted me. 
The contact that I got was from a judge, a senior presiding judge, and I wouldn’t have 
expected it any other way. It would be quite wrong for there to be an inference that 
the administration was taking any part in this, and I didn’t hear from them until after it 
was all over, when I got a phone call from a senior official to thank us for the work that 
we’d done. But no administrative suggestion as to how we should deal with the matter at 
all. 
Returning to this point towards the end of our conversation, Leonard expressed regret 
that the judiciary hadn’t made this clearer in 2011, and said his key recommendation if 
disturbances were to occur again would be that ‘It should be absolutely crystal clear to 
everybody that the decisions on what was happening in court were judicial decisions’. In 
parallel to this, magistrate David was equally quick to refute any notion that magistrates 
had been ‘unduly influenced’ by government.  
The Crown Prosecution Service, too, were keen to deflect suggestions of improper 
influence from the police or government. Kofi explained that ‘A lot of people don’t really 
understand that the CPS are completely independent from the police’, emphasising the 
CPS’s role in: 
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making sure that the innocent are acquitted and the guilty are convicted, and being, if 
you like, it’s a rather cliched term, but a minister of justice, which is what prosecutors 
are. I will get paid irrespective of the number of prosecutions we do, or irrespective of 
the number of convictions we secure. That’s something that I’m very proud of. 
Rather than working for the interests of the police, Kofi was clear that the CPS were a 
neutral entity who served the public and the public only. Similarly, prosecutor Amar 
emphasised the CPS’s independence from both the police and the government 
department whose offices they shared:   
There was never a sense that, you know, ‘gosh, we must lock everybody up’. Even riots 
aside, we are independent. I mean, you know this – we’re not part of the police force. 
We may be in this building now, the Ministry of Justice, but we’re nothing to do 
with them.  
Prosecutor Jason, however, who’d led the CPS’ Crown Court work, dealing with the more 
serious riot-related offences, painted a rather different picture. He described how the CPS 
had been under pressure to act quickly as the riots unfolded: 
There was a lot of political pressure on us as an organisation, from the Prime Minister’s 
office to make sure actually that those cases were being dealt with correctly, er and 
quickly. So we were trying to keep a real tight control on [riot-related] cases. 
This seemed to me a surprisingly frank acknowledgement from an organisation whose 
decisions are explicitly made ‘independently of the police and government’ (Crown 
Prosecution Service, 2018a).37 Whether or not the courts were unduly influenced by direct 
government interference; politicians applied a more insidious kind of pressure by publicly 
promising that the criminal justice system would respond in a certain way. In a public 
statement outside 10 Downing Street on 9th August David Cameron promised to ensure 
that  
court procedures and processes are speeded up and people should expect to see more, 
many more arrests in the days to come. I am determined, the Government is determined 
that justice will be done and these people will see the consequences of their actions. And 
 
37 However, my contact at the CPS, in the process of approving the thesis, emphasised that 
although prosecutors’ decision making is strictly independent, this does not preclude the CPS 
being expected to act as part of government and respond to government priorities.  
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I have this very clear message to those people who are responsible for this wrongdoing 
and criminality: you will feel the full force of the law and if you are old enough to commit 
these crimes you are old enough to face the punishment.  
(Cameron, 2011a) 
Speaking to the House of Commons two days later, he took an even more retributive 
tone, and set out specific sentences that rioters could expect: 
You will pay for what you have done… Anyone charged with violent disorder and other 
serious offences should expect to be remanded in custody, not let back on the streets, 
and anyone convicted should expect to go to jail.  
(Cameron, 2011d) 
On the same day, Home Secretary Theresa May echoed this sentiment, stating 
unequivocally that ‘the courts should hand down custodial sentences for any violent 
crimes’ (May, 2011). The CPS and the courts were to a great extent bound to meet the 
expectations of the executive, publicly stated and reinforced by the media, which as 
defence barrister Sadie put it, was characterised by a kind of ‘lock ‘em up and throw away 
the key’ attitude: 
I mean, in some ways, what were they gonna do? You know, no judge was gonna stand 
there and say ‘It’s fine, we’ll just let you all go home.’ Can you imagine the political 
(laughing) crisis that would have caused? I mean, it would’ve been horrendous. 
This political rhetoric on the riots, then, in many ways set the tone for the courts’ 
response, and it is difficult to conceive of the courts being entirely unaffected by these 
kind of proclamations about how they should and would react. After the ‘extraordinary 
lapse’ in authority that the riots posed, there was ‘an urgent political need’ to re-establish 
and maintain order (Gilson, 2011). The failure to do so carried a ‘huge and potentially 
fatal political cost’ (Barker, 2011). But the courts were under pressure to do more than 
restore order. To secure its own legitimacy, the state was under to pressure to show it was 
‘tough on crime’ (Gilson, 2011), and it was primarily through the courts that this would 
be demonstrated. 
Though prosecutors and sentencers were keen to emphasise that they were acting on 
behalf of the public, free from political interference, the notion of what the public wanted, 
and indeed, what was in the public interest, was configured through media and political 
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processes that framed the public in very particular – and peculiarly punitive – terms. 
Though criminal justice practitioners claimed to be responding primarily to the public’s 
desire or demand for punitiveness, these imaginations of what the public want are 
refracted through and entangled with  media and political discourses. The courts and the 
criminal justice system more broadly do not directly respond to public opinion or desire 
regarding how crime should be treated; rather, public attitudes ‘are filtered, shaped and 
moderated before they are translated into penal policy’ (Matthews, 2005: 189). Public 
opinion on crime does not emerge in a vacuum, as a fact that policy makers and politicians 
must simply reflect, but as a complex social process that both draws on and actively 
reinforces ideas about crime and punishment that circulate in political rhetoric and in the 
media (Hall et al., 2013 [1978]). Moreover, in many ways, whether or not society actually 
expected or demanded to see a tough punitive reaction was less important than the ability 
to inscribe this punitive impulse on an imagination of ‘the public’. Far from accepting it 
as a straightforward appraisal or reflection of public sentiment, we should look more 
critically at this configuration of the outraged and punitive public, where it emerges, and 
what it allowed practitioners to do and say. I have argued, then, that the ‘tough’ and ‘swift’ 
criminal justice reaction might be better understood as a response to pressures that were 
mediated by and through the media and politicians. It was largely via these institutions 
that ‘the public’ received information about the riots and how the state was responding; 
but it is also through these institutions that those working in the criminal justice system 
built an understanding of what people wanted and expected. Media and political reactions 
to the riots were vital in configuring a fearful and outraged public that practitioners felt 
they were speaking to and for.  
Conclusions 
This chapter has critically examined the claim that society demanded harsh punishment, 
and the putative public consent that was choreographed to justify the courts’ unusual and 
controversial approach to the disturbances. I have explored the ways that criminal justice 
professionals framed the courts’ response to the unrest as ‘sending a message’, not only 
to rioters or those who might have got involved, but – more importantly – to society at 
large. The idea that society expected and demanded to see rioters severely punished worked 
as an important cultural resource that practitioners drew on to legitimise the courts’ 
actions, and to absolve themselves (and the criminal justice system more broadly) of 
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moral responsibility for the incredibly harsh treatment of thousands of people. Claiming 
to represent and act on behalf of society was a means of claiming legitimacy of a particular 
kind; the legitimacy bestowed by acting in accord with ‘common sense’; or giving voice 
to ‘what everyone is thinking’; but we also need to look more closely at what is at stake 
in asserting that ‘the public’ wanted to see such a reaction.  
I have shown how this notion of the punitive public emerged in my interviews with 
criminal justice practitioners, allowing them to subtly shift moral accountability for these 
punitive practices away from the criminal justice system itself and onto the public at large. 
But, as I showed, the courts’ response far surpassed any empirical measure of public 
punitiveness. The courts, then, were not simply reflecting what the public wanted, but 
invoking a peculiarly punitive citizenry. The notion of the public on which practitioners 
drew, and claimed to represent, in fact referred to a very specific public orchestrated and 
imagined through media and political discourses. This public was defined primarily in 
opposition to the rioters and was demarcated along racialised and classed lines. 
The riots offered a screen onto which ongoing anxieties around Britishness, in particular, 
could be projected and its lines redrawn. The disturbances brought to the fore a discourse 
that positioned ‘the rioters’ firmly outside of, and in opposition to, the moral majority. 
This divide between the rioters and the rest of society was cast clearly in terms of the 
nation and national character: the rioters were positioned as outside of the limits of 
community and society, while those who rallied against them and sought to punish them 
were feted as ‘the best of British’. The various punitive responses to the riots – whether 
the courts’ vindictive approach to sentencing or the clean-up operations that became 
coded as white, middle-class citizens ‘reclaiming the streets’ – were celebrated as 
emblematic of a vigorous and resilient national character. This ‘blitz spirit’ rhetoric 
convened and configured a regressive and exclusionary imagination of Britishness, 
defined in opposition to, and based on the exclusion of, the rioters who were positioned 
as racialised others.  
I have mapped out some of the mechanisms through which this cultural configuration of 
the punitive public came to shape practitioners’ accounts of what society wanted, arguing 
that practitioners were not simply responding to public desire for punishment, but to a 
constellation of forces exerted by and mediated through political rhetoric and media 
narratives. Though professionals argued the criminal justice response was concerned 
primarily with meeting society’s expectations, this was inherently entangled with pressures 
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from within the criminal justice system; from central government and from the media. In 
particular, dramatic public proclamations about how the courts would and should 
respond made it very difficult for them to respond in a different, less punitive, way. While 
practitioners’ appeals to the public’s purported desire for punishment provided a 
powerful means of legitimating the courts’ harsh treatment of rioters, the courts’ 
treatment of rioters in fact emerged from a field of intense pressure from many directions. 
Claims to represent a punitive public are potent, productive and self-fulfilling. Politicians 
and media – but, I have shown, also prosecutors, civil servants and judges – stake claims 
to popular legitimacy by positioning themselves ‘solidly in the groove of popular 
thinking’, claiming to simply be articulating ‘“what everybody knows”, takes-for-granted 
and agrees with’ (Hall and O’Shea, 2013). But in fact,  
what they are really doing is not just invoking popular opinion but shaping and 
influencing it so they can harness it in their favour. By asserting that popular opinion 
already agrees, they hope to produce agreement as an effect.  
(Hall and O’Shea, 2013) 
But it is not only that media and political discourses shape public perceptions of crime 
and justice, priming the public to accept and support punitive penal policy. Rather, we 
might better think of public opinion as another part of the looping and spiralling flow of 
collective meanings around crime and justice, whereby political and policy rhetoric, media 
narratives and public opinion constantly interact with and reinforce each other (Ferrell et 
al., 2015), such that we cannot meaningfully separate public opinion from political 
rhetoric or professional discourse. In this way, the logic that rioters must be punished 
works as a kind of ‘amplifying spiral that winds its way back and forth through media 
accounts, situation action and public perception’ (Ferrell et al., 2015: 158). Reframing 
invocations of popular desire for punishment not as a fact but as part of this swirling flow 
of collective meanings around the riots, and as a resource for claiming legitimacy, draws 
attention to why particular meanings have become attached to ‘the public’.  
By staking a claim to reflect what society wants and needs, criminal justice practitioners 
draw on and add to a widespread common sense that positions the criminal justice system 
as an essentially benevolent entity; precluding discussions about whether it actually serves 
the public – and if so, which public. Claiming public support for punitive policy shores 
up the image of the criminal justice system as essentially concerned with public safety; 
while obscuring its actual effects, maintaining and reproducing profound economic, 
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political and social inequalities. Invoking public demands for the criminalisation and 
punishment of disproportionately marginalised, poor and racialised people ‘enable the 
state elite to legitimate itself by “responding to the demands of the “people” while at the 
same time exculpating its own historic responsibility’ in producing and entrenching 
profound social iniquities (Cooper, 2012: 14; citing Wacquant, 2008). By framing the 
punishment of rioters as a response to what the public – figured as monolithically fearful 
and vengeful – wanted, practitioners disavow the criminal justice system’s own 
accountability for reproducing and reinforcing these inequalities.  
Building on my analysis in the previous chapters on the role of ignorance, denial and 
silence in naturalising and normalising the criminal justice response to the riots, I suggest 
that invoking this highly selective idea of the public – one that wants punishment – 
involves actively ignoring and silencing other, more critical, voices that called for different 
kinds of responses to the unrest. Recognising this opens up the possibility of thinking 
about a response to the riots that might have reflected very different kinds of public 
attitudes to the unrest; not motivated by outrage against the rioters but perhaps reflecting 
the well-documented and widely shared frustrations at the roots of the disturbances. 
Rather than legitimising more law and order, listening to this public would necessitate a 
state response that actually addressed the structural and systemic inequalities that the 
courts’ response ignored and silenced. But doing so would require a different set of 
cultural resources from those that came to shape the 2011 response.  
Further developing this argument, the next chapter focuses in on one particularly violent 
aspect of the criminal justice response to the riots – the handing out of custodial sentences 
– to explore in more depth the moral and political complexities of the law and order 
reaction to the riots, and to think through how practitioners who designed and delivered 







Justifying imprisonment: Denial and disavowal in judges 
and magistrates’ accounts of sentencing 
 
As a purely personal view, I hate prison… If I was convinced that prison had no deterrent 
effect, I’d think it was a cruel thing to do, an unnecessary thing to do. 
Leonard, District Judge, London 
Introduction  
Over the preceding chapters I have discussed how criminal justice practitioners drew on 
and reproduced very particular understandings of the riots, the rioters and the public, 
showing how they positioned their work as vitally important, fair, and legitimate. In this 
final empirical chapter, I turn my focus to how practitioners invoke different imaginations 
of the criminal justice system itself – and prisons, in particular – that allow them to 
normalise and justify the imprisonment of thousands of people in the wake of the riots. 
I argue that agnosis is vital in allowing practitioners to frame custodial sentences as an 
appropriate and just response to the disturbances. By disavowing responsibility for 
sentencing decisions, denying the harms inflicted by custodial sentences and ignoring the 
structural inequalities that prison exacerbates, professionals who had been centrally 
important in imprisoning rioters were able to normalise and justify this strikingly violent 
penal reaction to the unrest.
The prison was absolutely crucial to the state’s response to the disturbances. Both the 
courts’ punitive approach to remand and the startlingly widespread use of custodial 
sentences handed down to those convicted, meant that prisons served both as holding 
pens and as sites of exceedingly harsh punishment.  Over half of those arrested for 
involvement in the disturbances (including those arrested for minor offences) were 
remanded to custody; compared to around ten per cent of people arrested for the most 
serious offences in normal circumstances (Curtis, 2011). The courts’ approach to 
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sentencing was even more severe: 66 per cent of those convicted of riot-related offences 
were sentenced to immediate custody (an increase of 24 per cent compared to similar 
offences in 2010), serving sentences on average four times longer than comparable crimes 
would attract in non-riot contexts (Ministry of Justice, 2012a). 
Almost as soon as the first defendants were sentenced (while the disturbances were 
ongoing) serious concerns were raised about not only the length of the sentences being 
given, but the way that sentencing decisions were being made and sentencing policy 
formulated. There was a great deal of controversy around judges purporting to issue 
‘guidelines’ on sentencing to other judges: Judge Andrew Gilbart QC, the first judge to 
pass sentences on riot-related cases, stated that riot offences were ‘outside the usual 
context of criminality’ and so should receive harsher sentences than those the sentencing 
guidelines set out and listed suggested sentences for a range of offences, prompting 
England and Wales’s most senior judge, the Lord Chief Justice Igor Judge, to call this a 
‘recipe for chaos’ (Binham, 2011). The week after the riots, the chair of Camberwell 
Green magistrates’ court, Novello Noades, claimed to have received a ‘government 
directive’ to sentence rioters to prison; a claim she quickly retracted in the face of an 
outcry about the compromise of judicial independence (Baird, 2011). Yet a freedom of 
information request revealed there had been direction from the Courts and Tribunals 
Service in the form of an email sent to justices’ clerks38 the week of the riots, instructing 
them to advise magistrates to disregard the sentencing guidelines (Bowcott, 2011b). It 
was also reported that the Metropolitan Police asked the government to take steps to 
ensure that sentencing was adequately harsh: a Metropolitan Police deputy assistant 
commissioner expressed ‘disappointment’ among the police about some of the early 
sentences handed out, which they felt were too lax, and said that the police had agreed 
with the Home Secretary the need for sentences to ‘reflect the crimes and the hugely 
devastating impact on the people of London’ (Ford Rojas et al., 2011).  
Two of the most widely reported cases were those of Perry Sutcliffe-Keenan and Jordan 
Blackshaw, aged 22 and 20. The young men, who had no prior convictions, were each 
sentenced to four-year custodial sentences for setting up Facebook pages to arrange ‘riots’ 
in their respective hometowns of Warrington and Northwich. In both cases, the posts 
had been quickly removed and no unrest broke out in either location (Travis, 2011). These 
 
38 Justices’ clerks are lawyers employed by Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service and provide 
legal advice to magistrates.  
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sentences were extraordinary when compared to sentencing in non-riot contexts, in 
comparison to earlier disturbances, and even in relation to the sentencing of other ‘rioters’ 
in 2011. As the Guardian pointed out, had the two men left home and actually taken part 
in a riot, it is likely they would have been charged with violent disorder, an offence which 
during the riots attracted an average sentence of 25.7 months; significantly shorter than 
the four-year sentences the two men received (Travis, 2011). Highlighting the harshness 
of the sentences in comparison to the approach taken in previous riots, Jordan 
Blackshaw’s lawyer pointed out that following the 2001 Bradford riots similar sentences 
were handed to ‘those carrying crossbows and wielding scaffolding poles’ (cited in 
Bowcott, 2011a). To qualify for a four-year sentence in ordinary circumstances, one 
would have to commit an offence such as kidnapping (with an average sentence of 47 
months in 2010), killing someone while drink driving (45 months), or sexual assault (48 
months) (Travis, 2011). 
The exceptionally harsh approach to sentencing was vindicated and encouraged by Lord 
Judge’s Court of Appeal judgement in October 2011. The ‘Facebook rioters’, along with 
eight others, appealed against the ‘manifestly excessive’ custodial sentences they had 
received (Travis, 2011); eight of these sentences, including Blackshaw and Sutcliffe-
Keenan’s, were upheld. The Court determined that those who deliberately participated in 
the disturbances had committed aggravated crimes; that the sentencing guidelines did not 
take into account the riot context and could be departed from; and that sentencers should 
impose severe sentences intended to punish and deter (Lightowlers and Quirk, 2015). As 
a result of the large numbers of people arrested, the extraordinary approach to 
prosecution and remand, and the high rates at which custodial sentences were imposed, 
in the wake of the riots the already-overcrowded prison system in England and Wales 
was stretched beyond precedent, rising above 88,000 for the first time in history in 
December 2011 (Prison Reform Trust, 2011a). A year on from the riots, there were still 
692 people in prison for riot offences, including those on remand (Rogers, 2012).  
For some practitioners, custodial sentences seemed a somewhat obvious and 
unproblematic response to an exceptional breach of law and order, requiring little further 
justification. But for others the imprisonment of rioters posed perhaps the most serious 
challenge to their efforts to present the response to the riots as reasonable and 
proportionate. For those whose work brought them into close proximity with the prison, 
especially, it played an often complex and contradictory role, their professional positions 
putting them in the distinctly uncomfortable position of delivering a response that they 
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felt was either ineffective or immoral. I show how those involved in sentencing rioters to 
prison and those responsible for managing the prison system used techniques of denial 
and disavowal to manage the cognitive and moral dissonance that their role in 
imprisonment posed, allowing them to justify and rationalise a profoundly violent, 
discriminatory and ineffective reaction to urban unrest. Drawing on Scott’s (2018) notion 
of ‘penal agnosis’ and building on work by researchers who have noted how political and 
media discourses distort and diminish the harm and suffering that prisons inflict upon 
those inside (Mason, 2006; Stanley and Mihaere, 2018), I argue that ignorance and denial, 
in various forms, are vital in allowing practitioners to legitimise prison as the primary 
response to the unrest.  
This chapter builds on the arguments I have developed in the previous chapters. In 
Chapter 4 I showed how framing the riots as a law and order issue, and forgetting or 
ignoring the political content of the events, paved the way for a harsh law and order 
response. The discourses around the meaning – or meaninglessness – of the riots licensed 
and legitimised a response that aimed simply to remove, contain and punish the 
‘criminals’, rather than seeking to understand or address the structural or systemic context 
in which they occurred. Here I show how the prison epitomises this exclusionary impulse. 
While Chapter 6 focused on how media and political pressures for a ‘tough response’ 
came to be understood as public demands for punishment; in this chapter I explore why 
the prison in particular seemed to meet this need for a strong show of state power. In 
Chapter 5 I suggested that practitioners drew on and subtly reinforced racialised and 
classed imaginations of crime and criminality that positioned ‘the typical rioter’ as 
somehow inevitably or naturally entangled in the criminal justice system. This chapter 
builds on this analysis, showing how practitioners’ accounts ignored but also normalised 
and naturalised the starkly racialised and classed lines along which the prison targets 
populations.  
The chapter is divided into three parts, each examining a distinct way in which 
practitioners’ accounts mobilised forms of ignorance and denial to legitimise the courts’ 
widespread use of custodial sentences in the wake of the riots. First I trace how 
participants used detached, abstract and bureaucratic language and logic that transformed 
the mass imprisonment of rioters from a political or ethical question into a technical 
problem that required relatively little moral consideration. In Part 2 I draw on my 
discussion with district judge Leonard, identifying how his self-exculpatory account 
allowed him to deny and disavow responsibility for the incarceration of rioters. In Part 3 
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I show how practitioners effectively minimised and obscured the profound harms 
inflicted by prison, and in particular, elide the starkly racialised and classed dimensions of 
this harm.  
Part 1. ‘That is their job’: Disavowing responsibility for 
imprisonment 
In this part of the chapter I show how prosecutors Amar and Kofi, and civil servant 
Martin, absolved themselves of responsibility for the imprisonment of ‘rioters’. While 
prosecutors were able to position themselves at a distance from prisons and disavow 
responsibility for its harms, for others more closely implicated in imprisonment, like 
Martin, framing his role in strictly technical or logistical terms allowed him to obscure the 
profoundly political and ethical complexities of his work. Drawing on Bauman’s (2000a 
[1989], 2000b) concepts of social distantiation and bureaucratic rationality, I argue that 
these processes enabled practitioners to effectively neutralise the profound moral burden 
of incarcerating thousands of people in the wake of the riots.  
In Chapter 4 I argued that framing the riots as an unprecedented outburst of unprovoked 
violence was a powerful means of legitimising a punitive penal response. For some 
practitioners, like prosecutor Amar, the widespread use of prison sentences to punish 
riot-related offences was simply a proportionate and appropriate response to these highly 
unusual events. I asked Amar if he had any apprehensions about the extent to which 
prison sentences were handed down in the wake of the riots: 
Chloe: Was there any concern that custodial sentences were being used perhaps too 
widely?  
Amar: Not really. I think we as a collective, I think we all took the view that the sentences 
were tough… you know, three weeks, four weeks’ custodial sentence39 immediately 
imposed. But I don’t think we thought it was bizarre or anything. We just thought, well, 
that’s what met the circumstances at the time. 
 
39 The average custodial sentence handed down for riot-related offences was in fact 17.1 months 
(Ministry of Justice, 2012a). 
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For Amar, the unusually long prison sentences were ‘tough’ but not concerning; simply a 
rational and justified response to the riots themselves; and, in particular, their unique 
character: 
They were very unique circumstances. I don’t know how else the criminal justice system 
was supposed to respond to it. 
In this sense Amar simply did not see the prosecution practices that ultimately led to 
prison as morally complex, let alone ‘dirty’ work for which he had to account. In part, I 
argue, this was because as a prosecutor, Amar did not see himself or his organisation as 
bearing the burden of responsibility for sentencing or for the administration of sentences.  
Chloe: To what extent would you, as the CPS or as prosecutors in court, to what extent, 
and forgive my ignorance, do you have a kind of a say around sentencing or, 
Amar: (overlapping) Well we don’t, we don’t have, we don’t generally. Our job at that 
time- and we do have a bit more say about sentencing as time’s gone on, but sentencing 
is generally the province of the magistrates or the Crown Court judges, that is their job. 
Our job is to charge cases. 
Although he qualified this somewhat – ‘When it comes to sentencing, we will make 
representations, so you mustn’t, you know, say to you that we don’t have any role; we do, 
we do have a role in sentencing’ – for Amar this was not really his responsibility.  
Similarly, When I asked prosecutor Kofi whether he had any concerns about the 
suitability of prosecution and sentencing decisions that had led to so many going to 
prison, he seemed to find it easy to brush this off: 
Chloe: Were there any cases that either you worked on or you remember hearing about, 
where you did think ‘that was too harsh’… in terms of either deciding to prosecute, or 
the sentencing? 
Kofi: Not really, no (laughing) 
Like Amar, Kofi was clear that the sentences handed down were beyond prosecutors’ 
remit: 
Chloe: Do you kind of get a sense of whether the sentences that people get as a kind of 
end result, whether they do have a deterrent effect, or rehabilitation, or? 
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Kofi: That’s not really a question for me; it’s more a question for probation, who actually 
see these people through, past sentence… I would only see those people again if they re-
offend and come back into the system. And unless it’s a name that stands out, or I actually 
recognise them: ‘hold on a minute, I remember this guy from last year when I prosecuted 
him.’  
For Kofi, moreover, he simply did not know what happened to people whose cases he 
had prosecuted and would only find out were he to recognise them in a future case.  
Though the CPS made extraordinary decisions about prosecution that directly fed into 
the penal backlash (Lightowlers and Quirk, 2015) I argue that the separation of 
prosecutors from the end results of their work, and from prisons in particular, enables 
prosecutors to distance themselves from and disavow responsibility for the punishment 
of rioters. For Kofi and Amar, the defined boundaries of their professional roles as 
prosecutors seemed to relieve them of the moral burden of the eventual outcomes of 
cases, and to position their work in singularly positive terms. As Amar put it, what 
happened to defendants beyond the stage of prosecution was simply not his 
responsibility: ‘that is their job. Our job is to charge cases.’  
David Green argues that the ‘bureaucratic compartmentalisation of the systems of 
criminal justice ensures that no single individual group holds any sufficient responsibility’ 
for the harmful cumulative effects of punishment (Green, 2015: 57). Rather, the strict 
division of labour allows criminal justice professionals and organisations to remain ‘cogs 
in a great machine’ (Weber, 1968), in which ‘everyone and no one’ is responsible for 
punishment (Green, 2015: 57). The estrangement of practitioners like Amar and Kofi 
from the practice of punishment and the prison itself ‘reduces, thins down and compresses 
the view’ (Bauman, 2000b: 27) of those whose lives are impacted by criminalisation and 
punishment, and in particular, the pain that prisons inflict on them. For those whose 
work keeps them on the peripheries of the prison, the inherent ineffectiveness and 
violence of prison can simply be overlooked or disregarded, ‘simply not discussed or 
treated in the context of the functioning of the penal system as a whole. The prison as 
such is conveniently forgotten’ (Mathiesen, 2006: 144). 
Transforming prison into a logistical problem 
For other professionals who were more directly responsible for imprisonment – either as 
sentencers or within the prison system itself – this kind of ‘convenient forgetting’ was 
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impossible. Instead, I argue, it was necessary to confront the prison head-on, 
acknowledging the complexities it posed and finding means to legitimise it.  
Martin, a senior civil servant at HM Prison and Probation Service positioned his work in 
bureaucratic and logistical terms that enabled him to rationalise and normalise the 
imprisonment of rioters despite his personal misgivings. When Martin and I met, having 
been put in contact by the chief executive of his department, Martin was in his last week 
in the job, leaving the civil service to take up a role in the private prison sector. Martin 
had joined the prison service as a graduate on a fast-track scheme, he told me (‘it doesn’t 
sound very fast, you know: six years of taught input, and six years to “realise your 
potential”, apparently’) starting as a prison officer and working his way up to become a 
junior prison governor. After this Martin had moved into the civil service, taking up 
national policy and operations roles relating to the prison system, and in 2011 he had 
been responsible overseeing the functions of the prison system in processing those 
remanded and sentenced to custody for riot-related offences. Martin’s account of that 
time was, on the whole, a measured and dispassionate description of the practical 
challenges that the riots had posed for the prison service. But there was also a hesitancy 
in Martin’s recollection of the time. For Martin, his personal opinion on the efficacy of 
the sentences handed out to rioters was at odds with the way the courts had sentenced so 
many to custody:  
My personal opinion is that short sentences don’t tend to work very well (laughing)… 
Often what we do is we take people who do abnormal things, we put them in an abnormal 
place, we do abnormal things to them in terms of programmes and activity, and then we 
shoot them out the other end of it saying ‘Well, you’re normal now.’ 
For Martin, then, there was an uncomfortable mismatch between his personal opinion 
that prison sentences often don’t work, and the job he was doing in managing and 
facilitating these same sentences. Martin navigated this tension in a number of ways. First, 
he drew a clear distinction between his own view and what needed to be done: ‘I think 
you have to separate your personal opinion about the use of custody from what was right 
at the time’. In particular, the criminal justice system needed to be seen to be reacting 
decisively: 
Short sentences don’t tend to work as well as community sentences, interestingly… But 
at the time was it the right response? I think yeah, actually. Because how could you be 
seen to be doing anything else?  
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Martin argued that the criminal justice system had little choice but to hand down custodial 
sentences since they were the only adequately serious response to the riots. Invoking the 
putative public demand for punitive sentences, as I argued in Chapter 6, allowed 
practitioners like Martin to disavow personal responsibility for imprisoning ‘rioters’, 
instead allowing them to position the harsh sentences as an unfortunate but inevitable 
outcome.  
For Martin, it was custodial sentences in particular that provided an adequately severe 
response to the unrest, demonstrating to the public that the criminal justice system was 
taking the disturbances seriously. Imprisonment provides a peculiarly ‘dramatic, tangible 
and visible’ means of showing the state to be ‘tough, resourceful, and above all, “doing 
something”’ to ensure safety and security (Bauman, 2000b: 37). In Chapter 4 I argued 
that the prevailing narrative both in popular discourse and in my conversations with some 
practitioners positioned the disturbances as a frightening outburst of meaningless 
violence, and in Chapter 5 I showed how practitioners invoked shared imaginations of 
the majority of ‘rioters’ as almost inherently or inevitably predisposed to crime. It is 
against this cultural and political backdrop that the courts’ extraordinarily harsh approach 
to remand and sentencing came to make sense. When the disturbances were defined not 
as a symptom of broader social or political problems but as the act of a group of 
irresponsible and violent individuals, physically removing those people to ‘spaces they 
cannot escape’ (Bauman, 2000b: 39) seems to offer a logical and powerful response, and 
publicly legible proof that something was being done to deal with the disturbances. 
Defining crime and criminals in such depoliticised and decontextualised terms means that 
prison appears to provide a seemingly simple solution. 
For a criminal justice system that felt under immense pressure to demonstrate its 
authority, the spectacle and immediacy of handing down prison sentences ‘matters more 
than their effectiveness’ (Bauman, 2000b: 37). But, regardless of its appeal as a show of 
state power, the widespread use of custody posed a serious challenge for practitioners 
whose experience and expertise meant that they knew that the response would likely be 
ineffective at best, and at worst deeply harmful. This uncomfortable position, I argue, 
required a set of practices of denial that allowed practitioners to distance themselves from 
the harms of prison. For Martin, the bureaucratic framework in which he worked seemed 
to provide a layer of insulation from the profound moral and ethical dilemmas of working 
within a system that he felt was in large part ineffective.  
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Martin explained his role in 2011: 
I was in charge of what was called ‘OSING’ – so, Operational Services and Interventions 
Group – at the time, and part of that was responsibility for population management and 
incident engagement.  
In this role Martin headed up the Ministry of Justice’s ‘gold suite’, the unit responsible 
for co-ordinating the centralised national response to major incidents, bringing together 
staff from the police, the probation service, the courts, and other partner organisations. 
The role had two key tasks, Martin explained: 
One, just be able to respond, because we expected lots of police remand and courts to 
create a sort of bump up in our population of remand prisoners. But also then in the 
aftermath, how were we going to logistically manage what would be a sort of big inflow 
of maybe several thousand people going through the courts, and then into prisons as a 
result of that.  
Martin’s job was to ‘make sure that we were set up to do that in the early days, in order 
to set the platform for doing that in a stable way thereafter’. As much as dealing with the 
immediate ‘inflow’ of remand prisoners, Martin’s team was responsible for the longer-
term project of dealing with the processing of those convicted. ‘That’s when our work 
really begins’, he explained, ‘because that’s when you’re pushing people through the 
courts, into prisons.’ His team, he said, was well set up to ‘manipulate the capacity’ of the 
prison system to deal with this increase: 
We have our PECS [prison escort and custody services] contracts, so we have a PECS 
contractor [that] is really slick at these things… They know how to manipulate the 
capacity around the system. We always know where we can deploy contingency spaces. 
The systems and processes in place meant that the prison system was able to ‘click back 
into pretty routine business, really, just with a few extra people’, as Martin put it:  
I mean, I wouldn’t want to underplay that it caused difficulty, because it did, but it didn’t 
cause catastrophic change in strategic direction… Whilst there would be a sort of peak 
in the population in prisons and on community orders, effectively in the short term, that 
would trail off… The main rump was quite quick in terms of working its way through 
the system.  
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Martin’s emphasis on the normality and routineness of the detention of rioters seemed 
to position the penal response as ordinary, unexceptional and unproblematic: the riots 
were a ‘moment in time’, Martin said, primarily a logistical challenge that was incorporated 
into the prison system’s broader ‘strategic direction.’ I was particularly struck by the 
bureaucratic and technical language that Martin used to describe his work. His team had 
been concerned with the ‘logistical management of people from place to place’, as he 
explained it; describing those sent to prison as an inflow, an influx, a population, even a 
‘rump’; and articulated the problem in terms of volume and backlog, systems, processes, 
flows and management.  
Drawing on Bauman’s (2000a [1989]) analysis of the vital role of the logic and language 
of bureaucratic processes in facilitating and normalising profound acts of violence40, I 
argue that the detached, abstract terms that Martin used to talk about the courts’ and 
prisons’ reaction to the riots obscured and obfuscated the profound political and moral 
implications of his work, effectively neutralising its potential taint. For Martin, the 
management and coordination of the imprisonment of thousands of people – many for 
minor offences, many of them children and teenagers – was transformed into a logistical 
puzzle for civil servants to solve. When Martin talked about the problems in prisons, 
acknowledging that the sentences handed down would likely be ineffective – ‘we put them 
in an abnormal place, we do abnormal things to them’ – the solution was cast in terms of 
adjusting the process: ‘the more we can actually normalise people’s transition through the 
criminal justice system, the better’. The technical, overtly politically ‘neutral’, jargon-laden 
language of policy makers and managers belies and obscures the deeply political and 
problematic work they are engaged in; providing the moral distance that allows them to 
ignore the harm and human suffering inherent in their work. Rather than requiring 
 
40 See also Green (2015) who argues that the same social processes that Bauman identifies as 
having enabled the Holocaust serve to perpetuate the monstrous growth of the American prison 
system. Through diminishing the public’s emotional proximity to, and sense of moral 
responsibility for, ‘collective human mistreatment’ the twin processes of bureaucratic rationality 
and social distantiation function to facilitate American society’s tolerance or acceptance of (and 
even support or enthusiasm for) extraordinarily expansive penal policy; and public indifference 
to the suffering it engenders. In his later work, Bauman also develops this connection between 
the Holocaust and prison, noting the functional parallels of prisons and concentration camps in 




professionals to think in moral, ethical or political terms about the eventual effects of the 
work they are engaged in, the management of prisoners is framed as technical problem, 
calling for ‘better, more rational designs, not for soul-searching’ (Bauman, 2000a [1989]: 
195). Bauman’s concepts help to make sense of how criminal justice practitioners like 
Martin came to understand the imprisonment of ‘rioters’ as largely unremarkable, or as 
unpleasant but ultimately necessary or inevitable. Approaching the imprisonment of 
rioters as solely a logistical challenge, I argue, allowed Martin to ignore its deeply 
problematic aspects, and to legitimise it as key response to the unrest. 
Part 2. Sentencing the rioters: Denying moral responsibility for 
the harms of prison 
In this part of the chapter I turn to my interviews with sentencers Leonard and David, 
who unlike prosecutors and civil servants, were directly responsible for imposing 
custodial sentences, to examine how they navigated the moral complexities of the prison. 
For retired district judge Leonard, in particular, techniques of denial were crucial in 
allowing him to obscure and deflect from the profound harms his sentencing work 
implicated him in, to rationalise and resolve the dissonance he felt about prison, and 
ultimately to disavow the burden of moral responsibility for imprisoning rioters. 
At the outset of our conversation, Leonard was overwhelmingly positive about how 
magistrates’ courts had responded to the riots. He praised the justices’ clerks, the court 
administrators, defence lawyers and the Crown Prosecution Service as well as the district 
judges and magistrates. In terms of sentencing, Leonard was very clear that the judges 
and magistrates dealing with riots cases had ‘got it right’. In part, Leonard drew on the 
same technique as civil servant Martin, invoking public demands for harsh punishment. 
As I argued in Chapter 6, Leonard’s claim that ‘society expected condign punishment’ 
and that ‘people would be outraged if a person didn’t go to prison’ was an important 
means of legitimising the courts’ punitive reaction to the riots. This idea that it was really 
the public who wanted harsh prison sentences, and the judiciary really had little choice 
but to reflect this public punitiveness, also echoed through Leonard’s broader account of 
the rising rates of imprisonment in recent years. ‘There undoubtedly has been a trend to 
lock up more people,’ he told me: ‘I mean, the figures are undeniable on that.’ But for 
Leonard this increase, too, could largely be explained in terms of public punitiveness. A 
key driver behind the increase in the prison population in recent years was the 
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introduction of sentencing guidelines, in various guises from the 1980s onwards, which 
Leonard thought had removed the ability of judges to use their individual discretion to 
sentence leniently.  
Every time we developed a guideline on the panel we’d send it out for consultation. And 
by and large the response would be ‘This is wet, you’ve got to tighten it up.’ 
For Leonard, it was the public who had compelled the judiciary into imposing harsher 
punishments by calling for sentencing guidelines to be ‘tightened up’. The idea of the 
punitive public again acts as a decoy onto which those in positions of responsibility can 
transfer accountability for punitive criminal justice practices.  
Alongside this emphasis on public punitiveness, Leonard was keen to highlight the 
relative leniency of the courts’ approach to sentencing in 2011, appealing to other times 
and places in which, he said, courts would have taken a more punitive stance: 
Judges, Crown Court judges and high court judges particularly, are far more liberal than 
the generation that went before me. There were lots of quite punitive people in the sixties 
and seventies. 
As Leonard pointed out, going further back in England’s history, his predecessor’s 
response to riots in London in 1780 had been much more severe:  
There were condign punishments when the Chief Magistrate’s office was burned in the 
Gordon riots.41 The fourteen-year-old who was caught was hanged on a lamppost nearby. 
We didn’t do that. 
Other practitioners similarly juxtaposed the criminal justice response to the 2011 riots 
with other, supposedly less liberal, reactions. Prosecutor Amar had recalled that during 
the 2011 riots in Croydon there had been: 
police officers standing by watching as [the rioters] were busy throwing petrol bombs at 
cars, so they’re sort of trying to contain it. Whereas in other groups of society, or 
 
41 The 1780 Gordon riots were London’s ‘longest-lasting and perhaps most terrifying’ riots 
(Mullan, 2001), a week of violence sparked by proposed legislation granting greater freedom to 
Catholics. Crowds destroyed Catholic religious buildings, attacked the Bank of England and 
released prisoners from jails. In response, 15,000 troops were brought into London to quell the 
disturbances and nearly 300 rioters were shot dead. 
Justifying imprisonment 
 175 
countries, whether it would have been dealt with in a different way, perhaps far more 
severe, there would have been water cannons and all sorts. So our approach is very 
different here. 
David, who had been a Magistrate in 2011, was likewise adamant that:  
the British justice system is one of the best in the world, if not the best in the world, 
warts and all. So the way in which these riots were handled in this country, I know how 
they would have been handled in many other countries. On the ground there would have 
been people more seriously hurt and loss of life. 
Comparing the criminal justice response to the 2011 riots to other, more violent, 
responses – whether in other jurisdictions or at earlier historical moments – was a way of 
‘recalibrating’ or ‘adjusting the implicit standards’ (Ashforth and Kreiner, 1999) by which 
the courts’ response to 2011 was measured. This effectively cast the courts’ actions in 
2011 as moderate and restrained, drawing attention away from the violence and excess 
that was inherent in imprisoning so many people. 
Having begun on a rather defensive tone, highlighting the judiciary’s liberal position 
relative to the public and compared to judges in the past, Leonard became much more 
contemplative as we talked. When I asked him what he thought about the widespread use 
of custodial sentences as a response to the riots later in our discussion, I was surprised by 
his response. After a few seconds of consideration, he told me: ‘As a purely personal view, 
I hate prison’. This was a striking statement when the magistrates’ courts’ response to the 
riots had been remarkably punitive and had handed out prison sentences for often minor 
offences. For Leonard to say he hated prison suggested a significant tension between his 
own values and his professional actions.  
In part Leonard’s feelings about prisons had been shaped by his personal familiarity with 
them. Leonard had had relatives in jail in the past:  
My brother, last time I saw him, was in prison; other family members, and so on. So you 
know, I’ve got quite a lot of experience, one way or another. 
These profound cleavages between ‘purely personal views’, which might be highly critical 
about custody as a response to crime, and professional cultures, policies and practices 
that maintain the central position of prisons in the criminal justice system, I argue, require 
professionals to find ways to manage this tension, which I explore below. By framing his 
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work as vindicated by a larger network of (highly credible and knowledgeable) 
professionals; as the only feasible option; and as necessary for deterrence, Leonard was 
able in some ways to neutralise and manage his intensely contradictory and complex 
feelings about the morality of imprisonment.  
The judiciary as a thought community 
Leonard was surprisingly pragmatic about the process that judges go through to decide 
on prison as a punishment:  
I don’t want to be too philosophical about this. You don’t sit there in each individual 
case sort of weighing these things in your mind. You have the experience. I’ve probably 
sentenced ten thousand people in my life. You know, they come in front of you, you put 
together the facts and you try and treat them the same way as everybody else in treating 
everybody else… So, we don’t on each individual case sit there thinking about what the 
pros and cons of prison [are]. 
This acknowledgment that judges do not systematically consider the ‘pros and cons of 
prison’ or the likely implications of a custodial sentence on a defendant was surprising to 
me. It was revealing of a deeply ingrained penal common-sense whereby prisons are seen 
as the automatic and default response to crime, one that is so natural and obvious as to 
need no positive rationale or justification. It also spoke to an entrenched organisational 
ideology that pushed judges to toe the line regardless of their own personal opinions. 
Leonard might have ‘hated prison’, but was clear that this would not radically change his 
approach to sentencing: 
I don’t really approve of judges who go off on a tangent on their own and do things 
differently. You don’t want a view to grow up that if you appear in front of judge ‘A’ 
you’ll get probation, and judge ‘B’ you’ll get four years. You don’t want that, so you go 
along, if you like, a common line… Because we’re a fairly tight-knit group… a common 
view does tend to develop. And people who are out of line are very gently, sometimes, 
made aware of that.  
The judiciary, in this sense, seems to work as a powerful ‘thought community’ (Douglas, 
1986) that works to define itself and create a highly selective narrative about its own work. 
Situating himself as part of a wider group with which he had to fit in provided Leonard 
with an effective means of disavowing individual responsibility for his sentencing 
decisions. This appeal to the need for consistency with his colleagues worked as an 
important means of resolving the tension that Leonard identified between his ‘personal 
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views’, which were critical of prison, and the continuing centrality of imprisonment in his 
professional role. Leonard emphasised the credibility of the judiciary as a moral 
community to which he was happy to defer. Judges – particularly those who, like Leonard, 
had practiced as defence lawyers – had real experience of prisons:  
We’re the ones who’ve been in the cells, we’re the ones who’ve been running up and 
down the stairs in the court… You know, we’ve got all that experience… All my judges, 
nearly all my judges, are independent prison adjudicators and go to prisons very 
frequently and see prisoners in prison.42 
Judges, then, are positioned as a credible and authoritative community. For Leonard, 
there had been ‘universal agreement’ among judges that rioters should go to prison: 
There was I think pretty well universal agreement that this was a severe public disorder, 
that the existing sentencing guidelines didn’t really cater for riot and that people actually 
arrested in the riots were, if they were clearly guilty, almost certainly going to receive a 
custodial sentence. 
Being ‘in line with’ this community of judges also offered potent retrospective 
justification for sentencers’ decisions. Leonard also pointed out that fellow judges in the 
higher courts had vindicated magistrates’ courts’ sentencing decisions: 
We had no sentencing guidance at all, really until the Lord Chief gave a decision in a case 
called Blackwood or something similar43 in October… We got it right. If you look at that 
seminal decision of the Lord Chief Justice, we were sentencing within, almost entirely 
and exactly within the range that the Lord Chief later said was right.  
Magistrate David made a similar point, stating that magistrates’ courts’ decisions are 
overwhelmingly upheld on appeal and that in the wake of the riots ‘the sentencing 
philosophy of magistrates was supported, generally speaking, in the Crown Courts, and 
if it ever went further than that, was supported at a higher level.’ For Leonard and David 
as sentencers, situating themselves within a wider community who agreed that sentencing 
 
42 Some judges, in contrast, will have less direct experience of prisons. Though judges are required 
to visit prison and probation services once (though some older judges may not have even done 
this bare minimum) these visits are announced and planned for, unlike inspections; similarly when 
lawyers visit prisons they may only see conference areas (Dyer, 2001). 
43 R v Blackshaw (EWCA Crim. 2312; [2012] 1 WLR 1126., 2011)  
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rioters to prison was right – legally if not according to their personal moral codes – 
seemed to provide a means of lightening the load of their responsibility.  
There is no alternative 
Leonard’s positioning of custodial sentences as the only feasible option available to judges 
worked to frame prison as necessary and inevitable, and to minimise personal 
responsibility for imposing such sentences. 
As Leonard explained, the structure within which judges work is that ‘you do not send 
someone into prison if there is an alternative’. But in the context of the decimation of 
community sentences, judges were left with little alternative but to sentence to custody: 
There is, I’m afraid, considerable lack of confidence among the judiciary that I work with, 
that any form of rehabilitative penalty actually works. There’s a fear which I think is 
worse now than it was in 2011, that you know, probation is broken and that you know, 
frankly if you were imposing a sentence other than a custodial sentence it wasn’t going 
to be in any way effective… This is all fairly unscientific and anecdotal, but it feeds back 
into the way you think. 
For Leonard, the problems facing the probation service meant that judges simply had no 
choice but to sentence to custody. Prison was, in practice, a last resort: ‘I suppose a typical 
decision is, is there any realistic alternative to prison? If there is, that’s where you go.’ But 
these alternatives to custody, said Leonard, were often ineffective: 
What you’re often faced with in the magistrates’ court is someone who’s been through 
the alternatives, erm, hasn’t responded to them, very often hasn’t undertaken the courses, 
just not bothered. What’s the point in imposing another community order they’re not 
going to do, and that’s not going to stop them offending?  
Moreover, Leonard pointed to the fact that judges sometimes were faced with people 
who wanted to go to prison: 
In private practice as a defence lawyer, of course, I came across plenty of people who 
were content to be in prison for a period of time. It took them away from pressures 
outside.  
In some ways this seems the starkest disavowal of judicial responsibility of all, suggesting 
that some of those he had sentenced to prison would willingly have chosen that outcome. 
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Retired magistrate David had similar recollections. Magistrates had to consider 
alternatives to custody, he said: 
But what do you do when a forty-two-year-old man is standing in front of you and says 
‘Send me back to prison?’… Why did he say that? Well, it was getting near Christmas, 
he’d have a home for Christmas, he’d have no bills to pay and he’d have three square 
meals a day… The alternatives [to custody] were limited because his reasons for going 
back were perfectly understandable. 
This kind of anecdote points to the urgent need for radical changes in social and 
economic organisation, and investment in meaningful social justice rather than criminal 
justice – a prison sentence is an entirely inadequate (and likely counter-productive) 
response to homelessness, unemployment or hunger; the pressures that might lead people 
to seek respite from their lives ‘outside’.  
Positioning prison as the only available option seemed to work to relieve judges of 
responsibility of imposing prison sentences, but this is also a highly simplistic and 
selective formulation of the purposes of the criminal justice system itself. As Leonard 
explained, sentencers grappled with a constant tension between ‘punishment’ and 
‘rehabilitation’: 
The law… sets out the purposes of sentencing, but it doesn’t give precedence to any 
one… So on any given day a judge or a bench of magistrates is having to say, well, you 
know, ‘Do we go for punishment here, or do we go for rehabilitation?’ 
When ‘rehabilitation’ is stripped of any real meaning beyond the decimated non-custodial 
sentences available to the courts, ‘punishment’ becomes the only viable option. Prison is 
the automatic, default response; one that requires no active rationale or justification other 
than that there are no alternatives. The stripping back and warping of the notion of justice 
into this formulation, ‘if not ‘non-custodial’ then prison,’ occludes discussions about what 
meaningful justice might mean. In the wake of the riots, justice might have meant 
addressing the structural and systemic inequalities that seemed to underpin the events. 
Even within narrower terms, meaningfully restorative approaches that addressed the 
needs and wants of those harmed in the unrest would have looked very different. Prison 
can only make sense as a response to this situation within the context of a judicial 
discourse that maintains an incredibly narrow and simplistic division between 
rehabilitation on the one hand (in the form of an underfunded and overstretched 
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probation service) and punishment (i.e. prison) on the other. By selectively framing 
custodial sentences as the only choice open to judges, Leonard was able to mitigate the 
weight of responsibility for imposing such sentences. 
Invoking the deterrent value of prison  
Besides the lack of available alternatives to custody, what allowed Leonard to position 
the prison as the only appropriate response to the disturbances was its supposedly unique 
deterrent role. For Leonard, the idea that locking up rioters would bring down crime rates 
(despite, as he acknowledges, this idea being refuted by research on the topic) was a 
powerful ideological means of dealing with profoundly uncomfortable ambivalence 
around his own work.  
I have to say, that if I was convinced that prison had no deterrent effect, I’d think it was 
a cruel thing to do, an unnecessary thing to do… I’m not really a believer in punishment 
unless it can be shown to have a deterrent effect. 
Although he ‘hated’ prison, Leonard said, ‘I’m, however, one of those old reactionaries 
who does believe in deterrence, unlike my academic colleagues’. He did not hesitate to 
acknowledge that ‘the weight of opinion is against me’ on the question of deterrence; that 
the idea of imprisonment as a deterrent was at odds with academic expertise and evidence 
(see Pina-Sánchez et al., 2017 for a review of this evidence), but quickly dismissed the idea 
that custodial sentences had no deterrent value: 
Some academics just don’t really believe [deterrence] is a factor, never mind a proper 
factor. Incidentally, if it exists in the real world, I can’t say. All one can say is that since 
the night courts started working and these sentences started being imposed, and people 
were not being released onto the streets, the rioting ended immediately. Of course, it 
might have burned its way out, it might have been going to be ending anyway, you can 
never tell with these things. But that was the reality of it. 
Leonard effectively undermined or neutralised the ‘problem’ posed by the academic 
research with his determined agnosticism toward the question of deterrence –  ‘if it exists 
in the real world, I can’t say’ – and his observation that the sentencing of rioters to prison 
had seemed to coincide with the riots slowing down. Dismissal of this kind is a key strategy 
that individuals and organisations use to deal with ‘uncomfortable’, ‘dirty’ or ‘polluting’ 
knowledge – knowledge that, if accepted, threatens to undermine key professional or 
organisational narratives and principles (Rayner, 2016). For judges, of course, the tenet 
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that punishment deters crime, even when this clearly contradicts the majority of the available 
evidence, is integral to their work. In some ways practitioners have little choice but to 
maintain ‘that the prison is a success, though in fact it is not and they more or less know 
it’; since to do otherwise would be to accept that one’s own work is, in part, ‘meaningless 
and counterproductive’ (Mathiesen, 2006: 144). 
Indeed Leonard’s focus on prison’s supposed deterrent power worked to effectively close 
down a broader discussion about the harms of prison. When I asked Leonard what his 
experience of working with defendants had taught him about the longer-term effects that 
custodial sentences might have on people convicted of riot-related offences, he framed 
the potential negative effects on the sentencing approach in very limited terms:  
As far as I’m aware, two things didn’t happen. I don’t think the prisons became 
immediately overcrowded… Secondly, there was not, as some people predicted, an 
increase in the crime rate as people were released. 
While I had in mind the well-documented harms wrought by prisons on the people locked 
up, the profound damage custodial sentences inflict on people’s safety, security, physical 
and mental health, family relationships, employment, housing and social support systems, 
Leonard pointed out two very specific effects that he could then swiftly dismiss. First, he 
responded to the concerns raised by the media about the prison system’s ability to cope 
with the influx of prisoners, dismissing the risk of overcrowding (despite evidence to the 
contrary).44 Nor was there an increase in the crime rate, he said: 
You know, there’s a section of the population that believes and says very vociferously 
that… prison is an expensive way of making people worse. So there’s a view that if you 
use custody, those people come out having learned the tricks of the trade in prison and 
re-offend. No evidence that that happened at all… Some evidence, though I think most 
academics don’t accept it, that having those people locked up actually reduced the crime 
rate rather than increased it.45 
In contrast to those critics who had suggested that prison sentences might lead to high 
rates of recidivism, Leonard thought it possible that ‘having those people locked up’ 
 
44 The prison system was already overcrowded in August 2011, as it consistently had been for 
decades; the thousand or so people who went to prison in the weeks following the riots pushing 
the prison population to its highest ever level (Prison Reform Trust, 2011a). 
45 See for example Bell et al (2014).  
Justifying imprisonment 
 182 
might have brought the crime rate down, whether by simply incapacitating a great number 
of people who might otherwise be ‘offending’, or by deterring others. As well as a 
dismissal and devaluing of academic knowledge, Leonard’s formulation of the potential 
problem reveals an extremely narrow imagination of the purpose and the harms of 
imprisonment. Leonard’s defence of custodial sentences as a response to the riots did not 
attempt to make an argument for prison as an effective means of rehabilitation or justice 
for victims. Rather, it reflected a logic of punishment that is increasingly focused solely 
on incapacitation and exclusion. ‘Incapacitation with its exclusionary focus does not 
require an explanation for prisons’ but rather focuses solely on the removal and ‘disposal’ 
of the criminal (Moore, 2014: 36).  
By limiting his conception of the harms of imprisonment to the somewhat detached and 
abstract notion of ‘crime rates’ – a straw man easily dismissed – Leonard’s account 
ignored the pressing issue of the harms caused by prison to those inside. By deferring to 
a wider community of judges, by emphasising the limited options available to them, by 
insisting on the deterrent effect of prison sentences and only selectively acknowledging 
the harms of prison, Leonard justified the widespread use of prison as a response to the 
riots. These techniques proved ideologically powerful, allowing Leonard to rationalise 
and legitimise a response that was startling violent, overwhelmingly targeting already over-
criminalised groups, and in spite of his profound personal reservations about the cruelty 
of incarceration. 
Part 3. Minimising the structural inequalities of imprisonment 
In this final part of the chapter I argue that for practitioners, obscuring or ignoring the 
deeply discriminatory way that prisons overwhelmingly target marginalised and 
disadvantaged communities, and negating the deep structural iniquities of race and class 
that prisons engender and perpetuate, is a crucial means of normalising them. To some 
extent I expected professionals like Martin and Leonard to find ways to neutralise the 
‘taint’ of prison: for Leonard as a judge with direct responsibility for sentencing people 
to custody, and for Martin, as a former prison governor and now a senior manager with 
responsibility for the prison service, the moral weight of their work in relation to 
imprisonment was evident. But it was not only those whose work implicated them in 
imprisonment in direct ways who found ways to minimise or occlude the harms of prison.  
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Roger – the very experienced and established criminal defence solicitor who I introduced 
earlier in the thesis – did not express the same personal experiences of prison or the 
philosophical considerations that Leonard did, and Roger’s remarks on prison and its 
likely effects on those caught up in the riots, were less morally fraught than Leonard’s. 
Roger did not advocate in any way for prison; but his account was full of more subtle and 
mundane means of eliding and dismissing its harms. Roger’s account highlighted how 
denial about the harms of prison is widespread throughout the criminal justice system: 
not just among sentencers but among those whose work is to keep people out of prison, 
too.  
Like Leonard, Roger framed the negative effects of imprisonment in narrow terms which 
avoided confronting its inherently classed and racialised violence. Roger did this, in 
particular, by framing the harm of prison only, or at least primarily, in relation to the 
implications of criminal records for individuals’ future job opportunities. I asked Roger 
what he felt the consequences of prison would have been on those sentenced to custody 
for riot-related offences: 
I think it probably will have changed some people’s lives… In times of low employment, 
if I’m faced with three people, two of which have got a [criminal] record, which one do 
you go for? It’s easy… [A long prison sentence] has consequences. I mean, it looks worse 
on the record, takes longer to become spent, takes longer to become protected, than if 
the sentencing had not been [so severe].  
This was, undoubtedly, a very pertinent point, given the system whereby unspent 
convictions must be disclosed to potential employers. The extraordinary severity of the 
sentences handed down to rioters – and the length of time they would take to become 
spent – would have serious implications for the work prospects of many young people, 
particularly, as Roger suggests, in a context of economic recession and high 
unemployment. But while Roger expressed disquiet about the consequences of criminal 
convictions on job opportunities, this is a myopic view of the harms of imprisonment, 
eliding the other profound personal, psychological, social implications of prison 
sentences. 
Moreover, Roger’s unease about the consequences of custodial sentences was primarily 
targeted towards the surprising, middle-class rioters I described in Chapter 5:  
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I think the consequences for a working-class kid, the sort of kid we’re representing 
around here much of the time… I don’t know how much difference that makes. But one 
of the girls, you know, university – I think she was still at uni, I think she’d done two 
years of uni – and gets a big sentence for burglary! You know, is middle-class ability to 
talk your way around something going to overcome what appears on the record?  
While Roger was somewhat indifferent about the effects of prison sentences on working-
class young people’s opportunities and futures – ‘I don’t know how much difference that 
makes’ – he expressed more serious concern about a middle-class university student 
receiving a serious conviction and prison sentence and its potential impact on her 
employment prospects. In this way Roger frames privileged people as more vulnerable 
than others to the harms of imprisonment, echoing the pattern I noted in Chapter 5 
whereby practitioners showed particular concern for middle-class young people who were 
‘caught up’ in the exceptional circumstances of the riots, while working-class and 
racialised young people were seen to be almost destined to become involved in crime. 
The idea that ‘the sort of kid’ Roger’s firm was representing ‘much of the time’ would be 
relatively unaffected by a custodial sentence seemed to reify the idea that the working-
class majority of those imprisoned for riot-related offences were already beyond help; and 
that a prison sentence could do little to further harm their prospects. This focus on the 
experiences of, and consequences for, middle-class people sentenced to prison, I argue, 
obfuscates the way that prison actually inflicts its harms, with people from ‘minority’ 
ethnic groups, people who are homeless or unemployed, disabled and learning disabled 
people, people with mental health problems and those with alcohol or drug addictions all 
greatly overrepresented in the prison population (Prison Reform Trust, 2016). There are 
particular concerns about racial disparity in the youth justice system: the last decade has 
seen a dramatic rise in the overrepresentation of black, Asian and ‘minority’ ethnic 
children and young people, who now comprise 41 per cent of the population in Youth 
Offending Institutions (Lammy, 2017), ‘incarcerated and present as an ever-ready cohort 
to transition to the adult estate when they become 21 years of age’ (Williams and Clarke, 
2018: 2). 
Civil servant Martin had similarly seemed to express greater concern for relatively 
privileged people criminalised in the wake of the riots. He acknowledged that ‘Everyone’s 
vulnerable in prison… let’s not dress that up’:  
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You might make yourself vulnerable by playing king of the castle, because you put 
yourself in a place to be shot down, so that makes you vulnerable but in a different way 
to someone who is frightened of coming into prison.  
But in this understanding, those ‘outwith the normal demographic’, as Martin put it (and 
largely figured as middle-class and white, as I discussed in Chapter 5) would be especially 
vulnerable. He expressed particular concern for ‘those people who got caught up in this, 
and to that point had led relatively law-abiding lives, never been in trouble with the 
police’. For those people: 
They’re very, very quickly going from nine-to-five jobs, holding down that job, family, 
house, whatever, to a position where you’re locked in a room. That’s not – that’s a shock 
to the system, as opposed to some. We’re not talking about people who went out with a swag 
bag and a crowbar with the intention of burgling houses or premises. We’re talking about 
people who got caught up in the moment, picked up bricks, threw them though windows, 
stole TVs and were walking down the street with them and got picked up by the police. 
Probably thinking ‘Well everyone’s doing it; I’ll have a bit of that,’ and all of a sudden, 
they’re in prison. (Emphasis added) 
What is implicit in Martin’s account is the imagination of the hardened criminal who is 
relatively unaffected by prison. This figuring of the ‘normal demographic’, ‘the majority 
of people’ in prison as somewhat less susceptible to harm and less deserving of care works 
as a way to delimit and curb the moral taint that practitioners felt about their own work 
regarding prisons.  
Other practitioners also expressed this kind of discerning or distinguishing concern 
towards not only young, middle-class people but also for women, in particular. Prosecutor 
Amar had been surprised by the frequency at which women were sentenced to custody 
during and immediately after the riots:  
It’s not a sexist view but it’s a view that I have, is that a lot of female defendants, first 
time offenders as far as I could see, were being locked up… I do remember thinking that 
was unusual – not unusual, but that was quite harsh… So it did have an impact, I would 
have thought… Whereas male offenders – I don’t think anyone sort of bats an eyelid 
about that sort of thing (laughing) 
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As Amar put it lightly, no-one bats an eyelid at a young man going to prison and the effects 
of this on their family and community; despite men making up 95  per cent of people in 
prison in England and Wales (Prison watch, 2019). 
Criminal justice professionals’ concern for those figured as the most vulnerable, those 
who do not belong in prison – whether this is women or middle-class ‘kids’ – ignores the 
inherent violence of prisons, and that this violence is targeted overwhelmingly not at 
women or middle-class people but at working-class and often racialised men. 
Underpinning the continuing place of, and widespread acceptance of or at least 
resignation to, the central place of prison as the response to crime is an unwillingness to 
acknowledge the lived realities of the harm it inflicts on all of those inside. This denial 
was perhaps crystallised most clearly in a comment Roger made when I asked him what 
kind of impact prison might have had on those who were sentenced to custody after the 
riots: 
I think very long prison sentences undoubtedly have an effect. Short prison sentences? I 
don’t know. It’s very unpleasant. But I went to public school, and the circumstances in 
which I lived were far worse than even the worst of the prisons. And you know, my 
grandfather was paying a lot of money for the privilege. 
My surprised laughter captured on the audio recording of our discussion reveals my 
incredulousness at this appraisal. I had assumed that Roger, having worked as a legal aid 
criminal defence solicitor for several decades, would have a sharply condemnatory view 
on the effects of prison sentences on his clients, of whom he must have represented 
hundreds if not thousands. It was perhaps a flippant and somewhat tone-deaf comment 
reflecting a lack of self-awareness as much as his deep political views; but comparing 
imprisonment favourably to elite private education struck me as incongruous. The week 
that I met Roger, it was widely reported that two-thirds of prisons in England and Wales 
were providing inmates with inadequate conditions or unacceptable treatment, with two 
in five deemed to be unacceptably unsafe (Townsend and Savage, 2018). Self-harm and 
assaults in prison were at a record high, with 42,837 recorded incidents of self-harm and 
28,165 assaults in the 12 months to September 2017 (Townsend and Savage, 2018). 
Against this background, Roger’s characterisation of prison sentences as merely 
‘unpleasant’ seemed seriously out of touch, reflecting either a surprising level of ignorance 




For Roger, moreover, rather than seeing prison as inherently and systemically alienating and 
harmful, whether or not people were affected by prison was framed as a matter of 
character. I asked Roger whether he had been concerned about the impacts of prison 
sentences beyond their implications for employment prospects. Roger agreed that prison 
could ‘change people’s perception of life’. But for him, whether or not it would 
profoundly affect somebody was ‘a personality thing’: ‘If you let it beat you, yes, it’s 
disastrous’. This framing of vulnerability to the harms of prison as (in part, at least) a 
matter of personality and resilience places the onus firmly on those in prison to be 
tenacious and tough; to resist its harms and not ‘let it’ defeat them; positioning the harm 
of prison as a matter of individual and moral responsibility, and obscuring the inherent 
and structural violence of prison as an institution. It simultaneously elides the fact that 
the ability to deal with the harms of prison is highly classed: those with support networks 
and professions may have the resources to return to their life relatively unscathed. The 
notion that working-class people would be less susceptible or vulnerable to long term 
effects on their prospects is at odds with what we know about how access to social and 
economic resources and networks mitigates the effects of prison on futures.  
Roger’s account, then, draws on a number of techniques that obfuscate the violence of 
prions. He dismisses the idea that imprisonment posed a serious danger to those 
sentenced to custody after the riots, framing prisons as relatively benign, and coping with 
imprisonment as a matter of individual character. When he did acknowledge the harms 
of prison, they were cast primarily in terms of the impacts on middle-class employment 
prospects; entirely avoiding or ignoring the structural dimensions of the violence 
perpetrated predominantly on working-class and racialised populations by the criminal 
justice system. This reflects broader patterns of ignorance in media, political and policy 
discourse whereby the violence of prisons is distorted, reduced to a matter of individual 
character (Scott, 2018; Stanley and Mihaere, 2018). 
For defence lawyers, as well as for prosecutors and sentencers, I argue, the stark and well-
documented harms of prison pose a profound challenge to professional identities and 
processes of legitimation. Though solicitors like Roger are not implicated in 
imprisonment in the same way as those whose roles are to push for prison, to hand down 
sentences or to manage the prison system, their role nevertheless entails a degree of 
complicity with a broader system in which the prison is the primary response to crime. 
My conversation with defence barrister Sadie brought to light the ambiguous nature of 
the role of defence lawyers, and her sense of unease at being involved in the criminal 
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justice response to the riots. She recalled her conversations with Lawrence who had been 
a colleague in 2011. The two used to commiserate after tough days in court:  
You’d get back to chambers and we’d say ‘How was your day?’ and the running line we’d 
have is the line from Blackadder, you know: ‘Defence fined 50 pounds for turning up’ 
(laughing). And so that was our kind of code for ‘It’s been really horrible and I got battered 
around the court by a judge.’ 
The riots, Sadie recalled, ‘were just like that writ large, basically,’ with the courts largely 
disregarding defence lawyers and handing out custodial sentences almost indiscriminately: 
When you make however many bail applications on end, and it doesn’t matter what you 
say, every single one of them the judge is like ‘No, send them down’, there comes a point 
where you think, like, what’s the point? I may as well not bother. Like, I’m just, I’m a fig 
leaf for this, right?  
For Sadie, her role was essentially ‘pointless’ because judges had already decided that riot-
related offences would receive prison sentences. Moreover, she felt that her presence as 
a defence advocate in this context was actively harmful, as it obscured the courts’ unfair 
treatment of defendants:  
I’m adding the illusion that there is some kind of fair trial going on here, but the reality 
is it doesn’t matter what I get up and say, because you’ve already made a decision. 
This had profound political and moral implications for Sadie’s understanding of her 
professional role. ‘As a lawyer,’ she felt she was ‘adding a kind of (pause) I don’t know, a 
sort of a gravitas’ to a deeply flawed system: 
I often thought there was an ethics question about the extent to which, you know, one’s 
mere presence as a defence advocate is adding a sense of (pause) a system that operates 
as it should, and protects the innocent, and convicts the guilty and all the rest of it, and 
in actual fact it’s not really doing any of those things at all.  
Sadie had since stopped practicing criminal law, the decimation of legal aid having made 
it impossible for her to make a living or to feel that she was working within a legitimate 
or functioning criminal justice system. Her comments highlight the complex ways in 
which criminal defence lawyers are entangled in the system; not fighting against it but an 
integral part of it. For Sadie, whose views were profoundly at odds with the prevailing 
penal direction of the criminal justice system, working within it became morally 
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impossible. For others, as I have shown, techniques of denial, dismissal and disavowal 
allow them to reach a position where they are able to continue.  
Conclusions  
This chapter has considered the discursive strategies that practitioners employed to justify 
the exceptionally punitive penal response to the riots, characterised by the courts’ high 
rates of remand and widespread custodial sentences. The idea that the riots warranted – 
indeed, necessitated – the widespread imprisonment of those involved seemed to achieve 
a kind of common-sense status in 2011, almost so obvious as to require little argument. 
But, I argue, imagining custodial sentences as a reasonable and proportionate response to 
the riots relies upon a very specific set of assumptions. This chapter has built upon the 
concept of ‘penal agnosis’ (Scott, 2018) showing how criminal justice practitioners 
mobilised techniques of ignorance and denial in order to rationalise and normalise the 
extraordinary use of imprisonment in the wake of the riots.  
Prisons are a site of constant contestation and struggle for legitimacy (Sparks and 
Bottoms, 1995). ‘Given their violent and coercive nature,’ prisons ‘require a degree of 
popular (and prisoner) consent to allow them to operate’ (Boyle and Stanley, 2017: 2–3). 
Such consent, and the legitimacy it confers, is never fully secured but must be actively 
maintained. Scholars have explored how governments attempt to secure both public 
consent for prisons (see e.g. Cheliotis, 2010; Boyle and Stanley, 2017) and to negotiate 
and reaffirm legitimacy among people in prison (Carrabine, 2005; Crewe, 2011; Liebling, 
2011). My analysis builds on this work by assessing the discursive processes by which 
professionals within the criminal justice maintain a sense of the prison as fair and 
necessary. By exploring how criminal justice practitioners rationalise and defend the 
sweeping penal backlash against the rioters, this chapter points to the narratives, claims 
and assumptions that allow professionals who are, in different ways, responsible for 
imprisoning people, to justify their own work. Contributing to literature on criminal 
justice work as ‘dirty work’, I argue that the violence of imprisonment poses a potential 
‘taint’ for professionals’ sense of their roles as morally sound and show how practitioners 
‘neutralise’ this threat by variously disavowing and denying the harms their work inflicts.  
For practitioners whose work kept them at an adequate distance from prisons it was 
possible to simply overlook the violence inflicted by the criminal justice system. Although 
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the CPS’s punitive approach to prosecution undeniably contributed to the surge in 
custodial sentences, prosecutors emphasised the organisational division of duties that 
meant they were not directly accountable for imposing prison. For others, the prison 
seemed to pose a trickier challenge to their accounts of their work as morally sound. Far 
from failing to notice the ‘fiasco of the prison’ (Mathiesen, 2006), people who have 
worked for many years in the criminal justice system know very well that the prison fails 
to meet even its own stated aims. Civil servant Martin told me he doubted prison 
sentences would be an effective response to the riots, while district judge Leonard made 
clear that he ‘hated prison’ and thought it ‘cruel’. These views posed profound challenges 
to their sense of their work as just and legitimate – for Leonard sentencing people to 
custody, and for Martin managing prison policy and operations. Yet, as I have shown, by 
mobilising techniques of disavowal and denial, professionals were able to neutralise this 
troubling tension, normalising and naturalising what was an exceptionally violent penal 
response to the riots.  
That participants like Martin and Leonard expressed grave personal reservations about 
prison – that it is ineffective, unnecessary and cruel – while maintaining roles as key 
figures with direct responsibility for sentencing and penal policy, speaks to the potency 
of an organisational, institutional and cultural will to ignore or elide the violence of 
imprisonment. I have argued that the judiciary, in particular, constitutes a ‘thought 
community’ (or inhabit a ‘thought world’) (Douglas, 1986), drawing on a shared set of 
narratives that serve to legitimise its own power. Institutions perpetuate certain kinds of 
knowledge while remaining ‘impervious to unpalatable information’ (Rayner, 2012: 114) 
shaping and delimiting the kinds of stories and claims that its individual members can 
make. 
But the tensions within Leonard and Martin’s accounts also highlight the importance of 
attending to conflicts within individuals’ accounts. Martin and Leonard’s framings of 
prisons did not fit neatly within the bounds of the prescribed logic and language of their 
respective organisations, but rather were characterised by deep contradiction; holding 
together their personal misgivings about prison with an insistence that the courts’ 
approach to sentencing was ‘right’. In this sense, their accounts point to the way that 
institutional ideology and common sense, as Billig et al. (1988) argue, is not simply 
imposed from above or unquestioningly absorbed and reproduced by unthinking 
individuals. Rather it is regenerated in everyday discourse through its contradictory 
elements; not as ‘singular positions that people consistently occupy’ or ‘as a closed system 
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for talking about the world’, but as ‘an incomplete set of contrary themes, which 
continually give rise to discussion, argumentation and dilemmas’ (Billig et al., 1988: 6). 
For Martin and Leonard, it was through this complex dilemma and deliberation that the 
handing down of long prison sentences was positioned as a rational and appropriate (or 
at least inevitable) response to the riots. The ‘uncomfortable knowledge’ that threatened 
this position – their personal feelings that prison sentences were ineffective and cruel – 
was not simply dismissed but incorporated and absorbed into institutional ways of 
thinking.  
These strategies of neutralisation and negotiation allow practitioners whose work renders 
them complicit in imprisonment to construct meanings around their work that make it 
liveable, and to position their work in 2011, in particular, as necessary and reasonable. 
Identifying these processes of normalisation and legitimation, I argue, reveals something 
significant about the broader cultural and ideological politics of the prison. It points to 
the centrality of ignorance, disavowal and denial in the cultural political economy of 
punishment whereby the prison is considered legitimate, inevitable, and ‘so “natural” that 
it is extremely hard to imagine life without it’ (Davis, 2003: 9–10) even in the face of its 
well-documented failure to meet even its own aims of crime reduction and rehabilitation. 
In the next chapter I draw together the arguments I have made in the preceding chapters 
of the thesis and consider what my analysis as a whole suggests about the modes of 







Conclusions: Riot talk and the cultural political economy 
of punishment 
 
In the preceding chapters I have explored how criminal justice professionals who were at 
the heart of designing and delivering the extraordinarily punitive state reaction to the 2011 
‘riots’ legitimised, defended and criticised it. This riot talk, I contend, is vitally important; 
both in helping us to understand the cultural and ideological context from which a 
moment of startling state violence emerged; and in helping us to trace a series of shared 
narratives and imaginations of crime, criminals, society and punishment that justify and 
legitimise the criminal justice system more widely.  
I began the thesis by highlighting some of the most striking dimensions of the criminal 
justice response to the 2011 disturbances, from the CPS’s unusual approach to 
prosecuting riot-related offences, to the controversial overnight court sittings, the high 
rates of remands to custody and the hugely inflated sentences handed down. While the 
unrest received a huge amount of academic attention, most of this work aimed at 
explaining the various social, economic and political factors that were seen to have caused 
them, while relatively little research has focused on the state’s spectacularly violent 
backlash. This response, I have argued, was just as remarkable as the disturbances 
themselves, and warrants sustained sociological attention.
I have aimed to address three research questions: How did the criminal justice system 
respond to the ‘riots’? What are the moral claims, shared understandings, narratives and 
imaginations that legitimised, normalised and naturalised this response? And, lastly, what 
does this reveal about the cultural and ideological processes by which the criminal justice 
system sustains itself? In this concluding chapter I revisit these questions and review how 
the analysis in the intervening chapters has shed light on them. I draw together the key 
arguments of the thesis and assess its broader significance, explaining how my analysis 
both enriches existing sociological understandings of the 2011 disturbances and 
contributes new empirical evidence and original theoretical perspectives to broader 
academic discussions about criminal justice in the current conjuncture. First I argue that 
criminal justice practitioners’ riot talk helps us to trace the shared imaginations of the 
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disturbances, the rioters, the public and prisons that served to justify the punitive criminal 
justice response to the unrest; not only those that circulated in media and political rhetoric 
but those that shored up the response from within the criminal justice system. Second, 
building on emerging academic conversations about agnosis, I contend that denial, 
amnesia and obfuscation are vitally important in normalising and naturalising the violent 
punishment of rioters. I argue that my experiences of negotiating access and consent for 
this research further highlights the role of ignorance in underpinning the criminal justice 
system. Lastly, I show how this analysis offers insight into the shared meanings that 
legitimise the broader racist and class-based criminal justice system. 
Criminal justice practitioners’ riot talk helps us to trace the shared 
imaginations of the riots, the rioters, the public and prisons that served to 
justify the punitive criminal justice response to the riots 
The thesis has sought to investigate the discursive constructions that criminal justice 
practitioners draw on to justify and normalise the penal backlash to the disturbances. 
While the CPS and the courts’ response to the unrest was startlingly punitive, and targeted 
racialised and working-class communities especially harshly, most of the prosecutors, 
sentencers, civil servants and defence lawyers I met expressed a sense that this reaction 
was more or less necessary and appropriate. The thesis has explored the shared 
imaginations of the riots, the rioters, the public and the criminal justice system that 
allowed them to do so; identifying a set of powerful ideological resources that 
practitioners mobilised to justify and legitimise the extraordinarily harsh criminal justice 
response to the unrest.  
In this way, the research makes a substantial contribution to academic literature on the 
2011 disturbances, and more specifically to a body of critical work on the cultural and 
ideological imaginaries that legitimised the state’s extraordinarily severe criminal justice 
reaction (among others Gilroy, 2013; Jensen, 2013; Lamble, 2013; Sim, 2012; Slater, 
2016b; Tyler, 2013b). While this previous work has analysed how political and media 
discourses in 2011 legitimised the harsh punishment of those apprehended for their 
involvement in the unrest, I have focused on how professionals within the criminal justice 
system justify and make sense of the punitive backlash against the rioters. By attending 
to practitioners’ accounts, the thesis offers a view on an under-explored arena in which 
the broader cultural meanings around the unrest were translated into a set of 
extraordinarily punitive decisions and policies, which in turn further reaffirmed and 
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bolstered the delimited definitions of the disturbances that have continued to circulate in 
their afterlife. 
Paying close attention to criminal justice practitioners’ accounts reveals a set of shared 
narratives, moral claims and assumptions that are connected to, but often distinct from, 
the meanings that dominated political and media discourse in 2011, highlighting the value 
of my interviews in adding complexity and nuance to existing analyses of the cultural and 
ideological context that made possible the punitive backlash to the unrest. I have shown 
how practitioners invoked specific stories about the riots, the rioters, the public and the 
criminal justice system that served to rationalise and justify their own work in the wake 
of the riots. I have focused on examining a narrative of the riots as an unprecedented and 
meaningless outburst of violent criminality; an imagination of the rioters that placed 
responsibility firmly with marginalised and racialised communities; a fiction of the public 
as monolithically punitive; and a strictly circumscribed vision of prisons that elides the 
profound harms inherent in them. These work together to create a set of meanings in 
which the revanchist backlash against those involved in the unrest came to be seen as a 
broadly acceptable and inevitable response, and whereby calls for a different kind of 
response were silenced or dismissed. 
In Chapter 4 I argued that shared ideas about the disturbances themselves, why they 
happened and what they meant were vitally important in allowing practitioners to 
legitimise the law and order reaction to them. An imagination of the unrest as an eruption 
of meaningless and unpredictable violence posing an unparalleled threat to the very fabric 
of society was especially powerful in structuring CPS lawyers’ accounts of their 
organisation’s approach to the unrest, allowing prosecutors to position themselves as 
moral guardians with a responsibility to protect and restore order by any means necessary. 
This narrative, I argued, was predicated on politically powerful patterns of amnesia and 
elision, relying on highly selective and limited acknowledgements of  the events of  2011 
and their historical precedents. It was only by ignoring Mark Duggan’s death, dismissing 
the context of  deepening austerity, and forgetting or distorting the deeply troubled 
history of  urban unrest in English cities and the long history of  racialised state violence 
that it speaks to, that prosecutors and other professionals were able to maintain the 
narrative that the riots were an unprecedented criminal phenomenon necessitating an 
exceptional criminal justice reaction.  
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In Chapter 5 I showed how practitioners drew on assumptions about the rioters that 
normalised the criminal justice response and its targeting of marginalised and racialised 
communities. I identified two contrasting figures – ‘the typical rioter’ and ‘the surprising 
rioter’ – that populated practitioners’ accounts, and argued that important ideological 
claims about race, class and culpability condensed around the distinction between these 
two very different kinds of  rioter. The positioning of  surprising rioters (figured as middle-
class, educated and white) as passive bystanders who had unfortunately been ‘swept up’ 
in the unrest, tacitly shifted blame, responsibility and culpability onto the typical rioters; 
a ‘criminal element’ imagined as working-class and racialised. In this way, I argued that 
practitioners’ emphasis on the ‘unlikely mob’ of  privileged rioters, far from unsettling a 
long-standing ‘myth of black criminality’ (Gilroy, 1982b), in fact leaves intact and adds 
ballast to ideological constructions of black and brown people as ‘exceptionally crime-
prone’ (Williams and Clarke, 2018: 2). Practitioners’ imaginations of  marginalised 
communities as essentially responsible for the unrest, I argue, allowed them to imagine 
the criminal justice response – which overwhelmingly targeted working-class and 
racialised young people – as fair and appropriate.  
Chapter 6 set out a third supporting pillar in the structure of meaning that practitioners 
drew on to justify the harsh criminal justice response to the disturbances: the claim that 
society demanded draconian punishment. The imagination of an unanimously punitive 
public allowed practitioners to disavow responsibility for their own and their 
organisations’ practices, claiming that they had little choice but to cede to (unfortunate, 
and often misinformed, but inevitable) public outrage and punish rioters accordingly. In 
claiming to speak and act for the public, criminal justice practitioners effectively shifted 
accountability for the state’s actions away from themselves and their professions, instead 
placing responsibility with the public. But, I argued, those making decisions about how 
to respond to the disturbances were not simply channelling monolithic public desire for 
law and order, but rather drawing on and contributing to a highly orchestrated 
imagination of public punitiveness. Rejecting the idea that the criminal justice system was 
merely responding to monolithic public opinion, I argued that criminal justice 
professionals were instead conjuring a very specific sector of the public: a fearful and 
vengeful constituency that was defined in opposition to the racialised rioters. Moreover 
professionals were not simply reflecting public opinion but were invoking a highly 
structured notion of public opinion that is intimately bound up with the pressures – 
imagined or explicit – that pressed upon the criminal justice system from the media and 
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from the government. I showed how practitioners’ imaginations of the public were 
entangled with media and political discourses that summoned a highly circumscribed and 
selective public that excluded and rendered invisible those with less punitive sensibilities 
and, of course, the rioters, their families and their communities.  
Finally, in Chapter 7 I described how the professionals I interviewed routinely ignored, 
minimised or disavowed responsibility for the profound harms of imprisonment. Penal 
agnosis (Scott, 2018), I argued, was a critical means of normalising and justifying the 
courts’ extraordinarily punitive approach to remand and sentencing for riot-related 
offences. For some practitioners, the administrative and bureaucratic nature of prisons 
work kept them at a great enough distance from the lived realities of incarceration to 
allow them to overlook or avoid engaging with the profound ethical and moral 
implications of their work. For others, framing prison as the only feasible option, 
invoking the common-sense claim that prison deters crime, dismissing the harms of 
prison, or selectively acknowledging them, allowed practitioners to justify the use of 
custodial sentences for offences that would ordinarily not have warranted prosecution, 
let alone such serious punishment.  
These imaginations of the riots, the rioters, the public and prisons knitted together in 
practitioners’ accounts to justify and normalise what was in fact a highly unusual, violent 
and discriminatory state reaction. Taken together, dehistoricised, decontextualised and 
depoliticised definitions of the riots, classed and racialised constructions of culpability, a 
delimited imagination of a punitive public, and strategic ignorance about the impact of 
the criminal justice response licensed a law and order reaction and simultaneously closed 
down debate about the need for structural or systemic remedies to address the profound 
economic, social and political inequalities that the riots revealed. In this way, these 
narratives allowed practitioners to present their work – work that might have been 
‘tainted’ or rendered dirty (Hughes, 1962; Ashforth and Kreiner, 1999, 2014) by 
implications of  disproportionality, ineffectiveness or racism – as justified and morally 
sound. 
The more critical voices that emerged in my research open up spaces for thinking 
differently about the criminal justice response to the disturbances. In Chapter 4 I recalled 
how barrister Sadie, in contrast to the prevailing political discourse and the narrative I 
heard from prosecutors, foregrounded a reading of  the riots as a reaction of  marginalised 
communities to entrenched patterns of  economic inequality and racialised police 
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harassment and criminalisation. Reading the riots not as mindless violence and looting 
but rather as ‘a response to repeated stop-and-search, racist policing, deprivation, poverty, 
unemployment… anger, and inequalities between the haves and the have-nots’ (James, 
2011; cited in Slater, 2016b) points squarely to the unfulfilled need for structural and 
systemic remedies. In Chapter 5 I discussed how practitioners from probation, youth 
offending and community services challenged the media representations of the rioters as 
overwhelmingly black and working-class, critiquing and problematising the 
overwhelming focus of the criminal justice response to the riots on already over-policed 
and over-criminalised groups. In Chapter 6 I noted how some interviewees questioned 
the notion that the public demanded punishment and that the criminal justice system 
simply had to appease them, instead pointing to the ways that this putative ‘public 
opinion’ is in fact orchestrated through and imbricated with pressures from the right-
wing press and populist political rhetoric. Again, recognising this opens up the possibility 
of thinking about a response to the riots that might have reflected very different kinds of 
public attitudes to the unrest; not motivated by outrage against the rioters but reflecting the 
well-documented and widely shared frustrations at the roots of the disturbances.  
These more critical perspectives speak to the abject failure of the state’s response to 
deliver justice in the wake of the unrest. Meaningful justice might have included, at the 
barest minimum, accountability for Mark Duggan’s killing, a broader acknowledgement 
of the need for systemic changes in policing strategy, and more radical political and 
economic measures to reverse the wide-reaching structural violence of austerity. This 
framing of  the disturbances, then, enables a very different interpretation of  the CPS and 
the courts’ reaction; seeing it not as a necessary and adequate response to an outburst of  
offending, but as a violent and counterproductive backlash that would make future riots 
more, not less, likely. Yet these interpretations of  the riots and the criminal justice 
response have remained marginal in the afterlife of  the riots; overshadowed by the 
definitions of  crime, criminality, society and justice that positioned the immediate penal 
reaction and longer-term punitive policy agendas as rational and necessary responses. 
 
Agnosis, amnesia and obfuscation are vitally important in normalising and 
naturalising the violent punishment of rioters 
This analysis makes an original empirical contribution to emerging sociological debates 
on the multifaceted role of agnosis in the contemporary politics of criminal justice. My 
research, conducted in 2018, offered an opportunity to observe how shared imaginations 
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of the riots, rioters and the criminal justice response had shifted and settled over the years; 
to see what had faded, been lost or forgotten; and what had remained and been reaffirmed 
in the intervening years. In critically analysing the meanings and shared understandings 
that circulated in practitioners’ accounts of the riots, the rioters, the public and prisons, 
the preceding chapters have shown how practitioners mobilise structured and strategic 
denial, amnesia, dismissal and disavowal to justify and normalise the harshly punitive 
response to the unrest. It was only by omitting England’s long history of unrest and 
forgetting Duggan’s death, distorting the demographics of ‘the rioters’, summoning a 
highly selective notion of public opinion, and obscuring the racialised and classed harms 
that prisons perpetuate, that professionals were able to rationalise and justify the courts’ 
reaction to the unrest. 
The thesis provides an empirically grounded contribution to sociological work that 
examines how states and powerful organisations mobilise ignorance as a potent political 
and ideological resource to legitimise their practices (Proctor and Schiebinger, 2008; 
McGoey, 2016a, 2019; Slater, 2014, 2016a). More specifically, it adds to contemporary 
academic conversations on the role of ignorance in normalising and justifying the criminal 
justice system and its harmful and discriminatory effects (Barton and Davis, 2018; 
Mathiesen, 2004). I have shown how ignorance, broadly conceived, plays an important 
role in sustaining and upholding widely held ideas about ‘race’ (Mills, 1997; Sullivan and 
Tuana, 2007) and, in particular, imaginations of racialised communities as 
disproportionately predisposed to crime and criminality (Gilroy, 1982b; Williams and 
Clarke, 2018). 
The thesis emphasises the importance of critical academic research in tracing how 
ignorance, amnesia and obfuscation are mobilised to legitimise and reproduce a violent 
and discriminatory criminal justice system. Yet undertaking this kind of critical research 
poses significant challenges. As I discussed in Chapter 3, by closely controlling 
researchers’ ability to access its organisations, the criminal justice system effectively 
guards itself from critical analysis. ‘Studying up’ reflects an ambition to subvert the 
traditional power dynamics of sociological and criminological research that has focused 
largely on marginalised groups. But the practicalities of negotiating access to the CPS, the 
judiciary and the courts – and, as I describe below, of securing permission to use the 
material gleaned through this research – mean that powerful individuals and institutions 
are able to exert their authority to carefully control their exposure to academic critique. 
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This closedness in effect constitutes an additional means by which the agencies of the 
criminal justice system mobilise agnosis and obfuscation to sustain themselves.  
The process of finalising the thesis and securing the requisite approval from my 
participants sheds light on the challenge of conducting independent, critical research 
when studying sites and practices of power that are shielded from scrutiny. As discussed 
in Chapter 3, as a condition of securing interviews with prosecutors Amar, Kofi and Jason 
I had agreed to send a full draft of the thesis to my contact at the CPS so that they could 
comment on it prior to submission (see page 57 for discussion). Sending these chapters 
to the CPS in early 2020 caused me considerable anxiety, as I feared that my critical 
analysis would cause consternation which could have resulted in the organisation simply 
refusing to grant me permission to use the interviews. At this late stage of the project, 
after more than a year of analysis, writing and editing, this would have posed a significant 
problem and required a thorough re-working of the thesis. I was very lucky that my 
contact at the CPS was gracious and generous, showed an interest in the research, and 
only asked me to clarify or correct a few details regarding policy and to change a 
pseudonym which happened to be the name of another prosecutor. Knowing that a 
representative of the CPS (though not the participants themselves) had read the thesis, 
checked it for accuracy, and – most importantly – understood the nature of the analysis 
provided a measure of reassurance that the organisation would be unlikely to respond 
negatively to the thesis or, more likely, the subsequent publication of the research in a 
monograph or journal articles. However, it is notable that while I had to sign agreements 
with extremely unfavourable terms and serious financial and penal implications for me 
(see appendices on page 238 and 239) I never received anything in writing to confirm that 
the organisation had approved the draft thesis. 
Similarly, securing sign-off from district judge Leonard brought to the fore the challenges 
facing researchers studying the criminal justice system. While I offered all my research 
participants the opportunity to review and amend the interview transcript, none except 
district judge Leonard and magistrate David took me up on this offer – understandably, 
doing so would be time-consuming, and my assurances that they would be anonymised 
seemed adequate. Leonard and David, both public figures who were used to speaking on 
the record, were somewhat bemused by my suggestion that I anonymise their accounts; 
and turned down my offer to provide a transcript for checking. David asked me to send 
the quotes I was planning to use and some context of the analysis, which I did but 
received no response. Leonard requested I send a summary of the key points of our 
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conversation and, later, a list of quotes I was planning to use in the thesis. Doing so 
required me to share with him not only the material, but an insight into my own analytical 
perspective since many of the quotes I had selected captured the moments in which 
Leonard grappled with the complex political and ethical question inherent in his work as 
a judge. This raises an ethical issue. Sending these quotes to Leonard in early 2020, I felt 
cautious, concerned that he might feel I had betrayed his trust by focusing on parts on 
the conversation he might not have expected me to and might withdraw his consent for 
me to use the interview. Though he approved the quotes (subject to some minor 
clarifications and edits), I remained apprehensive about how he might respond to the 
analysis in the thesis itself; whether he – or indeed other participants – might feel I had 
misled them by not explicitly explaining my analytical and theoretical approach to the 
interviews. In part, my decision to anonymise all my participants, even those who 
suggested I use their real names and roles, reflects this anxiety and wish to mitigate 
potential feelings of misrepresentation.  
In research with powerful organisations there is a peculiar dynamic to the challenge of 
balancing research ethics with the practicalities of negotiating access and maintaining 
positive relations with participants while maintaining academic integrity and developing 
critical perspectives on participants’ accounts (Rice, 2010). In particular, subjecting 
participants’ accounts to critical discourse analysis, as I have done, arguably poses an 
ethical dilemma. Research participants typically assume (and are often encouraged by 
researchers to assume) that the research is aiming to document their experiences, expert 
insights and views, while CDA in fact focuses primarily on how they talk, the claims they 
make, and the political implications of this, so that ‘there is a potential for discrepancy 
between informants’ expectations and what is actually done with the data they provide’ 
(Hammersley, 2014: 530). This tension is particularly pertinent in ‘upstream’ critical 
research of this kind because participants are in some ways regarded as representing, or 
being implicated in ‘the dominant ideology, and the institutional patterns and practices it 
legitimates’ (Hammersley, 2014: 530).   
Yet it is important to contextualise these concerns – my responsibility as a researcher to 
accurately explain the purpose of the research and its analytical approach, to faithfully 
represent my participants’ voices and honour their trust – against a background of 
arguably much more serious power imbalances between myself and those I have written 
about. In practical terms, this potential mismatch between participants’ assumptions 
about the nature of the research and the final analysis is an uncomfortable but necessary 
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element of ‘studying up’, since explicitly disclosing a critical research agenda is likely to 
close off opportunities for access, especially when these are mediated by organisations’ 
official processes. My apprehensions about individual prosecutors’ and sentencers’ 
personal feelings about being misrepresented need to be situated in the context of greater 
disparities of control and power that structure the research. Though as a researcher I may 
have held ‘the interpretative power over the data’ (Neal and Mclaughlin, 2009: 700) 
subjecting participants’ accounts to critical discourse analysis poses very little risk for 
harm (Hammersley, 2014) and any impacts on organisational reputation represent a more 
serious risk to me as an individual researcher than to my participants.  
In Chapter 3 I argued that my experience of conducting the interviews seemed to call for 
a more nuanced appreciation of power dynamics in the research process. In contrast to 
accounts of ‘elite interviewing’ which assume interview interactions directly reflect the 
power discrepancy between interviewer and participant, my conversations with 
professionals were characterised by complexity, defensiveness and dilemma. Nevertheless 
it is vital, I argue, to maintain a critical analysis of the power relations within which 
research takes place, beyond those that play out in the immediate interaction between 
researcher and the participant as an individual. While research interviews might mean 
participants are called to account for their actions; this dynamic is situated within a 
broader set of power structures. 
This highlights a need to reframe sociology’s ethics frameworks for studying powerful 
institutions, balancing the researcher’s duty to honour ethical standards with the integrity 
of the project’s critical analysis of a violent and unjust system. While the past thirty years 
have seen an unprecedented opening up of the courts and the justice system to academic 
research, officially sanctioned studies often produce anodyne and unreflective accounts 
that fail to account for structures and practices of power, while researchers who are not 
funded by or affiliated with the organisations they study are marginalised and 
undermined, their research agendas and dissemination determined by the institutions they 
research and seek to hold to account (Baldwin, 2008; Whyte, 2000). While traditional 
research ethics frameworks are based on an assumption that the researcher is in a position 
of power over their participants, the stark disparities of authority and control inherent in 
this research project call for a more nuanced approach to research responsibilities than 
those offered by standard ethics frameworks; one that takes into account the challenges, 
risks and harms facing researchers as well as participants. 
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As I have argued throughout the thesis, forms of agnosis, amnesia and dismissal are 
central to the cultural and ideological processes by which the criminal justice system 
sustains itself. Strategies of disavowal, denial and obfuscation are vital in justifying 
‘justice.’ It was by drawing on a delimited, decontextualised and depoliticised conception 
of crime; racialised and classed discourses of criminality; the imagination of a 
monolithically punitive public; and strategic ignorance of the harms of punishment, that 
professionals were able to rationalise the courts’ reaction to the 2011 unrest. But it is also 
through erecting and guarding barriers that shield organisations like the judiciary from 
critical scrutiny by researchers, that the criminal justice system succeeds in managing and 
mediating the stories it tells, and protects and reaffirm the representations and narratives 
that justify and legitimise it.  
This analysis offers insight into the shared meanings that legitimise the 
broader racist and class-based criminal justice system 
Finally, the thesis has a broader set of implications for the sociology of criminal justice in 
the contemporary conjuncture. Paying close attention to criminal justice practitioners’ 
riot talk offers an original perspective on the ideological mechanisms that legitimise and 
underpin the policies and practices of the criminal justice system more widely. As well as 
allowing us to trace the narratives that served to legitimise the punitive response to the 
2011 disturbances as a very specific and situated moment, my interviews and analysis 
offer insight into the cultural politics that continue to sustain the criminal justice system 
from within.  
My research took place at a moment of profound anxiety within the criminal justice 
system about its own future. In many of my interviews, taking place in 2018, practitioners 
lamented what they saw as a catastrophic decline in funding and standards across the 
system. Defence solicitor Roger told me that ‘the criminal justice system is now in 
collapse. It is so cash strapped, it barely functions.’ This crisis was endemic, hitting 
agencies across the system, from the CPS (‘if the public knew how many cases the CPS 
lost because they just don’t do casework, I think there’d be a riot’, he told me laughing) 
to the courts. For barrister Sadie it was the decimation of criminal defence that was by 
far the greatest concern. She described how the defence had ‘been bureaucratised out of 
existence’ and the magistrates’ courts had become ‘the wild west of the criminal justice 
system’ in which defendants’ rights had been eroded by a combination of changes in 
administrative practice. When Sadie and I met, the criminal bar was in the midst of a 
three-month long strike following further cuts to the legal aid system. Sadie explained the 
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financial pressures facing criminal defence barristers, who would often end up being paid 
a standard fee of around £50 – before rent to chambers and tax – for a day’s work at 
court. ‘There’s just not enough money in the legal aid system, and there’s not enough 
people who can afford to pay privately.’ Defence solicitor Tanya also emphasised the 
‘despair’ that ongoing cuts to legal aid had had on solicitors. Tanya had seen colleagues 
leaving the profession ‘in droves’, resulting in ‘defence deserts’ where legal representation 
was unavailable, defendants increasingly representing themselves in court and the defence 
being left as ‘just this sort of scrambling, unprotected entity’:  
You know, all the money they could’ve possibly saved on legal aid they’ve now spent 
again on wasted court time with everyone trying to represent themselves… It’s absurd. 
[Defendants] are cross-examining their own victims (laughing). It’s madness. It’s total 
madness. 
In prisons and youth offending institutions, too, as Claire told me, ‘standards have 
absolutely imploded’:  
The violence has gone up exponentially over the last few years. Very, very scary, violent 
places. They don’t get proper education, they don’t get proper anything in these places 
anymore. 
The probation service, she pointed out, had also ‘been through a terrible time since half 
of it was privatised’: 
It was just like they disappeared (laughing)… You just didn’t see the probation officers 
anymore, and the good work they were doing all got lost. Loads of people left – all really 
stressed, people going off sick. It’s just been horrendous.  
Equally pessimistically, solicitor Roger concluded that ‘the criminal justice system is just 
not a primary concern of government. As long as we deal with the big cases, the multiple 
rapists and the really serious crime,’ he said, ‘really they don’t give a damn what happens 
with everything else.’  
In the midst of this moment of crisis in criminal justice, my analysis offers some clues 
about how practitioners maintain an imagination of the system as essentially functional and 
fair, if in need of reform and better resourcing. I have set out the cultural imaginaries, 
narratives and stories about crime, criminals, society and justice that recur across 
practitioners’ accounts, media texts and political rhetoric. These elements were not unique 
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or peculiar to 2011 but have a wider currency; together they work to authorise and 
normalise the criminal justice system, not just in exceptional moments like 2011, but in 
its everyday functioning. In particular, my analysis adds to critical work on the discourses 
of race, class and crime that legitimise criminal justice practices. I have shown how 
practitioners mobilised imaginations of crime, criminality, society and punishment that 
served to normalise and justify a criminal justice reaction that predominantly targeted 
marginalised and racialised individuals and communities. Taking the riots as a moment 
where underlying logic and language of criminal justice became shockingly visible, I argue 
that the thesis points to a broader set of discursive resources that procure consent for a 
racist and class-based system.  
The preceding chapters have highlighted four interlocking and overlapping elements of 
what, drawing on Jensen and Tyler (2015), I have called a cultural political economy of 
punishment: delimited, decontextualised and depoliticised conceptions of crime, racialised and classed 
imaginations of criminality, an imagined punitive public, and strategic ignorance of the harms of 
punishment. These elements – each characterised by ignorance and agnosis – are crucial in 
legitimising and underpinning punitive penal policy and minimal or regressive reform 
agendas. My analysis showed how omitting the historical and structural context of the 
riots allowed practitioners to ignore the racialised and classed patterns of marginalisation, 
exclusion and police violence that preceded them; how imaginations of  ‘typical’ criminals 
draw on and reify long-established cultural constructions of working-class and racialised 
people as inevitably or inherently criminal, and normalising their punishment; how a 
shared imagination of  the public similarly legitimises the classed and racialised violence 
of the criminal justice system by reinforcing traditionalist and exclusionary ideas of 
society, citizenship and the nation; and how technical and bureaucratic concerns about 
prison draw attention away from more pressing questions about their role in maintaining 
and reproducing profound economic, political and social inequalities.  
These findings point to a set of imaginations of crime, criminals, society and justice that 
are powerful in legitimating the criminal justice system more widely. These key 
imaginaries did not emerge from a vacuum in 2011; rather, the riots worked as a powerful 
‘ideological conductor’ (Hall et al., 2013 [1978]: 2) around which already-circulating ideas 
about crime, justice, citizenship and society coalesced, condensed and became clearly 
visible. Examining riot talk tells us not only about the discourses that legitimised the 
state’s harsh reaction against the rioters in 2011, but offers a lens onto the ‘technologies 
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of consent’ (Jensen and Tyler, 2015: 5) through which a punitive common-sense is crafted 
and sustained in the wake of the riots.  
Moreover, riot talk not only reflected and revealed the narratives and discourse that legitimise 
class and race-based punishment, but has also actively shaped this cultural political 
economy. In this way the thesis contributes to work that traces how contemporary 
anxieties about race, class and citizenship are constituted and reinforced through public 
conversations about crime, law and order (Hall et al., 2013 [1978]) and how urban unrest, 
in particular, remains a key site for the reproduction of cultural meanings that legitimise 
the discriminatory criminalisation and punishment of marginalised and racialised people 
(Camp, 2016; Gilroy, 2002). The dominant narratives that have coalesced around the 2011 
riots have fortified imaginations of riots as a threat to society; ‘reinforced common-sense 
associations between race, crime and chaos’ (Camp, 2016: 122); provided an important 
stage for the rehearsal and enactment of exclusionary and regressive ideas about the 
nation and belonging; and worked as a moment in which penal agnosis could be 
rearticulated. The riots, I argue, catalysed a set of stories and common-sense claims that 
have served to legitimise and exculpate the criminal justice system in the years since 2011.  
The thesis has demonstrated that these justificatory meanings are not fixed, stable or 
hegemonic, but rather are a site of constant contestation and negotiation. Practitioners 
did not uniformly or consistently justify or defend the criminal justice response to the 
riots, rather, some vehemently challenged and contested these narratives. My participants 
often grappled and negotiated with competing and contradictory narratives about crime 
and justice.  Meanings around crime, criminality, punishment and justice are always being 
reconfigured, variously reflecting and contradicting discourses at play in popular media 
and politics, as well as in professional and policy spheres. As my interviews make clear, 
this struggle is not just between, say, those who advocate unequivocally for harsh 
punishment and those who look to more progressive or radical alternatives to 
imprisonment. Rather, individuals working within the criminal justice apparatus 
constantly negotiate and balance competing and contradictory ideologies and meanings 
around their work; working through profound political and moral dilemmas to make 
sense of their own roles. My analysis provides a glimpse into how those at the heart of 
the criminal justice system make sense of their place within it and attempt to fix – if 
momentarily – an imagination of the world in which their work is both vitally important 
and morally sound, if somewhat flawed or compromised.  
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Conclusion: Justifying ‘justice’  
This thesis has examined how criminal justice professionals justified the vindictive, 
violent and starkly discriminatory penal response to the 2011 ‘riots’ and made sense of 
their own roles within it. Despite the state reacting to the unrest with extraordinary haste 
and shocking violence, for many of those I interviewed, they had ultimately ‘got it right’. 
I have traced how professionals at the heart of the criminal justice system justify and 
normalise its power and practices of punishment, rendering the remarkable entirely 
unremarkable and unquestionable; closing down critique in mainstream media and 
politics, and reaffirming a view of the system as beleaguered, benevolent and benign. 
What I have argued is that political and professional ‘riot talk’ tells us far more about the 
ideological and discursive processes by which the criminal justice system seeks and 
secures popular consent for its punitive practices than it does about the nature of the 
unrest or those who were involved in it. Paying close attention to practitioners’ riot talk, 
I have argued, affords important insight into the narratives and discursive mechanisms 
that allow professionals to continue to work within the system – as prosecutors, 
sentencers, defence lawyers, probation and youth offending managers and policy makers 
– and to maintain a sense of their work as just and justified. The stories that practitioners 
tell about the riots, the rioters, society and prisons are vitally important; offering a view 
onto the imaginations and assumptions that underpinned not only a striking moment of 
state violence, but an ongoing regime of racialised and classed-based criminalisation and 
punishment.  
This analysis offers an original perspective on how the criminal justice system sustains 
itself not only through managing its image in public and in political debate – though these 
spheres are vital – but also from within. The stories that policy makers, prosecutors and 
sentencers tell are connected to those we can trace through media representations and 
political rhetoric; but have their own distinctive outlines and features that warrant careful 
consideration. They are characterised by complexity, contradiction and dilemma that 
speaks to the political and moral weight of criminal justice work. The discursive 
mechanisms of self-justification and legitimation inside the criminal justice system 
illustrate how the system supports and reproduces itself from the inside.  
By focusing on those individuals who were responsible for designing and delivering the 
strikingly violent state response to the disturbances, I have sketched a set of shared 
imaginations about crime, criminality, society and penal practices that serve to normalise 
Conclusions 
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and naturalise the harms of the criminal justice system. I have situated these imaginations 
in a broader cultural and ideological moment and milieu, tracing how they replicate and 
reinforce cultural connections about race, class and nation forged in political and media 
debates; but also how they invert or modify these meanings. In doing so, the thesis makes 
a significant contribution to tracing the contours of a cultural political economy of 
punishment in the current conjuncture, highlighting the forms of ignorance and 
obfuscation that allow practitioners to justify ‘justice’ – justice that is no justice at all, but 
is discriminatory, starkly violent and disproportionate even by the system’s own 
standards. 
What is at stake in this analysis is not just an academic appraisal of the semantics of riot 
talk, but an appreciation of the political implications and potency of such statements. This 
thesis has argued that depoliticising and dehistoricising understandings of crime; 
racialising imaginations of criminality; distorting discourses about the public and denial 
about prisons are vitally important in maintaining the system as it is and resisting 
meaningful change. Building a critical awareness of the structures of meaning and 
strategies of agnosis that support and undergird the criminal justice system plays a small 
but significant part in the process of critiquing, challenging, undermining and ultimately 






Addley E, Vasagar J and Coleman J (2011) UK riots: in courtrooms across country, 
there was little room for leniency. The Guardian, 11 August. Available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/aug/11/uk-riots-courtrooms-country 
(accessed 16 December 2017). 
Aiello G and Pariante CM (2013) Citizen, interrupted: the 2011 English riots from a 
psychosocial perspective. Epidemiology and Psychiatric Sciences 22(1): 75–79. DOI: 
10.1017/S2045796012000364. 
Akram S (2014) Recognizing the 2011 United Kingdom riots as political protest: A 
theoretical framework based on agency, habitus and the preconscious. British 
Journal of Criminology 54(3): 375–392. DOI: 10.1093/bjc/azu013. 
Alam F (2012) Riots Reframed. Motion picture. VoiceOver Productions. 
Allen K and Taylor Y (2012) Placing parenting, locating unrest: Failed femininities, 
troubled mothers and riotous subjects. Studies in the Maternal 4(2): 1–25. 
DOI: http://doi.org/10.16995/sim.39. 
Alvesalo-Kuusi A and Whyte D (2017) Researching the powerful: A call for the 
reconstruction of research ethics. Sociological Research Online 23(1), 136–152. DOI: 
10.1177/1360780417747000. 
Amnesty International (2018) Trapped in the matrix: Secrecy, stigma, and bias in the Met’s gangs 
database. Available at: 
https://www.amnesty.org.uk/files/reports/Trapped%20in%20the%20Matrix%
20Amnesty%20report.pdf (accessed 29 January 2020). 
Amponsah G (2016) The Hard Stop. Motion picture. Ga Films.  
Angel H (2012) Governmental responses to the riots. Criminal Justice Matters 87(1): 24–
25. DOI: 10.1080/09627251.2012.671002. 
Annison H (2014) Interpreting the politics of the judiciary: The British senior judicial 
tradition and the pre-emptive turn in criminal justice. Journal of Law and Society 
41(3): 339–366. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6478.2014.00673.x. 
Ashforth BE and Kreiner GE (1999) ‘How can you do it?’: Dirty work and the 
challenge of constructing a positive identity. The Academy of Management Review 
24(3): 413–434. DOI: 10.2307/259134. 
Ashforth BE and Kreiner GE (2014) Dirty work and dirtier work: Differences in 
countering physical, social, and moral stigma. Management and Organization Review 
10(01): 81–108. DOI: 10.1111/more.12044. 
Atkinson DW, Roberts DS and Savage PM (eds) (2012) Class Inequality in Austerity 




Back L (2014) Police and thieves as a political proverb: Junior Murvin’s gift. In: Theory, 
Culture & Society. Available at: https://www.theoryculturesociety.org/les-back-
on-junior-murvin/ (accessed 26 June 2018). 
Back L and Solomos J (1995) Marxism, racism and ethnicity. American Behavioral Scientist 
38(3): 407–416. 
Bail Act (1976). Available at: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1976/63/contents 
(accessed 5 February 2019). 
Baird V (2011) Riots sentencing: A sinister attempt to upend the judicial process. The 
Guardian, 18 August. Available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/aug/18/riots-sentencing-
courts (accessed 16 December 2017). 
Baker SA (2011) The mediated crowd: New social media and new forms of rioting. 
Sociological Research Online 16(4): 195–204. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.5153/sro.2553 
Baldwin J (2008) Research on the criminal courts. In: Doing Research on Crime and Justice. 
Second edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 375–398. 
Ball J, Taylor M and Newburn T (2011) Who were the rioters? The Guardian, 5 
December. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/dec/05/who-
were-the-rioters (accessed 30 November 2018). 
Banakar R and Lort Phillips A (2014) Law, community and the 2011 London riots. In: 
Nobles R and Schiff D (eds) Law, Society and Community. Farnham: Ashgate, pp. 
169-186.  
Barkas B (2014) Framing the death of Mark Duggan. In: Institute of Race Relations. 
Available at: http://www.irr.org.uk/news/framing-the-death-of-mark-duggan/ 
(accessed 6 November 2018). 
Barker M and Beezer A (1983) The language of racism: An examination of Lord 
Scarman’s report on the Brixton riots. International Socialism 2(18): 108–125. 
Barker R (2001) Legitimating Identities: The Self-Presentations of Rulers and Subjects. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Barker R (2011) The riots and the Occupy movement are both protests against, and a 
rejection of, an economy that is no longer working for most ordinary citizens. 
In: LSE British Politics and Policy: The 2011 London Riots. Available at: 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/ (accessed 8 November 2016). 
Barry C (2020) ‘You can’t tell anyone how you really feel’: Exploring emotion 
management and performance among prison staff who have experienced the 
death of a prisoner. International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 61. DOI: 
10.1016/j.ijlcj.2019.100364. 
Barton A and Davis H (2018) Ignorance, Power and Harm: Agnotology and The Criminological 
Imagination. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. 
References 
 210 
Bateman T (2012) With the benefit of hindsight: The disturbances of August 2011 in 
historical context. In: Briggs D (ed.) The English Riots of 2011: A Summer of 
Discontent. Hook: Waterside Press, pp. 91–109. 
Baudains P, Johnson SD and Braithwaite AM (2013) Geographic patterns of diffusion 
in the 2011 London riots. Applied Geography 45: 211–219. DOI: 
10.1016/j.apgeog.2013.09.010. 
Bauman Z (2000a [1989]) Modernity and the Holocaust. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press. 
Bauman Z (2000b) Social uses of law and order. In: Garland D and Sparks R (eds) 
Criminology and Social Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 23–46. 
Bauman Z (2011) The London riots: On consumerism coming home to roost. In: Social 
Europe. Available at: http://www.socialeurope.eu/2011/08/the-london-riots-
on-consumerism-coming-home-to-roost/ (accessed 3 December 2015). 
Bawdon F and Bowcott O (2012) Chaos in the courts as justice system rushed to 
restore order. The Guardian, 3 July. Available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/jul/03/chaos-courts-justice-system 
(accessed 18 January 2018). 
Bawdon F and Wolfe-Robinson M (2012) Courtroom profiles: ‘I think the lives of all of 
us have changed’. The Guardian, 3 July. Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/jul/03/courtroom-profiles-reading-
the-riots (accessed 10 April 2017). 
BBC News (2014) Mother’s appeal to silent witnesses. 20 March. Available at: 
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-london-26673608 (accessed 12 June 
2020). 
BBC News (2019) Duggan family settle with Met over shooting. 10 October. Available 
at: https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-london-49997178 (accessed 10 
October 2019). 
BBC News (2011a) Jailed London rioters named by Met Police. 22 December. Available 
at: https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-london-16297723 (accessed 8 
August 2018). 
BBC News (2011b) Riot bin theft boy, 11, sentenced. 31 August. Available at: 
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-london-14732986 (accessed 22 
February 2019). 
Bell B, Jaitman L and Machin S (2014) Crime deterrence: Evidence from the London 
2011 riots. The Economic Journal 124(576): 480–506. DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12137. 
Benyon J (1984) Scarman and After: Essays Reflecting on Lord Scarman’s Report, the Riots and 
Their Aftermath. Oxford: Pergamon. 
Benyon J (1987a) Interpretations of civil disorder. In: Benyon J and Solomos J (eds) The 
Roots of Urban Unrest. Oxford: Pergamon, pp. 23–41. 
References 
 211 
Benyon J (1987b) Unrest and the political agenda. In: Benyon J and Solomos J (eds) The 
Roots of Urban Unrest. Oxford: Pergamon, pp. 165–179. 
Benyon J and Solomos J (1987a) British urban unrest in the 1980s. In: Benyon J and 
Solomos J (eds) The Roots of Urban Unrest. Oxford: Pergamon, pp. 3–21. 
Benyon J and Solomos J (eds) (1987b) The Roots of Urban Unrest. Oxford: Pergamon. 
Bhattacharyya G (2013) Regional narratives and post-racial fantasies in the English riots. 
Journal for Cultural Research 17(2): 183–197. DOI: 
10.1080/14797585.2012.756247. 
Billig M, Condor S, Edwards D, et al. (1988) Ideological Dilemmas. London: Sage. 
Binham C (2011) Judge criticises riot sentence ‘guidelines’. Financial Times, 27 
September. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/228ae5a4-e916-11e0-
9817-00144feab49a (accessed 22 February 2019). 
Bottoms A and Tankebe J (2013) ‘A voice within’: Power-holders’ perspectives on 
authority and legitimacy. In: Tankebe J and Liebling A (eds) Legitimacy and 
Criminal Justice. Oxford University Press, pp. 60–82. DOI: 
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198701996.003.0005. 
Bottoms AE and Tankebe J (2017) Police legitimacy and the authority of the state. In: 
du Bois-Pedain, A, Ulväng, M, and Asp P (eds) Criminal Law and the Authority of 
the State. Oxford and Portland, OR: Hart Publishing Limited. DOI: 
10.17863/CAM.7952. 
Bowcott O (2011a) Appeal court criticises judge’s approach to riot sentencing. The 
Guardian, 27 September. Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/sep/27/riot-judge-sentencing-
guidelines-criticised. 
Bowcott O (2011b) Magistrates were told to send rioters to crown court, emails show. 
The Guardian, 14 September. Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/sep/13/riots-sentencing-justice-
system-emails (accessed 22 February 2019). 
Bowcott O and Bates S (2011) Riots: magistrates advised to ‘disregard normal 
sentencing’. The Guardian, 15 August. Available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/aug/15/riots-magistrates-sentencing 
(accessed 9 August 2018). 
Bowling B and Phillips C (2002) Racism, Crime and Justice. Harlow: Longman. 
Box S (1983) Power, Crime, and Mystification. London and New York: Routledge. 
Boyle O and Stanley E (2017) Private prisons and the management of scandal. Crime, 
Media, Culture: DOI: 10.1177/1741659017736097. 




Bristow J (2013) Reporting the riots: Parenting culture and the problem of authority in 
media analysis of August 2011. Sociological Research Online 18(4): 11. 
Brotherton D and Hallsworth S (2011) Urban disorder and gangs: A critique and a warning. 
Runnymede Perspectives. The Runnymede Trust. Available at: 
https://www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/publications/pdfs/UrbanDisordera
ndGangs-2011.pdf (accessed 17 January 2019). 
Burgess J (1985) News from nowhere: The press, the riots and the myth of the inner 
city. In: Burgess J and Gold JR (eds) Geography, the Media & Popular Culture. 
London: Croom Helm, pp. 192–228. 
Burke L, Millings M, Taylor S, et al. (2020) Transforming rehabilitation, emotional 
labour and contract delivery: A case study of a voluntary sector provider in an 
English resettlement prison. International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 61. DOI: 
10.1016/j.ijlcj.2020.100387. 
Burns T (2011) Pseudoscience and the London Riots: Folk Psychology Run Amok. In: 
Scientific American Blog. Available at: https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-
blog/pseudoscience-and-the-london-riots-folk-psychology-run-amok/ (accessed 
3 November 2016). 
Cacho LM (2012) Social Death: Racialized Rightlessness and the Criminalization of the 
Unprotected. New York and London: NYU Press. 
Cameron D (2006) Speech to the Centre for Social Justice. Available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/5166498.stm (accessed 10 April 2019). 
Cameron D (2011a) London riots: Prime Minister’s statement in full. 9 August. 
Available at: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/8691034/London-riots-
Prime-Ministers-statement-in-full.html (accessed 21 September 2017). 
Cameron D (2011b) Speech on the fightback after the riots. 15 August. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-speech-on-the-fightback-
after-the-riots (accessed 10 January 2016). 
Cameron D (2011c) Troubled families speech. 15 December. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/troubled-families-speech (accessed 
24 April 2020). 
Cameron D (2011d) UK riots: text of David Cameron’s address to Commons. 11 
August. Available at: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/8695272/UK-riots-text-of-
David-Camerons-address-to-Commons.html (accessed 10 January 2016). 
Camp JT (2016) Incarcerating the Crisis: Freedom Struggles and the Rise of the Neoliberal State. 
Oakland, CA: University of California Press.  
Canning V (2018) Border (mis)management, ignorance and denial. In: Barton A and 
Davis H (eds) Ignorance, Power and Harm: Agnotology and The Criminological 
Imagination. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 139–162. 
References 
 213 
Carrabine E (2005) Prison riots, social order and the problem of legitimacy. The British 
Journal of Criminology 45(6): 896–913. DOI: 10.1093/bjc/azi052. 
Carter H and Bowcott O (2011) Riots: mother jailed for handling looted shorts freed on 
appeal. The Guardian, 19 August. Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/aug/19/riots-mother-looted-shorts-
freed (accessed 22 February 2019). 
Casey E (2013) ‘Urban safaris’: Looting, consumption and exclusion in London 2011. 
Sociological Research Online 18(4): 8. 
Castella T de (2011) Is the broom the symbol of resistance? BBC News, 10 August. 
Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-14475741 (accessed 1 
September 2019). 
Cattermole C (2019) Prison: A Survival Guide. London: Ebury. 
Cavalcanti R, Goldsmith C, Measor L, et al. (2012) Riotous connections? Criminal Justice 
Matters 87(1): 34–35. DOI: 10.1080/09627251.2012.671015. 
Channel 4 News (2011) More than 3,000 arrests following August’s riots. Available at: 
https://www.channel4.com/news/more-than-3-000-arrests-following-augusts-
riots (accessed 8 August 2018). 
Chase E and Walker R (2012) The co-construction of shame in the context of poverty: 
Beyond a threat to the social bond. Sociology 47(4): 739–754. DOI: 
10.1177/0038038512453796. 
Cheliotis L (2010) The ambivalent consequences of visibility: Crime and prisons in the 
mass media. Crime, Media, Culture 6(2): 169–184. DOI: 
10.1177/1741659010378629. 
Cheliotis L and Xenakis S (2016) The moral psychology of penal populism. In: Jacobs J 
and Jackson J (eds) Routledge Handbook of Criminal Justice Ethics. London: 
Routledge.  
Clarke B (2012a) Deconstructing the rioters: A case study of individuals convicted and 
sentenced in Greater Manchester. Safer Communities 11(1): 33–39. DOI: 
10.1108/17578041211200092. 
Clarke B (2012b) Profiling the ‘rioters’: Findings from Manchester. In: Briggs D (ed.) 
The English Riots of 2011: A Summer of Discontent. Hook: Waterside Press, pp. 279–
300. 
Clarke J (2010) Of crises and conjunctures: The problem of the present. Journal of 
Communication Inquiry 34(4): 337–354. 
Clarke J (2014) Conjunctures, crises, and cultures: Valuing Stuart Hall. Focaal 2014(70). 
DOI: 10.3167/fcl.2014.700109. 
Clement M (2014) Mobs versus markets: Bristol’s Tesco riot. In: Pritchard D and Pakes 
F (eds) Riot, Unrest and Protest on the Global Stage. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, pp. 33–51. 
References 
 214 
Clover J (2016) Riot. Strike. Riot: The New Era of Uprisings. London: Verso. 
Cohen S (1973) Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers. St. 
Albans: HarperCollins. 
Cohen S (2001) States of Denial: Knowing about Atrocities and Suffering. Cambridge: Polity 
Press. 
Cooper C (2012) Understanding the English “riots” of 2011: “Mindless criminality” or 
youth “mekin histri” in austerity Britain? Youth and Policy 109(6): 6. 
Cooper C and Nicholls A (2011) What caused England’s riots? The Guardian, 12 
October. Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/society/joepublic/2011/oct/12/what-caused-
england-riots (accessed 18 November 2016). 
Courts and Tribunals Judiciary (2018) Judicial participation in research projects. 
Available at: https://www.judiciary.uk/publications/judicial-participation-in-
research-projects/ (accessed 31 October 2019). 
Crewe B (2011) Soft power in prison: Implications for staff–prisoner relationships, 
liberty and legitimacy. European Journal of Criminology 8(6): 455–468. DOI: 
10.1177/1477370811413805. 
Crossley S (2016) ‘Realising the (troubled) family’, ‘crafting the neoliberal state’. Families, 
Relationships and Societies 5(2): 263–279. DOI: 
10.1332/204674315X14326465757666. 
Crossley S (2017) In Their Place: The Imagined Geographies of Poverty. London: Pluto Press. 
Crossley S (2018) Troublemakers: The Construction of ‘Troubled Families’ as a Social Problem. 
Bristol: Policy Press. 
Crown Prosecution Service (2011) Public Disorder - August 2011 Guidance for 
Prosecutors on Charging Public Order and other offences. Available at: 
https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/public-disorder-august-2011-guidance-
prosecutors-charging-public-order-and-other (accessed 9 August 2018). 
Crown Prosecution Service (2018a) About CPS. Available at: 
https://www.cps.gov.uk/about-cps (accessed 15 November 2018). 
Crown Prosecution Service (2018b) The Code for Crown Prosecutors. Available at: 
https://www.cps.gov.uk/publication/code-crown-prosecutors (accessed 10 
September 2019). 
Curtis P (2011) Riots: Metropolitan police planned to hold all suspects in custody. The 
Guardian, 22 August. Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/aug/22/riots-metropolitan-police-
suspects-custody (accessed 4 October 2018). 
Daily Mail (2011) ‘Turn looting children in to police,’ says mum who reported her own 




Olympic-ambassador-Chelsea-Ives-said-best-day-ever.html (accessed 1 
September 2019). 
Daily Mail Comment (2011) No excuses for this wanton criminality. Mail Online, 9 August. 
Available at: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2023967/London-
riots-No-excuses-wanton-criminality.html (accessed 29 April 2019). 
Darbyshire P (2011) Sitting in Judgment: The Working Lives of Judges. Oxford: Hart 
Publishing. 
Davis A (2003) Are Prisons Obsolete? New York: Seven Stories Press. 
De Benedictis S (2012) Feral parents: Austerity parenting under neoliberalism. Studies in 
the Maternal 4(2): 1–21. 
Dhaliwal S and Forkert K (2015) Deserving and undeserving migrants. Soundings 61(61): 
49–61. 
Dick P (2005) Dirty work designations: How police officers account for their use of 
coercive force. Human Relations 58(11): 1363–1390. DOI: 
10.1177/0018726705060242. 
Dodd V (2019) Mark Duggan shooting report challenged by human rights groups. The 
Guardian, 5 December. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2019/dec/05/mark-duggan-shooting-report-challenged-by-human-rights-
groups (accessed 15 April 2020). 
Dodd V and Taylor D (2012) Police apologise to Mark Duggan’s family for not telling 
them of his death. The Guardian, 29 February. Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/feb/29/police-apologise-mark-
duggan-death (accessed 7 November 2018). 
Douglas M (1986) How Institutions Think. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. 
Durodié B (2012) The changing nature of riots in the contemporary metropolis from 
ideology to identity: lessons from the recent UK riots. Journal of Risk Research 
15(4): 347–354. DOI: 10.1080/13669877.2011.643479. 
Dyer C (2001) Clare Dyer talks to six judges. The Guardian, 29 January. Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2001/jan/29/prisonsandprobation.clare
dyer (accessed 18 September 2018). 
Easton M (2011) The return of the underclass. BBC News, 11 August. Available at: 
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-14488486 (accessed 24 October 2019). 
Eddo-Lodge R (2011) Twitter didn’t fuel the Tottenham riot. The Guardian, 8 August. 
Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/aug/08/tottenham-riot-
twitter (accessed 18 November 2019). 
El-Enany N (2014) ‘Innocence charged with guilt’: The criminalisation of protest from 
Peterloo to Millbank. In: Pritchard D and Pakes F (eds) Riot, Unrest and Protest on 
the Global Stage. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 72–97.  
References 
 216 
Elliott-Cooper A (2011) The UK riots: Advertising as a form of violence. Ceasefire, 18 
September. 
Elliott-Cooper A (2016) The Dog-Whistle Racism of the Neoliberal State. Available at: 
https://roarmag.org/magazine/neoliberalism-dog-whistle-racism/ (accessed 10 
October 2017). 
Elliott-Cooper A, Boulay E du and Kilroy E (2014) Moral panic(s) in the 21st century. 
City 18(2): 160–166. DOI: 10.1080/13604813.2014.896649. 
Empson L (2018) Elite interviewing in professional organizations. Journal of Professions 
and Organization 5(1): 58–69. DOI: 10.1093/jpo/jox010. 
Evening Standard (2011) Remember you’re a #RiotWomble. Available at: 
http://www.standard.co.uk/news/remember-youre-a-riotwomble-
6431361.html (accessed 30 July 2019). 
EWCA Crim. 2312; [2012] 1 WLR 1126. (2011) R v Blackshaw and other appeals. Available 
at: https://lexisweb.co.uk/cases/2011/october/r-v-blackshaw-and-other-
appeals (accessed 10 August 2018). 
Fairclough N (2013) Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language. Abingdon: 
Routledge. 
Fanon F (2007 [1952]) Black Skin, White Masks. Revised edition. New York and 
Berkeley, CA: Grove Press. 
Ferrell J, Hayward K and Young J (2015) Cultural Criminology. Second edition. Los 
Angeles: Sage. 
Finchett-Maddock L (2012) Seeing red: Entropy, property, and resistance in the 
summer riots 2011. Law and Critique 23(3): 199–217. DOI: 10.1007/s10978-012-
9111-z. 
Fitzgibbon W, Curry D and Lea J (2013) Supervising rioters: The role of probation. The 
Howard Journal of Criminal Justice. DOI: 10.1111/hojo.12037. 
Ford Rojas J-P, Whitehead T and Kirkup J (2011) UK riots: magistrates told ‘ignore the 
rule book’ and lock up looters. 15 August. Available at: 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/8703370/UK-riots-
magistrates-told-ignore-the-rule-book-and-lock-up-looters.html (accessed 19 
October 2018). 
Freeman S and Moore-Bridger B (2011) I’ve been unfairly made a scapegoat for the 
violence says jailed Olympics girl. London Evening Standard, 23 November. 
Available at: https://www.standard.co.uk/olympics/olympic-news/ive-been-
unfairly-made-a-scapegoat-for-the-violence-says-jailed-olympics-girl-
6371186.html (accessed 1 September 2019). 
Gardiner N (2011) London riots: Britain may need to build more prisons in response to 




to-buildmore-prisons-in-response-to-this-brutal-mob-looting/ (accessed 8 May 
2013). 
Gilroy P (1982a) Police and thieves. In: Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies The 
Empire Strikes Back: Race and Racism in 70s Britain. London: Hutchinson, pp. 143–
181. 
Gilroy P (1982b) The myth of black criminality. The Socialist Register 19: 47–56. 
Gilroy P (2002) There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack: The Cultural Politics of Race and 
Nation. London: Routledge. 
Gilroy P (2004) After Empire: Melancholia or Convivial Culture? Abingdon: Routledge. 
Gilroy P (2006) Multiculture in times of war: an inaugural lecture given at the London 
School of Economics. Critical Quarterly 48(4): 27–45. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-
8705.2006.00731.x. 
Gilroy P (2013) 1981 and 2011: From social democratic to neoliberal rioting. South 
Atlantic Quarterly 112(3): 550–558. 
Gilroy P (2019) Never Again: Refusing race and salvaging the human. University of 
Bergen. Available at: https://www.newframe.com/long-read-refusing-race-and-
salvaging-the-human/ (accessed 27 March 2020). 
Gilson C (2011) Punitive reactions by ministers and the judiciary seek to deter future 
riots. But if such measures undermine the perceived fairness and legitimacy of 
the criminal justice system and worsen police-community relations, they could 
prove counter-productive. In: LSE British Politics and Policy: The 2011 London 
Riots. Available at: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/ (accessed 8 
November 2016). 
Goodhart D (2011) The riots, the rappers and the Anglo-Jamaican tragedy. Prospect, 17 
August. Available at: https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/riots-
goodhart (accessed 1 August 2019). 
Gorringe H and Rosie M (2011) King Mob: Perceptions, Prescriptions and 
Presumptions About the Policing of England’s Riots. Sociological Research Online 
16(4): 17. 
Gough J and Glenton J (2011) Darcus Howe’s timely insurrection. Counterfire, 9 August. 
Available at: http://www.counterfire.org/articles/163-resisting-austerity/14478-
darcus-howes-timely-insurrection (accessed 15 November 2016). 
Graeber D (2016) Despair fatigue: How hopelessness grew boring. The Baffler, 8 March. 
Available at: https://thebaffler.com/salvos/despair-fatigue-david-graeber 
(accessed 31 July 2017). 
Green D (2015) The re-humanization of the incarcerated Other: Bureaucracy, 
distantiation, and American mass incarceration. In: Eriksson (ed.) Punishing the 
Other: The Social Production of Immorality Revisited. London: Routledge, pp. 87–130. 
Green L (1990) The Authority of the State. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. 
References 
 218 
Gregg D (2010) Family intervention projects: a classic case of policy-based evidence. London: 
Centre for Crime and Justice Studies. 
Griffith JAG (1977) The Politics of the Judiciary. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Grover C (2011) Social protest in 2011: Material and cultural aspects of economic 
inequalities. Sociological Research Online 16(4): 18. 
Hall S (1987) British urban unrest in the 1980s. In: Benyon J and Solomos J (eds) The 
Roots of Urban Unrest. Oxford: Pergamon, pp. 45–50. 
Hall S and O’Shea A (2013) Common-sense neoliberalism. Soundings 55(55): 9–25. 
Hall S, Critcher C, Jefferson T, et al. (2013 [1978]) Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State and 
Law and Order. 35th Anniversary edition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Hammersley M (2014) On the ethics of interviewing for discourse analysis. Qualitative 
Research 14(5): 529–541. DOI: 10.1177/1468794113495039. 
Harvie D and Milburn K (2013) The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the 
Twenty-First Century. South Atlantic Quarterly 112(3): 559–567. DOI: 
10.1215/00382876-2146476. 
Hatherley O (2016) Keep Calm and Carry On – the sinister message behind the slogan 
that seduced the nation. The Guardian, 8 January. Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/jan/08/keep-calm-and-carry-on-
posters-austerity-ubiquity-sinister-implications (accessed 31 July 2019). 
Hayden C and Jenkins C (2014) ‘Troubled Families’ programme in England: ‘Wicked 
problems’ and policy-based evidence. Policy Studies 35(6): 631–649. DOI: 
10.1080/01442872.2014.971732. 
Himmelblau S (2011) #riotcleanup or #riotwhitewash? In: University For Strategic 
Optimism. Available at: 
https://universityforstrategicoptimism.wordpress.com/2011/08/10/riotcleanu
p-or-riotwhitewash/ (accessed 2 November 2016). 
Hinsliff G (2006) Cameron softens crime image in ‘hug a hoodie’ call. The Observer, 9 
July. Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2006/jul/09/conservatives.ukcrime 
(accessed 10 April 2019). 
Hirsh S and Swanson D (2020) Photojournalism and the Moss Side Riots of 1981: 
Narrowly selective transparency. History Workshop Journal 89: 221–245. 
HM Government (2011) Ending gang and youth violence: cross-government report. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ending-gang-and-youth-
violence-cross-government-report (accessed 20 November 2017). 
HMIC (2011) The Rules of Engagement: a review of the August 2011 disorders. Her Majesty’s 
Inspectorate of Constabulary. 
Home Affairs Committee (2011) Policing Large Scale Disorder: Lessons from the disturbances of 




08.htm (accessed 7 September 2017). 
Home Office (2011) An overview of recorded crimes and arrests resulting from disorder events in 
August 2011. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/an-
overview-of-recorded-crimes-and-arrests-resulting-from-disorder-events-in-
august-2011(accessed 6 August 2020) 
Hughes EC (1962) Good People and Dirty Work. Social Problems 10(1): 3–11. DOI: 
10.2307/799402. 
Humblet D (2020) Locking out emotions in locking up older prisoners? Emotional 
labour of Belgian prison officers and prison nurses. International Journal of Law, 
Crime and Justice 61. DOI: 10.1016/j.ijlcj.2020.100376. 
Ipsos MORI (2011) The strengths and skills of the Judiciary in the Magistrates’ Courts. Ministry 
of Justice Research Series 9/11, November. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-strengths-and-skills-of-the-
judiciary-in-the-magistrates-courts (accessed 19 February 2019). 
James M (2011) Behind the riots: what young people think about the 2011 summer 
unrest. The Guardian, 5 September. Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2011/sep/05/young-people-2011-
summer-unrest (accessed 8 May 2020). 
Jefferson T (2012) Policing the riots: from Bristol and Brixton to Tottenham, via 
Toxteth, Handsworth, etc. Criminal Justice Matters 87(1): 8–9. DOI: 
10.1080/09627251.2012.670995. 
Jensen T (2013) Riots, restraint and the new cultural politics of wanting. Sociological 
Research Online 18(4): 36–47. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5153/sro.3158 
Jensen T (2014a) Classic book: Policing the Crisis. Red Pepper, 1 February. Available at: 
https://www.redpepper.org.uk/classic-book-policing-the-crisis/ (accessed 16 
October 2019). 
Jensen T (2014b) Welfare commonsense, poverty porn and doxosophy. Sociological 
Research Online 19(3): 277–283. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5153/sro.3441 
Jensen T and Tyler I (2015) ‘Benefits broods’: The cultural and political crafting of anti-
welfare commonsense. Critical Social Policy: 35(4): 470–491. DOI: 
0261018315600835. 
Jessop B (2010) Cultural political economy and critical policy studies. Critical Policy 
Studies 3(3–4): 336–356. DOI: 10.1080/19460171003619741. 
Johnston MS and Kilty JM (2016) “It’s for their own good”: Techniques of 
neutralization and security guard violence against psychiatric patients. Punishment 
& Society 18(2): 177–197. DOI: 10.1177/1462474516635884. 
Jones H (2013) Negotiating Cohesion, Inequality and Change: Uncomfortable Positions in Local 
Government. Bristol: Policy Press. 
References 
 220 
Jones H, Gunaratnam Y, Bhattacharyya G, et al. (2017) Go Home? The Politics of 
Immigration Controversies. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Keith M (1993) Race, Riots and Policing: Lore and Disorder in a Multi-Racist Society. London: 
UCL Press. 
Kelsey D (2013) The myth of the “Blitz spirit” in British newspaper responses to the 
July 7th bombings. Social Semiotics 23(1): 83–99. DOI: 
10.1080/10350330.2012.707034. 
Kelsey D (2015) Defining the ‘sick society’: Discourses of class and morality in British 
right-wing newspapers during the 2011 England riots. Capital & Class 39(2): 
243–264. DOI: 10.1177/0309816815583393. 
Khan S (2011) Riots are not a genuine outlet of political angst. Evening Standard, 9 
August. Available at: http://www.standard.co.uk/news/riots-are-not-a-genuine-
outlet-of-political-angst-6431047.html (accessed 16 September 2019). 
Kreiner GE, Ashforth B and Sluss DM (2006) Identity dynamics in occupational dirty 
work: Integrating social identity and system justification perspectives. 
Organization Science 17(5): 619–636. DOI: 10.1287/orsc.1060.0208. 
Kvale S and Brinkmann S (2009) InterViews: Learning the Craft of Qualitative Research 
Interviewing. London: Sage. 
Lakhani N (2012a) Judge says riot sentences were fair. Available at: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/judge-says-riot-sentences-
were-fair-7855270.html (accessed 9 October 2018). 
Lakhani N (2012b) Night the row about riot sentencing was reignited. Available at: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/night-the-row-about-riot-
sentencing-was-reignited-7855273.html (accessed 12 April 2018). 
Lamble S (2013) The quiet dangers of civilized rage: Surveying the punitive aftermath of 
England’s 2011 riots. South Atlantic Quarterly 112(3): 577–585. DOI: 
10.1215/00382876-2146494. 
Lammy D (2017) The Lammy Review: An independent review into the treatment of, and outcomes 
for, Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic individuals in the Criminal Justice System. 8 
September. Available at: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads
/attachment_data/file/643001/lammy-review-final-report.pdf (accessed 28 
February 2020). 
Lancaster K (2017) Confidentiality, anonymity and power relations in elite interviewing: 
conducting qualitative policy research in a politicised domain. International Journal 
of Social Research Methodology 20(1): 93–103. DOI: 
10.1080/13645579.2015.1123555. 
Lea J (2011) Shock horror: Rioters cause riots! Criminals cause crime! British Society of 
Criminology Newsletter 69. 
References 
 221 
Lennie S-J, Crozier Sarah E and Sutton A (2020) Robocop - The depersonalisation of 
police officers and their emotions: A diary study of emotional labor and burnout 
in front line British police officers. International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 61. 
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijlcj.2019.100365. 
Lewis P (2011) Tottenham riots: a peaceful protest, then suddenly all hell broke loose. 
The Guardian, 7 August. Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/aug/07/tottenham-riots-peaceful-
protest (accessed 14 November 2018). 
Lewis P and Prasad R (2012) Policing the riots: fear, frustration – and a deep sense of 
pride. The Guardian, 1 July. Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/jul/01/policing-riots-fear-frustration-
pride (accessed 12 December 2016). 
Lewis P, Newburn T, Taylor M, et al. (2011) Reading the Riots: Investigating England’s 
summer of disorder. Available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/46297 (accessed 13 
October 2017). 
Liebling A (2011) Distinctions and distinctiveness in the work of prison officers: 
Legitimacy and authority revisited. European Journal of Criminology 8(6): 484–499. 
DOI: 10.1177/1477370811413807. 
Lightowlers C and Quirk H (2015) The 2011 English ‘riots’: Prosecutorial zeal and 
judicial abandon. British Journal of Criminology 55(1): 65–85. DOI: 
10.1093/bjc/azu081. 
Lightowlers CL (2015) Let’s get real about the ‘riots’: Exploring the relationship 
between deprivation and the English summer disturbances of 2011. Critical Social 
Policy 35(1): 89–109. DOI: 10.1177/0261018314545597. 
Lowe F (2013) The August 2011 riots: Them and us. Psychodynamic Practice 19(3): 279–
295. DOI: 10.1080/14753634.2013.807980. 
Mackenzie Davey K, Symon G and Stanley L (2014) Exploring media construction of 
investment banking as dirty work. Qualitative Research in Organizations and 
Management: An International Journal 9(3): 270–287. DOI: 10.1108/QROM-12-
2012-1119. 
Malik K (2020) The violence in Delhi is not a ‘riot’. It is targeted anti-Muslim brutality. 
The Guardian, 1 March. Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/mar/01/violence-in-
delhi-is-not-a-riot-it-is-targeted-anti-muslim-brutality (accessed 10 March 2020). 
Malvini Redden S and Scarduzio JA (2018) A different type of dirty work: Hidden taint, 
intersectionality, and emotion management in bureaucratic organizations. 
Communication Monographs 85(2): 224–244. DOI: 
10.1080/03637751.2017.1394580. 
Mason P (2006) Lies, distortion and what doesn’t work: Monitoring prison stories in the 
British media. Crime, Media, Culture 2(3): 251–267. 
References 
 222 
Massey DB and Hall S (2010) Interpreting the crisis. Soundings 44: 57–71. 
Mastracci SH and Adams IT (2020) It’s not depersonalization, It’s emotional labor: 
Examining surface acting and use-of-force with evidence from the US. 
International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 61. DOI: 10.1016/j.ijlcj.2019.100358. 
Mathiesen T (2004) Silently Silenced: Essays on the Creation of Acquiesence in Modern Society. 
Winchester: Waterside Press. 
Mathiesen T (2006) Prison on Trial. Third edition. Criminal policy series. Winchester: 
Waterside Press. 
Matthews R (2005) The myth of punitiveness. Theoretical Criminology 9(2): 175–201. DOI: 
10.1177/1362480605051639. 
May T (2011) Speech to the House of Commons. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/riots-theresa-mays-speech-on-11-
august-2011 (accessed 16 October 2018). 
McGoey L (ed.) (2016a) An Introduction to the Sociology of Ignorance: Essays on the Limits of 
Knowing. Abingdon: Routledge. 
McGoey L (2016b) Strategic unknowns: towards a sociology of ignorance. In: McGoey 
L (ed) An Introduction to the Sociology of Ignorance: Essays on the Limits of Knowing. 
Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 1–16. 
McGoey L (2019) The Unknowers. London: Zed Books. 
McIntyre LJ (1987) The Public Defender: The Practice of Law in the Shadows of Repute. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
McKee M and Raine R (2011) Riots on the streets. The BMJ 343: d5248–d5248. DOI: 
10.1136/bmj.d5248. 
Mckenzie L (2013) Fox-trotting the riot: Slow rioting in Britain’s inner city. Sociological 
Research Online 18(4): 10. 
McSmith A (2011) No Such Thing as Society: A History of Britain in the 1980s. London: 
Constable. 
Miles R and Brown M (2003) Racism. Second edition. London: Routledge. 
Miller D (2012) Expert Voices. In: Baker SE and Edwards R (eds) How Many Qualitative 
Interviews Is Enough. NCRM, p. 31. Available at: http://eprints.ncrm.ac.uk/2273/ 
(accessed 4 April 2018). 
Millington, G (2013) ‘Man dem link up’: London’s anti-riots and urban modernism. 
Sociological Research Online 17(4): 33-44. 
Mills C (1997) The Racial Contract. London and Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Ministry of Justice (2012a) Statistical bulletin on the public disorder of 6th to 9th 





Ministry of Justice (2012b) Swift and sure justice: the government’s plans for reform of the criminal 
justice system. July. London: Stationery Office. 
Ministry of Justice (2019) Judicial Salary Schedule October 2019. Available at: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads
/attachment_data/file/836749/judicial-salary-schedule-oct-2019.pdf (accessed 
12 June 2020). 
Ministry of Justice (2020) Tackling Racial Disparity in the Criminal Justice System: 2020 
Update. February. 
Moore C (2011) Riots: a Tory PM must always deliver peace and order - Telegraph. The 
Telegraph, 9 August. Available at: 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/8691353/Riots-a-
Tory-PM-must-always-deliver-peace-and-order.html (accessed 1 September 
2019). 
Moore JM (2014) Is the Empire coming home? In: Papers from the British Criminology 
Conference, 2014, pp. 31–48. Available at: 
http://www.britsoccrim.org/new/volume14/pbcc_2014_moore.pdf (accessed 
8 June 2016). 
Moxon D (2011) Consumer culture and the 2011 ‘riots’. Sociological Research Online 16(4): 
19. 
Mullan J (2001) A brief history of mob rule. The Guardian, 28 April. Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/education/2001/apr/28/artsandhumanities.hig
hereducation (accessed 2 March 2017). 
Murdock G (1984) Reporting the riots: images and impact. In: Benyon J (ed.) Scarman 
and After: Essays Reflecting on Lord Scarman’s Report, the Riots and Their Aftermath. 
Oxford: Pergamon, pp. 73–95. 
Murji K (2017) Racism, Policy and Politics. Bristol: Policy Press. 
Murji K and Neal S (2011) Riot: Race and politics in the 2011 disorders. Sociological 
Research Online 16(4): 24. 
Nader L (1972) Up the anthropologist: Perspectives gained from studying up. In: 
Hymes DH (ed.) Reinventing Anthropology. New York: Pantheon, pp. 284–311. 
Neal S and Mclaughlin E (2009) Researching up? Interviews, emotionality and policy-
making elites. Journal of Social Policy 38(4): 689–707. DOI: 
10.1017/S0047279409990018. 
Newburn T (2012) Disaster averted but questions remain over courts’ response to riots. 
The Guardian, 3 July. Available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/jul/03/questions-remain-court-
response-riots (accessed 3 July 2018). 
Newburn T (2015) The 2011 England riots in recent historical perspective. British 
Journal of Criminology 55(1): 39–64. DOI: 10.1093/bjc/azu074. 
References 
 224 
Newburn T, Cooper K, Deacon R, et al. (2015) Shopping for free? Looting, 
consumerism and the 2011 riots. British Journal of Criminology 55(5): 987–1004. 
DOI: 10.1093/bjc/azv007. 
Nisco MC (2016) Agency in the British Press: A Corpus-Based Discourse Analysis of the 2011 
UK Riots. Cambridge Scholars Publishing. 
Nygh T (2012) Riot from Wrong. Motion picture. Fully Focused. 
Ostrander SA (1995) “Surely you’re not in this just to be helpful”: Access, rapport, and 
interviews in three studies of elites. In: Studying Elites Using Qualitative Methods. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, pp. 133–150.  
Paton K, McCall V and Mooney G (2017) Place revisited: class, stigma and urban 
restructuring in the case of Glasgow’s Commonwealth Games. The Sociological 
Review 65(4): 578–594. DOI: 10.1111/1467-954X.12423. 
Peacock C (2014) Territorial stigma and regeneration in Tottenham. In: openDemocracy. 
Available at: http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/chloe-
peacock/territorial-stigma-and-regeneration-in-tottenham (accessed 18 April 
2017). 
Peacock C (2019) Curative, regenerating, redemptive and liberating? The systematic 
production of ignorance in Michael Gove’s rhetoric on prison reform at a time 
of crisis. Crime, Media, Culture 15(1): 89–105. 
Pemberton S, Fahmy E, Sutton E, et al. (2015) Navigating the stigmatised identities of 
poverty in austere times: Resisting and responding to narratives of personal 
failure. Critical Social Policy: DOI: 10.1177/0261018315601799. 
Phoenix Aisha and Phoenix Ann (2012) Racialisation, relationality and riots: 
Intersections and interpellations. Feminist Review 100(1): 52–71. 
Pickles E (2012) Statement on the response to the August 2011 riots. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/august-2011-riots (accessed 15 
May 2017). 
Pina-Sánchez J, Lightowlers C and Roberts J (2017) Exploring the punitive surge: 
Crown Court sentencing practices before and after the 2011 English riots. 
Criminology and Criminal Justice 17(3): 319–339. DOI: 
10.1177/1748895816671167. 
Platts-Fowler D (2013) ’Beyond the loot’ : social disorder and urban unrest. Papers from 
the British Criminology Conference 13: 17–32. 
Portelli A (1991) The Death of Luigi Trastulli, and Other Stories: Form and Meaning in Oral 
History. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. 
Prasad R and Owen P (2012) Police profiles: ‘there was nothing else to attack at this 
point apart from us’. The Guardian, 2 July. Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/jul/02/police-profiles-reading-the-
riots (accessed 18 October 2019). 
References 
 225 
Prison Reform Trust (2011a) Bromley Briefings Prison Factfile December 2011.  
Prison Reform Trust (2011b) Public want offenders to make amends. September. Available at: 
http://www.prisonreformtrust.org.uk/Portals/0/Documents/public%20want
%20offenders%20to%20make%20amends.pdf (accessed 16 May 2019). 
Prison Reform Trust (2016) Bromley Briefings Prison Factfile Autumn 2016. 
Prison watch (2019) May. The Howard League. Available at: 
https://howardleague.org/prisons-information/prison-watch/ (accessed 21 
May 2019). 
Proctor R and Schiebinger LL (2008) Agnotology: The Making and Unmaking of Ignorance. 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Proctor RN (1995) Cancer Wars: How Politics Shapes What We Know and Don’t Know About 
Cancer. New York: Basic Books. 
Puwar N (1997) Reflections on interviewing women MPs. Sociological Research Online 2(1).  
Rai SM (2015) Political performance: A framework for analysing democratic politics. 
Political Studies 63(5): 1179–1197. DOI: 10.1111/1467-9248.12154. 
Rayner S (2012) Uncomfortable knowledge: the social construction of ignorance in 
science and environmental policy discourses. Economy and Society 41(1): 107–125. 
DOI: 10.1080/03085147.2011.637335. 
Rayner S (2016) Uncomfortable knowledge: the social construction of ignorance in 
science and environmental policy discourses. In: McGoey L (ed) An Introduction 
to the Sociology of Ignorance: Essays on the Limits of Knowing. Abingdon: Routledge, 
pp. 107–125. 
Reicher S (2011) You can’t explain something when you don’t even know what it is. The 
Psychologist 24(10): 723–725. 
Reiner R (2012) In praise of fire brigade policing: Contra common sense conceptions of the police role. 
What if...? Series of challenging pamphlets. London: The Howard League for 
Penal Reform. 
Richardson JE (2006) Analysing Newspapers: An Approach from Critical Discourse Analysis. 
Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Riots Communities and Victims Panel (2012) After the riots. The final report of the Riots 
Communities and Victims Panel. Available at: 
https://www.salfordcvs.co.uk/sites/salfordcvs.co.uk/files/Riots-Panel-Final-
Report.pdf (accessed 9 May 2017). 
Roberts JV and Hough M (2013) Sentencing riot-related offending Where do the public 
stand? British Journal of Criminology: DOI: 10.1093/bjc/azs069. 
Rogers S (2012) Riots broken down: who was in court and what’s happened to them? 
The Guardian, 4 July. Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2012/jul/04/riot-defendants-
court-sentencing (accessed 12 December 2016). 
References 
 226 
Rudé G (1964) The Crowd in History: A Study of Popular Disturbances in France and England, 
1730-1848. New York: Wiley. 
Saha A (2018) Race and the Cultural Industries. Newark: Polity Press. 
Sasson T (1995) Crime Talk: How Citizens Construct a Social Problem. Hawthorne, NY: 
Aldine de Gruyter. 
Scheppele KL (1989) Foreword: Telling Stories. Michigan Law Review 87(8): 2073–2098. 
DOI: 10.2307/1289300. 
Scott D (2018) Penal agnosis and historical denial: Problematising ‘common sense’ 
understandings of prison officers and violence in prison. In: Barton A and 
Davis H (eds) Ignorance, Power and Harm: Agnotology and The Criminological 
Imagination. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 213–238. 
Shildrick T and MacDonald R (2013) Poverty talk: how people experiencing poverty 
deny their poverty and why they blame ‘the poor’. The Sociological Review 61(2): 
285–303. DOI: 10.1111/1467-954X.12018. 
Silvestri M (2013) Reflections on a ‘depressing inevitability’. Sociological Research Online 
18(4): 2. 
Sim J (2009) Punishment and Prisons: Power and the Carceral State. London and Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Sim J (2012) ‘Shock and Awe’: judicial responses to the riots. Criminal Justice Matters 
89(1): 26–27. DOI: 10.1080/09627251.2012.721974. 
Sim J (2018) We Are All (Neo) Liberals Now: Reform and the Prison Crisis in England 
and Wales. Justice, Power and Resistance 2(1): 165–188. 
Simpson A (2017) Neutralising deviance: The legitimation of harm and the culture of 
finance in the City of London. In: White H and Fletcher S (eds) Emerging Voices: 
Critical Social Research by European Group Postgraduate and Early Career Researchers. 
London: EG Press, pp. 215–224. 
Simpson R and Simpson A (2018) “Embodying” dirty work: A review of the literature. 
Sociology Compass 12(6). DOI: 10.1111/soc4.12581. 
Skeggs B (2011) Imagining personhood differently: person value and autonomist 
working-class value practices. The Sociological Review 59(3): 496–513. DOI: 
10.1111/j.1467-954X.2011.02018.x. 
Slater T (2008) A Literal Necessity to be Re-Placed’: A Rejoinder to the Gentrification 
Debate. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 32: 212–213. DOI: 
10.1111/j.1468-2427.2008.00781.x 
Slater T (2011) From ‘criminality’ to marginality: Rioting against a broken state. Human 
Geography 4: 106–115. DOI: 10.1177/194277861100400307 
Slater T (2014) The myth of “Broken Britain”: Welfare reform and the production of 
ignorance. Antipode 46(4): 948–969. DOI: 10.1111/anti.12002. 
References 
 227 
Slater T (2016a) Revanchism, stigma, and the production of ignorance: Housing 
struggles in austerity Britain. Research in Political Economy 31: 23–48. DOI: 
10.1108/S0161-723020160000031001. 
Slater T (2016b) The neoliberal state and the 2011 English riots: A class analysis. In: 
Mayer M, Thörn C, and Thörn H (eds) Urban Uprisings. London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, pp. 121–148.  
Smith E (2013) Once as history, twice as farce? The spectre of the summer of ‘81 in 
discourses on the August 2011 riots. Journal for Cultural Research 17(2): 124–143. 
DOI: 10.1080/14797585.2012.756243. 
Smith KE (2006) Problematising power relations in ‘elite’ interviews. Geoforum 37(4): 
643–653. DOI: 10.1016/j.geoforum.2005.11.002. 
Sokhi-Bulley B (2016) Re-reading the riots: Counter-conduct in London 2011. Global 
Society 30(2): 320–339. DOI: 10.1080/13600826.2016.1143348 
Solomos J (1988) Black Youth, Racism and the State: The Politics of Ideology and Policy. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Solomos J (2011) Race, Rumours and Riots: Past, Present and Future. Sociological Research 
Online 16(4): 20. 
Sosa K (2012) In the Public Interest: Reforming the Crown Prosecution Service. Policy Exchange. 
Available at: https://policyexchange.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/in-
the-public-interest.pdf. 
Sparks JR and Bottoms AE (1995) Legitimacy and order in prisons. The British Journal of 
Sociology 46(1): 45–62. DOI: 10.2307/591622. 
Stanley E and Mihaere R (2018) Managing Ignorance About Māori Imprisonment. In: 
Barton A and Davis H (eds) Ignorance, Power and Harm: Agnotology and The 
Criminological Imagination. Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 113–138.  
Stott C and Reicher S (2011) Mad Mobs and Englishmen?: Myths and Realities of the 2011 
Riots. London: Robinson. 
Stott C, Drury J and Reicher S (2019) London’s 2011 riots: report blames deprivation 
and poor policing – not mad, bad, dangerous people. In: The Conversation. 
Available at: http://theconversation.com/londons-2011-riots-report-blames-
deprivation-and-poor-policing-not-mad-bad-dangerous-people-111770 
(accessed 8 August 2019). 
Sullivan S and Tuana N (eds) (2007) Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance. Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press. 
Sumner C (2011) Riots, aggravated shopping and 30 years of opportunism. In: Crime 
Talk. Available at: 
http://www.crimetalk.org.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&i




Sykes GM and Matza D (1957) Techniques of neutralization: A theory of delinquency. 
American Sociological Review 22(6): 664–670. DOI: 10.2307/2089195. 
Tamm M (ed.) (2015) Afterlife of Events: Perspectives on Mnemohistory. Palgrave Macmillan 
Memory Studies. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Taylor M, Lewis P and Clifton H (2011) Why the riots stopped: fear, rain and a moving 
call for peace. The Guardian, 9 December. Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/dec/09/end-of-riots-reasons-rioters 
(accessed 18 February 2020). 
Taylor M, Adegoke Y and Hyde S (2012) ‘It was everything’: riot victims struggle to 
move on from what was lost. The Guardian, 2 July. Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/jul/02/riot-victims-struggle-move-on 
(accessed 18 October 2019). 
Taylor-Gooby P (2013) Why do people stigmatise the poor at a time of rapidly 
increasing inequality, and what can be done about it? The Political Quarterly 84(1): 
31–42. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-923X.2013.02435.x. 
The Centre for Social Justice (2012) Time to Wake Up: Tackling gangs one year after the riots. 
October. Available at: https://www.centreforsocialjustice.org.uk/library/time-
wake-tackling-gangs-one-year-riots (accessed 23 November 2017). 
The Guardian (2011) Charging and convicting rioters is not a simple matter. 11 August. 
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/law/2011/aug/11/charging-and-
convicting-rioters (accessed 9 October 2018). 
The Institute for Government (2020) COBR (COBRA). Available at: 
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainers/cobr-cobra (accessed 
12 June 2020). 
The Telegraph (2011a) Arab Spring: timeline of the African and Middle East rebellions. 21 
October. Available at: 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/88
39143/Arab-Spring-timeline-of-the-African-and-Middle-East-rebellions.html 
(accessed 15 November 2019). 
The Telegraph (2011b) Man killed in shooting incident involving police officer. 4 August. 
Available at: 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/8682655/Mark-Duggan-
killed-in-shooting-incident-involving-police-officer.html (accessed 17 September 
2019). 
Thompson EP (1971) The moral economy of the English crowd in the eighteenth 
century. Past & Present 50(1): 76–136. DOI: 10.1093/past/50.1.76. 
Tidmarsh M (2020) ‘The right kind of person for the job’? Emotional labour and 
organizational professionalism in probation. International Journal of Law, Crime and 
Justice 61. DOI: 10.1016/j.ijlcj.2019.100363. 
References 
 229 
Tonkin E, Pfeiffer HD and Tourte G (2012) Twitter, information sharing and the 
London riots? Bulletin of the American Society for Information Science and Technology 
38(2): 49–57. DOI: 10.1002/bult.2012.1720380212. 
Townsend M and Savage M (2018) Are prisons in England and Wales facing a 
meltdown? The Observer, 17 February. Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2018/feb/17/britain-prison-crisis-
facing-meltdown-gangs-drugs-violence (accessed 29 May 2019). 
Tracy S and Scott C (2007) Dirty work and discipline behind bars. In: Drew S, Mills M, 
and Gassaway B (eds) Dirty Work: The Social Construction of Taint. Waco, TX: 
Baylor University Press, pp. 33–53. 
Travis A (2011) England riots: will harsher sentences act as a deterrent? | Alan Travis. 
The Guardian, 17 August. Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/aug/17/england-riots-harsher-
sentences-deterrent (accessed 9 October 2018). 
Treadwell J, Briggs D, Winlow S, et al. (2013) Shopocalypse now: Consumer culture and 
the English riots of 2011. British Journal of Criminology 53(1): 1–17. DOI: 
10.1093/bjc/azs054. 
Trott B (2014) Research and the riots: Politics and England’s 2011 urban uprisings. In: 
CritCom. Available at: http://councilforeuropeanstudies.org/critcom/research-
and-the-riots-politics-and-englands-2011-urban-uprisings/ (accessed 14 
December 2016). 
Tyler I (2008) “Chav mum chav scum”: Class disgust in contemporary Britain. Feminist 
Media Studies 8(1): 17–34. DOI: 10.1080/14680770701824779. 
Tyler I (2013a) Revolting Subjects: Social Abjection and Resistance in Neoliberal Britain. London: 
Zed Books. 
Tyler I (2013b) The riots of the underclass?: Stigmatisation, mediation and the 
government of poverty and disadvantage in neoliberal Britain. Sociological Research 
Online 18(4): 6. DOI: 10.5153/sro.3157 
Tyler I (2015) Classificatory struggles: class, culture and inequality in neoliberal times. 
The Sociological Review 63(2): 493–511. DOI: 10.1111/1467-954X.12296. 
Tyler I and Slater T (2018) Rethinking the sociology of stigma. The Sociological Review 
66(4): 721–743. DOI: 10.1177/0038026118777425. 
Ugelvik T (2012) Prisoners and their victims: Techniques of neutralization, techniques 
of the self. Ethnography 13(3): 259–277. DOI: 10.1177/1466138111435447. 
Ugelvik T (2016) Techniques of legitimation: The narrative construction of legitimacy 
among immigration detention officers. Crime, Media, Culture 12(2): 215–232. 
DOI: 10.1177/1741659016648180. 
Valentine G (2002) People like us: negotiating sameness and difference in the research 
process. In: Moss P (ed.) Feminist Geography in Practice: Research and Methods. Oxford: 
Blackwell, pp. 116–26. 
References 
 230 
Valluvan S, Kapoor N and Kalra VS (2013) Critical Consumers Run Riot in 
Manchester. Journal for Cultural Research 17(2): 164–182. DOI: 
10.1080/14797585.2012.756245. 
Wacquant L (2008) Urban Outcasts: A Comparative Sociology of Advanced Marginality. 
Cambridge: Polity. 
Wacquant L (2010) Crafting the neoliberal state: Workfare, prisonfare, and social 
insecurity. Sociological Forum 25(2): 197–220. DOI: 10.1111/j.1573-
7861.2010.01173.x. 
Wacquant LJD (2009) Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity. 
Durham: Duke University Press. 
Walker R (2014) The Shame of Poverty. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Weber M (1991 [1948]) Politics as a vocation. In: Mills CW and Gerth HC (eds) From 
Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 77-128. 
Weber M (1968) Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. New York: 
Bedminster Press. 
Wells C and Quick O (2010) Lacey, Wells and Quick Reconstructing Criminal Law: Text and 
Materials. 4th edition. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Westaby C, Fowler A, Phillips J, et al. (2020) Conformity, conflict and negotiation in 
criminal justice work: Understanding practice through the lens of emotional 
labour. International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 61. DOI: 
10.1016/j.ijlcj.2020.100390. 
Westaby C, Fowler A and Phillips J (2020) Managing emotion in probation practice: 
Display rules, values and the performance of emotional labour. International 
Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 61. DOI: 10.1016/j.ijlcj.2019.100362. 
Whyte D (2000) Researching the powerful: towards a political economy of method? In: 
Doing Research on Crime and Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 419–
429. 
Williams P (2015) Criminalising the Other: challenging the race-gang nexus. Race & 
Class 56(3): 18–35. 56(3), 18–35. DOI: 10.1177/0306396814556221 
Williams P (2018) Being Matrixed: The (over)policing of gang suspects in London. August. 
StopWatch. 
Williams P and Clarke B (2018) The black criminal Other as an object of social control. 
Social Sciences 7(11): 234. DOI: 10.3390/socsci7110234. 
Williams Z (2011) The UK riots: the psychology of looting. The Guardian, 9 August. 
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/aug/09/uk-
riots-psychology-of-looting (accessed 1 March 2017). 
Winlow S and Hall S (2012) A predictably obedient riot: Postpolitics, consumer culture, 




Winlow S, Hall S, Briggs D, et al. (2015) Riots and Political Protest. Abingdon: Routledge. 
Winter A and Lumsden K (2014) Reflexivity in criminological research. In: Winter A 
and Lumsden K (eds) Reflexivity in Criminological Research: Experiences with the 
Powerful and the Powerless. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 1–20. 
Wodak R and Meyer M (2016) Critical discourse studies: History, agenda, theory and 
methodology. In: Wodak R and Meyer M (eds) Methods of Critical Discourse Studies. 
Third edition. London: Sage, pp. 1–22. 
www.gov.uk (2018) Population of England and Wales. Available at: 
https://www.ethnicity-facts-figures.service.gov.uk/uk-population-by-
ethnicity/national-and-regional-populations/population-of-england-and-
wales/latest (accessed 11 May 2020). 
Žižek S (2011) Shoplifters of the World Unite. London Review of Books, 19 August. 
Available at: http://www.lrb.co.uk/2011/08/19/slavoj-zizek/shoplifters-of-





Appendix 1: Overview of research participants 
Participant 
(pseudonyms) 
Role at time of riots in 2011 
Role at time of interview in 
2018 (if changed) 
Interview setting  
Lawrence Defence barrister, central London 
chambers  Café, central London 
Sadie Defence barrister, central London chambers  
Lecturer/researcher in Law, 
Central London university 
Interviewee’s university 
office, central London 
Roger Defence solicitor, East London law firm   Law firm office, East London 
Tanya Defence solicitor, North London law firm  Participant’s home office, North London 
Jenny  Defence solicitor, North London law firm  Café, South London 
Kofi Senior District Crown Prosecutor, Crown Prosecution Service  CPS offices, Westminster 
Amar Senior District Crown Prosecutor, Crown Prosecution Service 
Deputy Chief Crown Prosecutor, 
Crown Prosecution Service CPS offices, Westminster 
Jason Senior District Crown Prosecutor, Crown Prosecution Service  CPS offices, Westminster 
David  Magistrate  Retired Skype call 
Leonard District Judge Retired 
Deputy Chief Magistrates’ 
office, Westminster 
Magistrates’ Court 
Martin Senior civil servant (Prisons), Ministry of Justice  
Soon to leave civil service for 
role in private sector security 
firm 
Ministry of Justice offices, 
Westminster 
Adam Manager, adult probation service, London Head of Youth Offending Service, South London 
Local authority offices, 
South London 
Ashley Manager, Youth Offending Service, North London   
Local authority offices, 
North London 
Claire  Head of Youth and Community Services, North London local authority  










Tom (law firm 
project officer - not 
interviewed) - put in 
touch by mutual 
friend/colleague








barrister) - put in 




Service) - initiated 
contact via email 
Martin (Ministry of 
Justice) - put in touch 








Jacob (CPS staff 
member - not 
interviewed) - put in 











                                                                                                                                                                 
Rethinking the riots: Making sense of the criminal justice reaction to the 2011 
London riots 
Researcher: Chloe Peacock, Department of Sociology, Goldsmiths, University of London  
About the research project 
This research is being undertaken for a PhD thesis. The research aims to investigate the 2011 London 
‘riots’, how various organisations responded to them, and their long-term consequences. In 
particular, it aims to develop a better understanding of how the criminal justice system responded to 
the disturbances. While there has been a lot of good quality research into the underlying causes of 
the riots, there has been much less attention paid to what happened after the unrest. This research 
aims to explore how the police, courts, and communities reacted to the riots, and the long-term 
effects of these responses. I would like to include the insights and perspectives of a range of 
professionals who were involved in responding to the riots.  
The research is funded by a studentship from the ESRC (Economic and Social Research Council) and 
is supervised by Professor Les Back and Dr Emma Jackson at the Department of Sociology, 
Goldsmiths. If you have any concerns about the conduct of the research, please contact the 
department’s ethics officer, Professor Marsha Rosengarten (m.rosengarten@gold.ac.uk).  
Your participation 
 
• Informal interviews will last approximately 30-60 minutes, depending on your availability, and 
can be conducted at a time and location that is convenient to you. Interviews may be audio 
recorded, with your permission. 
• The research will feed into a PhD thesis that will be publicly available, and may also be published 
as academic articles, online blog posts, book chapters etc., and used in teaching materials. 
• The data provided will be confidential. All names and identifying information will be removed, unless 
otherwise requested and it will not be possible to identify you from the resulting thesis or other 
publications. 
• If you decide at any time during the research that you no longer wish to participate in this project, 
you can withdraw immediately without giving any reason.  
• There are no direct (e.g. financial) benefits to taking part. However, your time and expertise will 
contribute to a project that aims to understand how organisations and communities can better 
respond to events of unrest in the future.  
 
If you have any questions or would like more information, please contact: 










The Official Secrets Act 1989 came into force on 1 March 1990. The 1989 Act replaces 
section 2 of the Official Secrets Act 1911, under which it was a criminal offence to 
disclose any official information without lawful authority. Under the 1989 Act it is an 
offence to disclose information only in six specified categories and only if the 
disclosure is damaging to the national interest. 
 
The guide gives answers to basic questions about how the new law might affect you. It 
does not cover everything in the Act, but your Area Business Manager/Head of 
Division should be able to give to you more information and advice if you need it. 
 
Who is affected by the Act? 
 
The Act applies to: 
 
► Crown Servants, including: 
 
► Government Ministers 
 
► Civil Servants, including members of the diplomatic service 
 
► Members of the armed forces 
 
► The police 
 
► Government contractors, including anyone who is not a Crown Servant, but  
  who provides or is employed in the provision of goods or services for the  
  purpose of a Minster. 
 
► A small number of office holders and the members and staff of a small 
number of non-government organisations who are treated as Crown Servants 
for the purpose of the Act, including: 
 
  ► The UK Atomic Energy Authority 
 
  ► British Nuclear Fuels plc 
 
  ► Urenco Ltd 
 
  ► The National Audit Office and the Northern Ireland Audit Office 
 
  ► The Offices of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration  
   and the Northern Ireland Commissioner. 
 
► Members of the public and others who are not Crown Servants or  
government contractors but who have, or have had, official information in their 
possession. 
 
What is “official information” ? 
 
This means any information, document or an article, which a Crown Servant or 
government contractor has or had in his or her possession by virtue of his or her 
position as such. 
 










Appendix 5: CPS Declaration to be signed by non-civil servants 













DECLARATION TO BE SIGNED BY NON-CIVIL SERVANTS ON BEING 




I hereby confirm that I have read and understood the basic guide to 
the Official Secrets Act 1989 and have been advised of my obligations 
regarding the protection of official information as laid down in the 
1989 Act and the statutory provisions listed in Annex 1 to paragraph 





Name (Block Letters): CHLOE PEACOCK 
 
Area, Branch or HQ Division: …………………………………………………………. 
Signed:  
 











TO BE COMPLETED BY THE CPS: 
 
1. Researcher Name:  Chloe Peacock 
 
2. Sponsor Organisation: Goldsmiths, University of London 
 
3. Purpose For Which Access is Granted: In pursuance of ‘Rethinking the Riots’ 
which aims to aims to investigate the 2011 London ‘riots’, how various organisations 
responded to them, and their long-term consequences. In particular, it aims to 
develop a better understanding of how the criminal justice system responded to the 
disturbances. 
• Access is granted to interview 3 prosecutors in London 
• Access is granted until the end of 31/10/18 
 
TO BE COMPLETED BY THE RESEARCHER: 
 
4. Conditions of Access 
 
 Permission to interview/question CPS personnel has been granted solely for the 
purpose of the research project referred to at paragraph 3 above.  I agree that: 
 
(i) only the information required for the purposes of my research may be 
examined and recorded. The data may not be used in any way which will 
enable any individual on whom data is collected to be identified; 
 
(ii) consent must be obtained from the interviewee before proceeding to record an 
interview; 
 
(iii) any recording or transcript of interviews that are in my possession may only be 
used for the purposes of the research and will remain the property of the CPS; 
 
(iv) no unpublished information contained in recordings or transcripts of interviews 
may be quoted or disseminated to individuals outside the Service without the 
prior approval of CPS Headquarters; 
 
(v) any book, article, broadcast or lecture based upon the research findings and 
incorporating information derived from the interviews for which permission has 
been granted will be submitted to the CPS prior to any publication for 
comment.  The CPS retains the right to edit or otherwise restrict publication of 
any such information.  A thesis made available for public inspection shall be 
deemed a publication; 
 
(vi) a copy of any final publication will be forwarded to the CPS; 
 
(vii) I will comply with all the requirements of the Data Protection Act 1998 and am 
fully aware that non-compliance of the Act may result in a criminal offence. 
 
(viii) I hereby confirm that I am fully aware of my continuing obligations regarding 
the protection of official information as laid down in the Official Secrets Act 
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